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ABSTRACT
Unlike Cyrenaica, where educational development under the B.M.A. was modelled upon the 
system operating in Egypt, that adopted in Tripolitania at the start of the British Administration 
in 1943 had no such correlation. Instead the former Italo-Arab Schools merely continued with 
the Arabic Language replacing Italian without the support of modem textbooks, cuiriculum or 
examinations.
Also unlike Cyrenaica, where the British Government assured the population that there 
would be no return of Italian rule, Tripolitania continued until the mid-forties under the 
expectation that Italian sovereignty might be returned to the territory. Consequently, the
B.M.A. was unable to adopt a similar pattern of educational development for Tripolitania until 
the future of the territory was clear.
The final adoption of the Egyptian Curriculum in 1948 came too late to effectively enable 
the educational system operating in Egypt to be put into practice in the territory before 
Independence in 1951. Nonetheless, despite political uncertainty, inadequate resources of 
money and teachers, the B.M.A., in Tripolitania was able to make significant progress 
between 1943 and 1951 in reversing the neglect of Arab education which it had inherited from 
the former Italian regime.
In the latter respect, it more than fulfilled the requirements made of it by International Law, 
despite the severe budgetary restraints imposed by the policy of Care and Maintenance, which 
restricted its role in education as in other areas of activity.
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"We have arrived at a milestone in the war.
We can say: one continent redeemed !"
(Sir Winston Churchill in his speech to the United States 
Congress at the close of the North African Campaigns.)
"The greatest need of the country was for educational 
development. Even in the early days the B.M.A. had 
endeavoured to supply this."
(P.G.Sandison. Unpublished Memoirs.)
"A very cogent fact to remember, too, is that while there 
are only a few hundred individuals at the university level, 
there must be nearly 300,000 at the primary stage of 
Libyan education."
(W.F.Vietmeyer, Primary Teacher Training, July 1965 -15 November, 1969)
"The trouble with history is it's like a mole - it burrows 
away month after month and year after year without anyone ever 
noticing very much."
(Russian Dissident, circa 1984.
"The Libyan Arab People have endured harsh sufferings from the 
reactionist, ideological domination, Eastern and Western invasion 
and infiltration."
(Ministry of Information and Culture, Tripoli, L.A.R.,
1st September Revolution Achievements, 5th Anniversary, 1969 - 1974, The Cultural Aspect: 
Cultural Revolution, p. 13.
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O.L. - Ordinamento legislative della Libia, Ministero delle Colonie, 1914 
P.C.M. - Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri 
Stralc. - Stralcio (cuttings)
R.D. - Regio Decreto (Royal Decree)
G.H.Q. - General Headquarters 
S.C.A.O. - Senior Civil Affairs Officer
D.C.C.A.O. - Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer
D. of E. - Director of Education
C.C.A. - Chief Civil Affairs Officer.
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Chapter One
Establishment and Consolidation of British Military Rule in Tripolitania and 
the Resolving of the Libyan Independence Question
1. Chief Civil Affairs Officer and the Organising of Civil Affairs Branch G.H.Q.
While immense care and attention went into the planning and military assault upon Mussolini's 
African Empire, almost no thought at all was paid to the question of how such territories were 
to be governed, once the Duce's yoke had been cast off. Moreover, even less attention had 
been focused upon the ultimate fate of the Italian territories, whether as colonial appendages of 
Italy still, or as some-day independent states in their own right. The latter solution had already 
been agreed in the case of Ethiopia before the War had commenced, but nothing had been 
determined as far as the political future of Libya was concerned.
At the start of the war, attention was concentrated rather upon how territories were to be 
governed as they came under Allied domination. The military leaders were largely 
unconcerned about the second issue - the ultimate fate of the Italian colonies, once the war was 
won - which was seen as a political matter of concern only to civil governments. The former 
question was viewed as a system of semi-independent units, vaguely referred to as the "British 
Administration".
Unfortunately, very little was known of military administrations that could still be 
considered relevant in 1941 since all the known information was dated and of little practical 
use. Lack of relevant hindsight could be said to be the main problem facing Sir Phillip 
Mitchell in 1941 when he was instructed by the Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces, Lord 
Wavell, to take over the direction and control of the then Italian Empire. This had surprisingly 
fallen to the Allies in less than a year.
Essentially Mitchell's task lay in establishing at Cairo or Nairobi, as circumstances might 
dictate, an intermediary-type organisation, primarily to liaise with the government, Civil 
Service, Army and the various sections of the British Military Administration itself. As such, 
Mitchell's Cairo Political branch exercised a sort of quasi-control even though primarily 
designed as an information-passing body rather than as an independent controlling entity.
In addition to this communicatory and supervisory role, Political Branch G.H.Q. was also 
required to evolve policies for the individual B.M.A.s under its control. The task of 
implementing the policies, however, was largely left to the administrations themselves, even 
though Cairo was still theoretically in charge of their affairs. This is an important point when I 
come to educational matters as it implies that, while policy was formulated or at least 
determined in Cairo or London, its implementation was left to the individual B.M.A.s
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themselves. This probably goes a considerable way in explaining why educational policies 
pursued in Bengasi were decisively different in both aim and content from those followed up 
in Tripoli and why neither territory ever liaised on the matter.
Finally, Mitchell's Cairo body was entrusted with both the creation of future 
administrations in Cairo and the setting up of them, once the territories for which they were 
destined had been effectively cleared of enemy troops. Thus Mitchell’s role was both 
theoretical as well as practical since not only did he have to be kept well-posted with ideas, 
decisions and policies of both a military and civil complexion, but he was also responsible for 
ensuring that they were carried out in the territories concerned, once the B.M.A.S were 
formed.
Gradually, however, the needs of day-to-day administration would require that all 
information of relevance to the central government in London be collated in the form of an 
annual report to be produced in the individual territories themselves, before being passed on by 
Mitchell to the Government in London. To deal with this aspect of Political Branch's work, a 
special body known as Military Operations (M .0.11) was created by the War Cabinet.
By following these procedures, administrative direction and control of all "Occupied Enemy 
Territory" in Africa was effected at the highest levels of both army and government command 
structure. Mitchell's own status was determined by his title as Chief Government Affairs 
Officer, Middle East Command. This assumed that his position and function, though 
essentially of a non-military nature, was still integral to the full functioning of the military 
machine. Yet in all matters, it was clearly understood that administrative requirements must 
always be subordinate to military priorities. Hence, all personnel in the B.M.A. were required 
to be fully combative, if so required by the military command, and the B.M.A.S themselves 
would initially at least be fully supported by the military machine upon which they to a large 
extent depended for their daily requirements.
Throughout the virtual ten-year span of their existence, the B.M.A.S were kept informed 
by Mitchell, via the Deputy Chief Administrators, of all government and other decisions 
affecting their day-to-day existence. Such matters would range from impending visits by 
royalty and other dignitaries, to changes in policy or other important busines that might be 
determined in London. All this responsibility and control required continuous support from a 
bureaucracy specially created by Mitchell to cope with the mass of administrative detail 
destined for either the London government or the administrative systems operating in the 
various conquered territories themselves.
Mitchell's bureaucracy developed rapidly in Cairo with offices springing up to deal with a 
multitude of related administrative functions such as law, police accounts, to name but a few, 
in almost exact replication of the administrative functions of the individual B.M.A.S.
Personnel to man this additional bureaucracy were recruited primarily from the services or
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colonial service as such - especially for the higher appointments, such as Mitchell himself, 
who had been a former High Commissioner.
The delay in obtaining government approval for Mitchell's umbrella administration, which 
was not rubber stamped until the end of September 1941, resulted in many last minute 
appointments as the need to create B.M.A.S almost in exile increased with the imminence of 
actual conquest itself. To cope with these pressures, Political Branch's umbrella organisation 
consisted in the main of four departments headed by a Controller of Finances, Controller of 
Medical and Social Services, a legal Advisor and a G.S.O.I. in charge of the overall running 
of the secretariat.
The full system, which envisaged the provision of almost exact replicas of the B.M.A.S 
when they were eventually set up between 1942 and 1943 was never in fact implemented, due 
to the difficulty in recruiting or retaining the relevant personnel. This resulted in the merging 
of the work of the Medical and Services Departments with that of Finances and Accounts. All 
matters of a political nature, however, were handled by Mitchell himself, who also took all 
administrative decisions relating to the appointment of higher grades or affecting the running of 
Political Branch itself.
Political Branch in Cairo was also responsible for policy and planning but as it did not 
contain an educational office it could not have devised policies as such for either Tripolitania or 
Cyrenaica. It would, however, have conferred approval itself on matters, such as the adoption 
or non-adoption of the Egyptian curriculum, which step was full of political overtones and 
implications for Libya and the British role there.
Basically, however, Mitchell's role was that of implementer rather than originator, Field 
Marshall Wavell having already decided the aim, scope and model of the B.M.A.S under his 
control before Mitchell's appointment as Chief Civil Affairs Officer. Mitchell, however, was a 
man not without ideas of his own, tending to view the various B.M.A.S with the eyes of a 
former colonial officer. As such he often saw them as individual colonial governments being 
directly responsible to a centrally based High Commission which was, of course, Cairo 
Political Branch. Moreover, as education was such a grey area, it cannot be discounted that 
Mitchell himself was directly involved in determining its shape and orientation in Libya itself. 
Approval, for example, for the employment of Egyptian teachers, especially in Tripolitania 
would have come through his office, and he must also have had a clear understanding of the 
political ferment at that time affecting much educational activity in Egypt too with its possible 
implications for Libya under the B.M.A.S and even after.
The main question facing both Wavell and Mitchell to some extent too was what model to 
base the future government of ex-Italian Africa upon? According to Rennell of Rhodd, "as 
soon as the prospect of Cyrenaica falling into our hands was revealed to General Wavell, his 
mind had turned to Palestine and Syria in 1918-1919. The administration of these areas, 
including the Transjordan together with Iraq (or Mesopotamia as it was then called) and
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Tanganyika, provided indeed the only modern experience of military government of occupied 
enemy territories” (1)
So, the models anticipated by Wavell for North and East Africa following the Italian and 
German defeats would be solely based upon an imperfectly perceived historical 
precedent.This, however, was not just a case of history repeating itself, as might be first 
supposed, as the earlier models in Africa and the Middle East had not simply accorded with 
International Law, but had indeed emanated from i t  Thus the anticipated models of diplomatic 
art and bureaucratic skill were as much legal as historical ideas, albeit interpreted in the light of 
British military and colonial experience, rather than of any other individual power, such as 
France.
Moreover, the proposed administrations were to be conducted in the name of and under the 
authority of the Army Commander and in accordance with the law as set out in the Hague 
Convention of 1907. (2) A further reason, other than that of mere convenience, became also 
apparent at this point, since obedience to the Hague Rules in 1914 implied of necessity, 
administration by those laws in existence at the start of the occupation, except where the Army 
Commander thought otherwise. "By extension," Rhodd adds, "since military governments are 
not designed or intended to administer a country on much more than a care and maintenance 
basis, consistent with the needs of an occupying power. (3)
In this respect, Britain was particularly anxious to avoid being seen as adding to her 
Empire by assuming a further colonial role which she certainly did not want vis-a-vis the 
former Italian colonies, whether in Libya or anywhere else in North Africa at this time. 
Whether Britain wanted to establish a zone of influence in Libya to offset an anticipated decline 
of influence in Egypt is another question beyond the scope of this thesis. It was however 
repeatedly announced right at the beginning of the B.M.A.S - and throughout their longer than 
anticipated existence - that the regimes replacing the former colonial governments were 
temporary and solely designed to give way to civil administrations, as soon as circumstances 
permitted. The nature of "civil administrations" was similarly referred to in the vaguest of 
terms, the bottom line being that it was not the responsibility of the B.M.A. to deliberate upon 
such matters, being rather that of other authorities, whoever they may be.
1 Lord Rennel of Rhodd K.B.E.,C.B., British Military Administration o f Occupied Territories 
in Africa During the Years 1941 -1947, London, 1948, H.M.S.O., p.23.
3 Ibid., p. 10.
3 Ibid., p.21.
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II. Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer and the Organisation of Military 
Government in Occupied Territories.
As with the Chief Civil Affairs Officer and his administration in Cairo, so with the various 
deputies in the territorial entities about to be set up, the blue-print of historical precedent was to 
be closely adhered to, albeit as interpreted by Field Marshall Wavell. It was understood 
therefore that occupied enemy territory would be divided up into provinces and finally 
subdivided into districts and even subdistricts. A senior civil affairs officer (S.C.A.O.), 
usually with the rank of Lieut. Colonel, would normally be placed in charge of a province and 
be responsible for its administration on a day-to day basis. This pragmatic arrangement, 
however, did not depart from the general principle of overall control as far as the "general 
directions on policy" were concerned by the higher authority. W
In the latter respect, the D.C.C. A.O. had to assist him on his staff a number of technical 
officers adept in the fields of finance, law, medicine, police and the like. Each of these had 
special departmental officers undertaking duties in their respective spheres in the various 
territories comprising the B.M.A.
There does not, however, appear to have been an office dealing with educational matters or 
any identifiable individual with such responsibilities. Instead, responsibility for education was 
an entirely local matter devolving via the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer for the territory 
concerned to the Director of Education appointed by him. This did not of course eliminate 
entirely responsibility or involvement in education by Political Branch G.H.Q. which 
continued overall control of the operations of all the B.M.A.S as before - at least in theory.
The individual Director of Education, like the individual Director of Medical and Veterinary 
Services or Finance and Accounts, for example, was therefore more-or-less entirely 
responsible for the running and affairs of his department to the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs 
Officer of the territory and no other person. In the case of Tripolitania, therefore, the Director 
of Education, Major A.J. Steele-Greig, was directly responsible for his actions to the
D.C.C.O. of the territory, initially Brigadier Maurice Lush, by whom he was first appointed 
and, following Lush's vacation of the office, by his successor, Brigadier Travers Blackley. 
Finally, the D.GA.O.'s secretary would normally be a senior staff officer (S.S.O.I).
Despite the existence of this tidy hierarchical pyramid, stretching as it did from the 
technical personnel in the field to the C. in C. himself, it was understood that the problems 
being dealt with were essentially those of a "colonial type government." (5) At the earliest 
stages, a "mixed regime" had been considered, owing "allegiance" to both the War Office and
4 I bid., see Appendix II: Notes on the Military Government o f Occupied Enemy Territory
IV Organisation of Military Government, pp.565 - 566.
5 Ibid., p.24.
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the Colonial Office. This had however been ruled out for financial reasons. Instead, a purely 
military-type of organisation was favoured in which the personnel were "commissioned in
H.M. Forces with Mitchell being given the rank of Major G en era l" .^ )
This so-called military machine was very different from its Italian predecessor, though that 
too was controlled from the centre, and to a far greater degree than the B.M.A.S. The latter 
was more professional and bureaucratic in spirit and nature, producing endless reports for the 
benefit of the authorities in Rome, which were for the most part either destroyed or buried 
without trace by post-war Italian governments, leaving only the most innocuous for the 
historians to browse through in the state archives.
The system devised by Mitchell for Wavell was never in any absolute sense a "military 
machine", the personnel being military only in name, even if in theory liable to be called upon 
to perform military duties, were not in any real sense soldiers. Neither were they "colonial 
officers" as such, though Mitchell came to his post with a colonial background, having been 
the erstwhile Governor General of Uganda. Yet despite such discrepancies the B.M.A.s 
"more resembled colonial governments" than any other kind of government, except perhaps 
"for the existence of two political branches", requiring that "administrative matters would have 
to be referred by a colonial governor to the Colonial Office". Instead, under the B.M.A., 
administrative matters were under the nominal control of the C.in C. (?)
I. Establishing M ilitary Government (1943 - 1946).
Inherent in any set of military ideas must be the notion of a planned operation: the 
establishment of the B.M.A.s during the years 1941 - 1943 in the former Italian Colonies well 
illustrates this maxim. The general programme of the planned operation had been laid out as 
succinctly as possible in "Notes on the Military Government of Occupied Enemy Territory" (8) 
which was issued to all officers involved in the operation. It would be helpful therefore, while 
elaborating the essential "three phases" of this operation, to adhere to the plan implicit in this 
document. The following is a short paraphrase of the essential steps involved in each phase, 
followed by a rough description of events so prescribed.
1. First Phase: the Embryo State.
During Phase One of the Military Government's existence, government for official purposes is 
only regarded as being "in embryo state" as the "State of war" itself still obtains in the territory 
about to be occupied. At this stage, personnel are attached to Army H.Q. for the purpose of 
advising the military commanders on all matters concerning the regulation of the civil 
population. They had the task of ensuring that the civil population did not attempt to interfere
6 Ibid., p.25.
7 Op. Cit., p.295.
8 Ibid., p.559 - 583.
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with the military operation and that the resources of the country were turned to the benefit of 
the invading army. In this way, they were to act for and in the name of the C. in C. to whose 
army they were attached.
As the army penetrated into enemy territory, civil affairs officers were to be detached from 
the military H.Q. and released into back areas so as to take charge of the embryo military 
government. During Phase One, the D.C.C.A.O. was to remain attached to the H.Q. of the 
commander of the whole operation. He was only to move forward with the C. in C., hence 
the whole personnel for the future B.M.A.S of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, including the 
Director of Education, Major A.J. Streele-Greig, though he was only an infantry officer at the 
time, arrived in their respective territories in Montgomery's van. The duties of the D.C.C.A. 
were carefully laid down and designed to meet all of the requirements of his position, from the 
drafting of necessary proclamations, and the setting up of military courts to both 
communicating with the C.C. A.O. in Cairo and the officers and men comprising the new 
"embryo state". (9)
*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *
In historical terms, the establishment of military government first in Cyrenaica and then in 
Tripolitania was by no means as effortless as this prescription of official duties for the 
operation might seem to imply. On the contrary, the setting up of the B.M.A.s in Libya was 
greatly complicated by the military situation during which the British Army advanced three 
times before being finally victorious. In this process, it had withdrawn twice, so necessitating 
in Cyrenaica three attempts at setting up an Administration and one in Tripolitania.
The institution of the first B.M.A. in Cyrenaica derived from the impetus of Wavell's rapid 
advance in December 1940 into Libya's eastern province of Cyrenaica. Little attention had 
been given, however, to the establishment of an administration there apart from the gathering 
together at Maadi on the Egyptian Delta of a nucleus of personnel earmarked for such a 
purpose. The sudden fall of Benghazi early in the February of 1941 led Brigadier Longrigg to 
commence setting up his administration in the former Italian capital of the eastern provinces. 
Unfortunately, during its brief existence, Longrigg's small staff was too preoccupied with the 
restoration of law and order to be able to exercise any of its prerogatives and before very long 
abandoned the operation and joined Wavell's retreating army in April 1941.
The interim between the first and second occupation of Benghazi was occupied by the 
drawing up of preliminary arrangements in Cairo for a further institution of military
9 Op. Cit., Appendix II, Section IV, Organisation o f Military Government, p.564 - 9.
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government in Cyrenaica. Having been designated Chief Administrator for a second time on 
14th October, 1941, Longrigg began in this capacity to build around him a further nucleus of 
personnel for a future skeleton administration of the province.
Thus when Benghazi fell for a second time into British hands during Auchinleck's advance 
of December 24th 1941, administrative personnel were at least available under Longrigg to set 
up a second military government in Libya’s eastern province. At this point, however, the 
military situation was still extremely precarious for the British and Longrigg was still unable to 
begin any effective start to the administration of the scattered province. Indeed after barely a 
month, the British forces were again obliged to withdraw to Cairo as the Germans launched a 
successful counter-attack on 2nd February 1942. *00)
Between February 1942 and the third and final establishment of Longrigg's administration 
in Benghazi on 11th November 1942, B.M.A. Cyrenaica was given was given the task of 
taking care of the refugees fleeing into Egypt from the now completely devastated Eastern 
Province. Combined with this function was the important task of reorganising the Cyrenaican 
Police Force. Meanwhile Rommel had been halted at El-Alamein and rendered unable to 
renew his threat to Egypt. Moreover, the failure of the German attack on the Alam Haifa 
position threw them into complete retreat. From now on the B.M.A. could be officially 
established in Cyrenaica while the final routing of German forces in the sister province of 
Tripolitania enabled a similar administration to be established there too.
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B.M.A. Tripolitania, in what was still in terms of International Law, despite the success of 
British arms, the western province of Italy's colony of Libya, though it had been declared by 
Mussolini to be an integral part of "metropolitan Italy", passed de facto under British rule on 
15th December, 1942. Legally, this had been effected when Montgomery signed the eleven 
initial proclamations at Eighth Army H.Q. near Agedabia, declaring British occupation of 
Tripolitania and the methods whereby it would be applied. ( ^ )
Previous to this date, Brigadier Maurice Lush had been delegated Deputy Chief Civil 
Affairs Officer, a position similar to those he had held previously in Ethiopia and Madagascar. 
A provisional war office establishment was also formally approved, a third of the staff for 
which had already been posted by 31st December 1942, as is apparent from the following:
G.H. Becker Jnr., The Disposition of the Italian Colonies 1941 -1945., 
University of Geneva, February 1952, p. 42.
11 Annual Report, B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1943, p. 10.
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Entitlement Posted Strength
Officers, O.R.S, Inspectors Officers, O.R.s, Inspectors
B.M.A. Tripolitania:
132 224 - 53 65 •
Tripolitanian Police:
33 4 49
Tripolitanian Prisons:
2 1 10
Total:
167 229 59 62 65 10
(12)
The morale of the new administration was undoubtedly high and we are told by official 
commentators that "they had the experience of engaging in a well-planned enterprise". (13) 
Moreover, nothing was left to chance, the personnel, many of whom had been drafted from 
either the Colonial or Military Services. Such a body of personnel had been carefully selected 
rather than hastily gathered from any available source.
Accommodation for the new personnel was provided in a special camp outside Cairo, 
where they were trained as a specially organised unit for service in Libya. As such, "Notes on 
The Military Government of Enemy Occupied Territory", (14) became virtually their "Vade
12 Ibid., p. 10.
13 Ibid.
14 Sec, supra; note 4, p. 9.
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Mecum". Additional instruction was provided in the form of courses in both Italian and 
Arabic, along with lectures by personnel in possession of relevant experience in the 
administration of occupied territories, recently gained in former Italian East Africa especially. 
Finally opportunity was provided for the special study of particular territoriesd - most namely 
those to which personnel were already delegated. 0 ^ )
Otherwise, the virtual absence of enemy resistance, though a rally was expected on the 
border of Tunisia, enabled the military government of Tripolitania to be instituted in 
accordance with the blueprint for phases one, two and three, as outlined in the manual, 
virtually without a hitch. Certain priority areas were, however, given particular care and 
attention, such as the establishing of internal security to a high level, which was seen to be a 
matter of utmost importance by Brigadier Lush. This for a short time at least resulted in an 
emphasis upon direct as opposed to indirect rule which was no doubt more convenient in the 
administrative sense to the high command.
The Italians, however, had favoured indirect rule, with the territory being divided into two 
prefettura, one being based in Tripoli and the other in Misurata. 0 ^ )  Instead of this system, 
Lush decided that the more direct control could be achieved by allocating authority to six senior 
civil affairs officers based in Tripoli, Misurata, Horns, Garia, Zuara and Hon. The officers for 
these posts were selected in Dewcember and each was then placed in charge of a civil affairs 
team, comprising both administrators and departmental staff who were then to be trained and 
organised to a "military formation". O?)
The first of these teams left Maadi on the Delta on 23rd December, 1942, under the 
command of Lt. Col. Lowth, M.C., with orders to report to H.Q. 30 Corps by 9th January at 
Sirte, just as the Eighth Army was preparing for the final advance on Tripoli. The remaining 
teams followed at approximately weekly intervals. Thus as each major centre of population 
fell to British troops, another civil affairs officer would be despatched from Lowth’s team to 
take charge of the civil administration and, along with him, such units of the Sudan Defence 
Forces, as had been detailed to act as a force of occupation.
These arrangements had been well thought through and were found to work well in 
practice. The various outbreaks of looting that occured in the interval between the Axis 
withdrawal and the British advance were quickly brought under control as the occupation 
gradually became more effective. Military courts were set up at Misurata (28th January) and 
Tripoli (2nd February). Further additional battalions of the Sudan Defence Force were also 
made available for police duties pending the organising and training of a new civil police force. 
By such effective and timely measures, law and order was restored in Libya's western
15 Op. Cit., P.268.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
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province and the respect of the local population, whether Arab, Italian or Jew, assured for at 
least the immediate future.
18 Ibid., p. 270.
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ii. Phase two: defence against internal and external aggression and the 
consolidation o f military government in Tripolitania.
During "Phase Two" of the official handbook, issued only to o f f i c e r s / ^ )  it is  indicated that 
military government should "emerge from its embryo state and commence to function as a co­
ordinated whole under the immediate direction and active control of the DCCAO". (20) When 
this has occured, the DCCAO, who in Tripolitania was Brigadier Maurice Lush, would cease 
to be merely advisory but operate in an executive capacity with his whole staff.
In "Phase Two", therefore, military commanders would be relieved of any responsibility 
for military government in the local sense. Moreover, during this phase, "the laws of the 
country, as modified and supplemented by proclamation" were to be at all times enforced. 
Similarly, "the civil police force becomes primarily responsible for the maintenance of law and 
order; judicial machinery for both civil and criminal matters is provided; imports and exports 
are controlled; taxes, customs, excise duties and municipal rates are collected; trade and 
industry are encouraged and directed into channels beneficial to the occupant; exchange 
dealings are regulated; transport services are restored; public utility undertakings are reopened; 
financial control is exercised on a budgetary basis; civilian medical services are resumed; 
special attention is devoted to the administration of the native inhabitants; and control and 
supervision is exercised over tribal organisations." (21)
However, even the main objective during Phase Two is to return, as far as possible, 
normal circumstances - or at least the status quo ante bellum - the handbook continues to 
emphasise that "military considerations remain paramount": the :policy of the military 
government will therefore be shaped primarily to secure every advantage for the occupying 
army", It follows that emphasis must be placed therefore upon the character of the kilitary 
commander who remains ultimately responsible to the commander in chief for the pursuance of 
military government, even if this responsibility declines with the successful establishment of 
military government. Finally, the DCCA becomes the executive head of the Military 
Government by virtue of a special warrant issued tohim for this purpose by the commander-in- 
chief. (22)
* * * * * * * * *  *
19 Op. Cit.
20 Ibid ., Pp. 569 - 571.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., pp. 569 - 570.
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As is observed by Rennel of Rhodd, "the objectives of the Admnistration followed the 
textbook", by which he meant the "Notes on the Military Government of Occupied Enemy 
Territory" which had already been referred to. (23) The nature of this process was well 
summed up in the Annual Report of the first year of the Administration as "while the 
overriding demands of the Army engaged in active operations required quick administrative 
action in specific matters, such as those already mentioned, the general policy of the 
Administration in its wider aspects was gradually being implemented." (24)
Thus, while in the law the obligations of the occupying power were seen to be limited by 
International Law itself, in practice the demands of the war effort would require the stimulation 
of the whole productive capacity of the country to the ultimate end of winning the war against 
the Axis poers. While therefore the tasks of administering justice and collecting revenues, to 
take just two possible examples, may be kept in clearly defined limits, there still remains scope
amd indeed demand for constructive work in the fields of agriculture, trade and industries.
(25)
During Phase Two of Military Government and the first year of the military occupation itself, 
the territory was therefore required by forcr of military exigencies to become the main base for 
the pi nning and eventual invasion of Sicily. In pursuance of this goal, the Military 
Government had to aim at providing all the facilities required for the invasion itself. This also 
required that the productive capacity of the country be stimulated to aid the war effort.
In line with such aims, work was at once commenced upon the clearing of the mines and 
other obstacles from Tripoli harbour to facilitate the unloading of ships containing military 
suppplies even though the Public Works Department had not yet been set up. Work was also 
begun on the repair of buildings requisitioned by the Army and Administration, very few of 
which did not require some degree of attantion on account of the bombing blast.
Furthermore, power and pumping stations, roads and railways, all needed to be brought 
up to the right level of military serviceability. It was also important to ensure that the country's 
very resources of whatever category should be placed at the disposal of the military as well. 
The virtual absence of all kinds of stocks on the market required that the controller of civil 
supplies should acquire an immediate declaration of all the stocks being held by merchants. 
"The result", noted Rhodd, from about 250 firms, was "Flour 4.5 tons, sugar 5 tons, soup 
materials 46 tons, oil 30 tons. In addition, the farmers' cooperative held 100 tons of wheat 
flour, 280 tons of wheat grains; and a stock of edible oil." (26)
23 Op. C i l p. 270 and Notes on Military Government.
24 Annual Report B.M.A. Tripolitania, p. 12.
2  ^ Ibid., p. 12.
26 Rennel of Thodd, Op. Cit., p. 273.
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The army, however, was not in direct need of these items which the Administration 
proceeded to distribute to hospitals, orphanages and prisons along with a special loaf of 50 
grammes to Tripoli City. General work conditions, food shortages and the need to save 
shipping made agricultural production the prime consideration. In this respect, it was readily 
noted that Tripolitania "has always been and will always remain a deficiency area in most 
agricultural commodities, and policy has always been directed towards the maximum 
production of the three basic crops - cereals, oil bearing crops and vegetables. Little can be 
done to stimulate yields from vines, almonds, dates and citrus, beyond improving cultivation 
methods." (27)
Yet agricultural production in Tripolitania was continuing to increase and was 
considerably greater than a year before. Both commercially and industrially, Tripolitania was 
also dependent upon imports and as with agriculture, the productive capacity of the country 
was quite meagre. Brief mention, however, must at this point be made of the efforts of the 
Middle Eastern Supply Centre which had begun operations in Tripoli in March.
The Centre's objective was to increase Middle Eastern resources primarily to facilitate the 
war effort, while at the same time providing for the basic needs of the indigenous population 
of the area, an aim which following the ending of hostilities shifted to welfare and allied 
organisations. At this time, the work of the Centre was of the greatest importance for 
Tripolitania since the latter became part of a comprehensive plan for the area as a whole. 
Without the work of the Middle Eastern Supply Centre, it is doubtful if a territory such as 
Tripolitania, with its meagre natural resources and virtual lack of exports, could have managed 
to sustain itself following the withdrawal of Italian sibsidies, let alone through the terrible 
droughts of 1946 - 1947. (28)
The undertaking of constructive work in agriculture, trade and industry, initially to 
facilitate the war effort, was undoubtedly of some benefit, as far as the recovery and future 
development of the country was concerned. Phase Two, however, also required the 
implementation of a policy of Care and Maintenance in accordance with International Law, but 
at this stage Care and Maintenance was not the primary concern of the Aministration.
Finance and Legal Affairs were also from the start of the B.M.A. regarded as of paramount 
importance in the running of the country. As such they represented a highly diversified sphere 
of administrative activity, the former, along with the Accounts (again originally set up in Cairo 
in the December of 1942). These Departments were closely followed by those of Banking, 
Exchange, Currency, Social Insurance, Cost of Living Indices, Revenue and various other 
related activities. Customs and Excise, once a sub-department of Finance, quickly took over 
control of the corresponding Italian Department of Customs and Excise in Tripoli.
27 Annual Report, 1943, Op. Cit., p.30. 
2  ^ Ibid., p. 13.
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Similarly, the Legal Department, also pre-assembled in Cairo and later Maadi, during the 
uncertain months of 1941, took over its Italian namesake in Tripoli. Complex in structure it 
was no less diversified in form, being responsible for the supervision of British, Italian, 
Moslem and Jewish courts, the issuing of proclamations, required by the C. in C. and at the 
conclusion of Phase Two. The DCCAO, as well as the task of reviewing all legislation 
operating in the territory, also had to ensure such legislation fitted into the requirements of the 
B.M.A. Overlordship of the important and disputatious land registry was also the 
responsibility of the DCCAO. Legal affairs generally during this period included a vast 
volume of work, such as the drafting of orders, regulations and notices, the giving of opinions 
to other departments in relation to their various activities and the advising of the Administration 
generally upon a host of day-to-day matters.
A further requirement of this fledgling administration was the Department of Police and 
Prisons which General Montgomery had provided for in his proclamation No. 4 of 15 
December explicitly authorising the creation of a Tripolitanian Police Force. It was at 10.00 
hours on 23rd January, 1943, that representatives of this force, in the form of the 
Commissioner of Police and two other police officers entered Tripoli with Brigadier Lush and 
established police headquarters at the offices of the Polizia Africana Italiana.
This new creation was responsible during the year and subsequently for the existing police 
forces in Tripolitania, the establishment and training of a new police force, administration, 
crime, Italian registration, immigration and prisons. Legal Affairs, Finance and Police were 
the most important arms of the Administration; but during Phase Two in 1943, the remaining 
arms of the Administration were set up in Tripoli and the provinces. These were to include 
Road Transport, with responsibility for police vehicles and public transport too. This also 
included providing drivers to the Administration in Tripoli, works and public utilities 
departments with wide-ranging responsibilities for roads, railways, harbours, gasworks, 
power stations and stores supplies.
Further branches of the Administration included Medical Control, demographic 
colonisation schemes (included with agriculture), trade supplies (at this point vitally concerned 
with rationing and price control), custodianship of enemy property, registration and 
management of wide-ranging Italian assets, Labour (at this time basically concerned with the 
manning for military rather than civilian needs), education for Arabs, Italians and Jews, as 
well as the children of British expatriates, postal services, press and propaganda, which was 
mainly to do with press and public relations. (29)
29 Ibid., throughout pp. 1 - 117.
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iii. Phase Three: establishment of military government 
on a permanent basis under the control of the Administration 
of Brigadier Travers Blackley.
During this phase of military government, the "military problem" was soon to become 
"subordinate to civilian needs". It is therefore emphasised that the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs 
Officer, who had been specially selected "for his experience in military methods" is at this 
point "entrusted with full responsibility for the military government of the country". To mark 
this change in status, the DCCAO now becomes "Chief Administrator". Furthermore, the 
senior combatant officer’s title changes to "O.C. of Troops". Again the comparison is with a 
British colonial dependency where the distinction between two relatively autonomous civil and 
military spheres of activity and jurisdiction is maintained, the "military authorities" neither 
controlling or interfering in the affairs of the government, "except in the case of grave internal 
disorder". Yet, despite civilian matters being in the ascendancy during Phase Three, the 
government was to remain essentially military in character, deriving its authority and legality 
from "conquest by force of arms".
Within this kind of context, however, the Chief Administrator's position was recognised 
as being purely "transitory" with no inherent rights, his task throughout this final stage, which 
was to be of unusually and unexpectedly long duration in Libya, that of "restoring the territory 
to a state of settled government on as normal a basis as was consistent with the exercise of 
powers limited to the purpose of war, the maintenance of order and safety and the proper 
administration of the territory".
If it is difficult to fix with any degree of historical exactitude the ending of the First and Second 
Phase of Military Government, there can be little doubt that the successful inauguration of the 
B.M.A. during its early stages was in no small part due to the energy and leadership of 
Brigadier Maurice Lush, appointed in November 1943 as Chief Civil Affairs Officer at H.Q., 
Fifteenth Army Group. "Under him", the official report for 1943 states, "the Administration 
took control quickly and smoothly and thereby gained the confidence of Italian, Jew and Arab 
alike". (30) (31)
■*° I bid.
-*1 Annual Report, 1943, p. 14.
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The direction of the Administration, however, in November 1943 devolved upon Lt. 
Colonel W. J. Miller who was Chief Secretary. (32) phase Three of the operation can 
fortunately be more easily dated, with Brigadier T. Blackley's designation as Chief 
Administrator of Tripolitania during 1944, instead of as before Deputy Chief Civil Affairs 
Officer. (33) it is to Travers Blackley that the effective consolidation - if not development - of 
Lush's administration is due. This was rather a question of good sense and firm management 
than any employment of "force majeure" since both adequate resources of money and 
manpower were conspicuously lacking both before and after the ending of the war in 1945.
III. The Issue of Libyan Independence and the Consolidating of Military 
Rule (1944- 1945).
i. Action by the United Nations in Resolving 
the Diplomatic Impasse over Libya.
In a sense, Libya as a country or political entity between 1942 and 1949 ceased to exist As 
such it could neither determine its own destiny nor could the B.M.A. do this for it. Neither 
could it adequately develop since the policies of Care and Maintenance practised by the 
B.M.A. were carefully limited by international statutes for merely restoring and maintaining 
the status quo ante bellum. Even fulfilling these limited goals was extremely difficult in the 
circumstances then obtaining in Libya and the fabric of the country especially in the capital was 
rapidly falling into decay. To check this drift only the most basic repairs could be carried out 
as business confidence continued to wane on the prevailing uncertainty over the future of the 
country.
In more than one respect, therefore, Libya reverted to what it had been like before the 
Italian era had commenced - a geographical expression rather than a country set in a stagnant 
economy that was woefully inadequate to serve the needs of a developing country. 
Explanations of this state of affairs are not difficult to locate: though Italy had lost the war and 
her former colonial empire, yet these former colonies remained Italian in name at least, so 
retaining a status that was entirely ambivalent at each relevant point of the political and 
economic compass.
The essential power of deciding upon the future of the former Italian colonies, including 
Libya, fell of course to the victors rather than the vanquished, though the desires and 
aspirations of the latter still counted as plans for the reconstruction of Europe were developed.
32 Ibid., p. 14.
33 Annual Report, 1944, p. 43, neither the day nor the month are given.
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In this process, the wishes of the native inhabitants, as in colonial times, and indeed under the 
Ottomans too, scarcely mattered at all. How Libya ended up as a national entity at all therefore 
requires some explanation, following as it did from the decisions of the victorious powers of 
America, Russia, Great Britain and France in the immediate aftermath of the war itself.-
As the "cold war" gained momentum, rivalry between the powers continued, as in the 
colonial era itself to find expression in Africa, and was in a sense fuelled by the uncertainty 
surrounding the future of the former Italian colonies of Eritrea, Somalia and Libya. It was 
then generally understood by the concerned parties that these territories had never possessed 
much economic value, though the Italians had discovered in the colonial era itself the presence 
of oil in Libya but had done nothing to exploit it for politico-economic reasons. Furthermore, 
whereas the prestige value of colonial dependencies contributed to national status before 1945, 
it counted for little following the end of the war itself, though was still a factor in the 
calculations of the political forces in mainland Italy. For the most part, however, the post war 
world with its austerity budgets and ration cards, saw colonial dependencies as a drain on 
national resources that might be more profitably used in relieving economic misery at home. 
Hence, colonies became unpopular politically and colonial powers like Britain and France now 
actively sought to relieve themselves of the burden of empire as soon as the opportunity arose.
The pressure of the cold war, however, interposed on the desire to shed colonial 
dependencies with new strategic thinking that converged along the old familiar lines, and 
issued in an era of neo-colonialism in which zones of interest replaced old colonial boundaries. 
Italy's former African empire lay in the location of each territory along a "strategic life line to 
the approaches of the Mediterranean and the focal points of the Near East". (34) in this 
respect, Libya "being closer to the areas East-West conflict, became the most important of the 
three colonies from every angle, and specially from the point of view of strategic 
considerations". (35)
Thus in the circumstances of 1945, America, Britain, France and Russia had a strong and 
natural interest in securing their options in the Middle East, North Africa and East Africa, if 
only as a corollary to existing power rivalries and in particular the East-West conflict now 
heavily tinctured by cold war attitudes and rhetoric. For these reasons, therefore, no easy 
solution could be found for the future of the former Italian territories and indeed "the failure to 
agree on any solution finally obliged the Big Three (America, Britain and Russia, later joined 
by France) to hand the issue over to the United Nations where it was eventually settled by 
chance". (36)
34 Becker, Op. Cit., p. 72.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., p. 67.
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A) The Libyan Issue before the Big Four.
Although militarily Italy had lost all her African territories by 1942 and was knocked out of the 
Second World War itself in 1944, any direct discussion between the Allies of the future of the 
former Italian colonies was avoided until the defeat of Germany in 1945. Despite this, the 
subject was cautiously broached at Yalta in the Crimea and later at San Francisco. This was 
not unmarked since when the Big Three met at Potsdam during the summer of 1945, Stalin 
stated that he would like "to discuss the question of trusteeship" and added that the USSR 
"would like some territory of the defeated states." @7)
To this, Britain could not reasonably object as Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden had 
already unilaterally committed Britain to handing over Cyrenaica to his protegee, the Sayed 
Mohammed Idrid El-Senusi in 1942, and again in 1944 when, in answering to a House of 
Commons question, had stated Britain’s opposition to the return of the colonies to Italy. (38)
In fact, however, as must subsequently become apparent, Britain, especially under the post­
war labour Government, was far from immutably opposed to the return at least of Libya's 
western province of Tripolitania to Italy, and was certainly in favour of Italy retaining strong 
ties and influence in the country. (39)
Once the war was finally over, the Council of Foreign Ministers, appointed by the 
governments of the USA, Britain and the USSR, later joined by France, met in London during 
September, 1945, to discuss and arrange the agenda for the Paris Peace Conference which was 
intended to settle all important territorial and other claims still outstanding from the war. At the 
London Conference, the question of the disposition of the Italian Colonies, including Libya, 
was for the first time officially brought out into the open and placed on the agenda of the Paris 
Peace Conference.
The London Conference demonstrated very clearly that agreement on this issue, as upon 
many other issues, would be exceedingly difficult to arrive at and drawn out, as each of the 
Poweres had clearly defined interests at stake. This was the most serious problem facing a 
speedy and effective solution as collective agreement seemed the only method open to the 
Powers for a settlement of the issue before them. (40)
Unable to reach consensus in London, the Council of Foreign Ministers met again in Paris 
in the Spring of 1946, where they endeavoured to put the finishing touches to final 
preparations for the eventual Peace Conference itself. Until this point, the USA had advocated 
collective trusteeship for the former Italian colonies. France, however, desired the situation in
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., p. 55.
39 Ibid., p. 161.
40 Ibid., pp. 8 4 - 5 .
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the colonies to revert to the status quo ante helium. Britain supported the USA, but the USSR 
opposed the American plan, fearing it would strengthen the Western Powers in an area of vital 
strategic interests. Meanwhile, Italian hopes for the restoration of the whole or part of their 
former empire were by no means dead and received both tacit and overt support from the 
USSR and France. (41)
The realisation that the only way out of this emerging deadlock and arriving at a measure of 
agreement over the disposal of the former Italian colonies hinged upon the question of the 
degree of compensation that Italy might receive now began to find expression in the Council of 
Ministers. That any form of compensation which would involve the ceding to Italy of possibly 
Tripolitania would be highly unpopular amongst the native population was not a factor 
affecting the deliberations of the Big Four. Prior to any moves on this issue, however, an 
important measure of agreement was arrived at between the USA and the USSR over a number 
of procedural matters affecting the former Italian colonies. This had the result of finally 
opening up the war for holding the long-awaited peace conference itself. (42)
The failure by the Council of Ministers to find agreement over the disposal of the Italian 
colonies had the effect of delaying the opening of the Peace Conference scheduled for Paris by 
nearly a year. When finally convened on 29 July, 1946, the question was studiously avoided. 
Instead, the far more important and pressing European settlement issues were attended to. The 
draft proposals of the Italian Peace Treaty were, however, accepted, so depriving Italy of all 
sovereignty in her former colonies, though the Italians still continued to hope that their 
influence and control might eventually be restored. The Peace Treaty with Italy left the Big 
Four only a further year to resolve the question at issue. (43)
This deadline was only just met with the Big Four's deputies not being able to meet for the 
purpose of discussing and drawing up recommendations on the dispoal of the former Italian 
Colonies until 3 October, 1947. Once again the agreed venue for the Foreign Ministers of the 
Big Four to meet was London, where the same issue had been discussed two years before. In 
the meantime, the Peace Conference at Paris had merely shelved the subject, with prospects for 
its solution in 1948 being as unpromising as ever and time for finding a panacea running out 
fast. (44)
The seemingly intractable nature of the problem was once again admirably demonstrated 
when the Foreign Ministers met once again at London, where a full two months were spent 
wrangling over procedural matters connected with sending a Four Power Commission to the 
former colonies. The Commission was intended to furnish the Deputies with necessary 
information on the former colonies in connection with which they were for the most part
41 Ibid., p. 80. Also, see Becker, p. 113, for clarification of French aims
vis-a-vis spport for Italy at this stage of the Italian Plan.
42 Ibid., p. 90.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid., p. 104.
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completely ignorant. In particular at this late stage, information was looked for on the views 
and aspirations of the native inhabitants themselves who had never been even considered 
before this point (45)
The deputies also judged it important to obtain the views of nineteen "interested 
governments" upon the future of the Italian Colonies, for the examination and discussion of 
which, the London Conference was reconvened in February, 1948. Once this task had been 
got out of the way, the Deputies finally began to draft out their own recommendations for the 
Council of Foreign Ministers set to meet before 15 September, 1948. This was the last date 
for the issue to be resolved by the Big Four.
Completed by 1 August, 1948, the Report compiled by the deputies did little more than
emphasise existing disagreements between the USSR and the Western Powers and indeed
amongst the Western Powers themselves. (46) »in substance", writes Becker, "the
recommendations of the Deputies to the CFM offered little or nothing towards finding a
solution to the problem, but simply accentuated the fact that the Big Four were almost as far
from agreement on a means of disposing of the Italian Colonies as they had been in 1945". 
(47)
On Libya, the United States and Britain both proposed that Cyrenaica be placed under the 
United Nations trusteeship with the United Kingdom as the administering authority. The last 
provision on the joint proposal recommended that a decision on the future of Tripolitania and 
the Fezzan be postponed for one year. France agreed with the final section of the joint 
proposal, but preferred to have a decision on Cyrenaica also postponed for a year. (48)
B) The Issue before the General Assembly of the 
United Nations.
Not surprisingly, when the representatives of the Big Four met at Paris between 13 and 15 
September, 1948, finally to determine the fate of the Italian empire, they were as far away 
from agreement as when they had first met to determine the issue at London in 1946. Time, 
however, had irretrievably caught up with them and failure to agree signified failure to solve 
the problem which was at this point referred by them to the Secretary General of the United 
Nations. Once put up for discussion by the third session of the General Assembly on 21
45 Ibid., pp. 113 - 114.
46 Ibid., p. 135.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., p. 137.
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September, 1948, it ranked as tenth on a list of items up for consideration by the First 
Committee.
By handing the problem over to the United Nations at this point, the Powers had 
unwittingly delayed the resolution of the issue still further since this step gave Italy the 
opportunity of canvassing for support amongst the strongly pro-Italian nations of Latin 
America. At this point, Britain, which had long regarded the relinquishing of control in 
Tripolitania to Italy as a valuable fall-back position, once the American and British plan of 
British trusteeship had failed to get off the ground, now came out openly on the side of Italy.
The resolution of the problem of the future of Tripolitania was becoming a matter of 
pressing urgency for Britain, since not only the associated financial and political problems of 
maintaining Care and Maintenance needed urgent solution; but also it was still widely believed 
that Italy still represented the best chance of bringing back some stability to the area. Thus an 
apparently new factor entered into the situation with the resolution of the disposition of the 
Italian Colonies in favour of Italy being looked for by the USSR and the Western Powers. 
Developments on these lines were, however, now delayed until April, 1949, when a third 
session of the United Nations was scheduled to meet at New York.
ii. Effect of the Diplomatic Impasse upon the Conduct 
of Military Administration in Tripolitania during 1949.
By handing over to the United Nations effective responsibility and control for a decision upon 
the disposition of the former Italian Colonies and in particular Libya, the Big Four had at least 
opened the door for the Italians again to present their case for the restitution of at least 
Tripolitania to some form of Italian sovereignty. This, of course, had an immediate impact in 
Tripolitania itself, where such a move was strongly condemned and resisted by the indigenous 
population and its leaders. Their demands were for the immediate ending of the B.M.A. and 
the conceding of national independence. As for the British Government and the Arab 
population the issue of a return to Italian sovereignty had never really left the political 
agenda,.it is important at this stage not to gloss over its general significance, in shedding 
important light upon the general ambivalence of the political, cultural and social conduct of 
policy in the province under the B.M.A., especially in the educational field.
Despite its appalling record as a colonial power, only slightly better in its treatment of the 
native population in Libya than the worst excesses in Ethiopia, Italy was still able to derive 
support for the reimposition of Italian sovereignty in the country from Russia, France and 
finally Britain too. No doubt the reasons for supporting Italy at this juncture were political, 
stemming from great power rivalry with its roots in the cold war, but it should at the same time
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be seen as lacking in any moral basis, given the clear mandate for national independence 
expressed by the indigenous population of Libya and conveyed to the Big Four via the Four 
Power Commission.
As a leading supporter of the Italian case for a renewed mandate in Tripolitania, Russia 
hoped that by supporting Italy's case, the cause of communism would be greatly helped in the 
Italian General Elections of 1946. Why Italy should have wanted to return to Libya is not hard 
to fathom. Although termed a "collection of desens" and often seen by colonial propagandists 
and officials as a burden borne by Italy for reasons of historical necessity, Tripolitania in 
particular represented for Italy a considerable investment in farms and infrastructure spanning 
more than thirty years of continuous occupation.
No doubt the awareness of considerable, undefined, oil deposits was a factor in fuelling 
Italian demands, but this was by no means the only or most important element in the Italian 
desire to retain sovereignty over Tripolitania, which now far from being a "collection of 
deserts" was a ripe plum waiting to be plucked. The official position, however, was 
expressed by the then Foreign Minister, Senior Alcide de Gasperi, who in a letter to the U.S. 
Secretary of State Byrnes, stated that, "In spite of opinions already expressed by several 
important influential Italians concerning the possibility of an international administration for the 
colonies, Italy wished to retain her sovereignty over Libya and Eritrea but would accept Italian 
trusteeship over Somaliland." (49)
This move culminated in the Bevin-Sforza plan whereby Great Britain would have been 
left to administer Cyrenaica and also continue administering Tripolitania until 1951 with the 
help of an international advisory council. From 1951 onwards, however,Italy would become 
the administering authority in Tripolitania but under a system of international trusteeship. 
France, however, who had continuously supported the Italian case and opposed any form of 
national independence in Libya, would, according to the Sforza plan, have received a 
trusteeship in the Fezzan.
More generally, it was decided that Libya as a whole could expect to be made independent 
after ten years if the General Assembly considered such a move to be appropriate. In support 
of its own case for trusteeship over Cyrenaica, Britain did not see the necessity of making 
concessions to Arab states who opposed the Bevin-Sforza initiative. Neither would Britain 
make concessions to Asian countries who favoured collective trusteeship. Instead, Britain 
chose to make concessions to the large pro-Italian block in the United Nations to avert any 
possible deadlock.(50)
In this tortuous and sometimes conflicting saga, whereby Great Britain, ally of the USA, 
having won the war in the Middle East against Italy and Germany and ruled Libya in all but 
name for more than six years by means of a "Military Administration", it is not difficult to
49 Op. Cit., p. 126.
50 Ibid., p. 161.
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recognise the hand of the policy makers. It must in this respect be recognised that British 
concern was to retain control and influence in Libya for at least the foreseeable future either 
through retaining one or both of the Mediterranean provinces. In this way Britain hoped to 
maintain a military presence close to the Suez Canal and across the highway that connected 
North Africa with Egypt and the rest of the Arab world. In this respect, the espousing of the 
Sayed Mohamed Idris, as future king of a United Libya, must inevitably be seen as a last ditch 
attempt by Britain to retain some form of control over the area. As it was, however, by putting 
forward Idris as the future leader of the whole of Libya, not only did Britain forfeit any control 
over Cyrenaica, but also indeed over Tripolitania too, since it was unlikely that this sickly and 
ageing figure would retain control for long over a territory that had never subscribed to Senusi 
control. This must have been one of the biggest policy blunders in the history of the British 
Empire in modem times!
Meanwhile, in Tripolitania itself, the United Nations meeting in April and May not 
surprisingly caused considerable political interest amongst both Arab and Italian sections of the 
population there. The mood indeed in the province amongst all sections of the population was 
very intense - "the entire population feeling that its future was in the balance". (51) When the 
Bevin-Sforza agreements were revealed, a series of hostile demonstrations at once took place 
in the province. This followed the hardening of Arab opinion in 1948 against any return of 
Italian influence in any form. (52) But to the leaders of native opinion in the province, it 
seemed that the chances of an "Italian return were greater than they had ever been before." (53) 
At this point, the B.M.A.'s popularity with the local population sank to its lowest ebb, as the 
refusal of Britain to assume any form of political commitment in the territory was quite rightly, 
as it subsequently transpired, only part of the mounting evidence of British support for Italian 
claims over the territory. (54)
Not surprisingly therefore, the political temperature in Tripolitania rose rapidly and anti- 
Italian feeling was intensified. The mosques became the scene of violent speeches and 
petitions were presented to the Administration, protesting particularly against the French 
support for the return of Italy to Tripolitania as trustees of the United Nations. (55) Between 
the 8th and 9th of May, when news of the Bevin-Sforza Agreement was announced, and the 
17th May, when news was received of its rejection, the Administration came under its most 
intense pressure from the local population.
One official remarked at this time that "had the proposals gone through, it is hard to see 
how bloodshed could have been avoided." (56) Yet it was widely recognised in the rejoicing
51 Annual Report Tripolitania, 1949, p. 4. 
^  Ibid., p. 6.
^  Ibid., p. 7.
54 Ibid., p. 8.
55 Ibid.
Ibid., p. 4.
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that followed news of the rejection of the Bevin-Sforza plan, that ultimate freedom from what 
was termed the "Italian Menace" could only be assured by some form of Union with Cyrenaica.
If this was so, Britain now had no other alternative but to go along with it, since any 
opportunity of providing a viable alternative in Tripolitania to a united Libya under the Dayed 
Idris had now passed. This was perhaps part of the tragedy of the B.M.A. there that, having 
marched into the province eight years before with drums playing and banners flying, it had 
then in the manner of its Italian predecessor set about oppressing political development in the 
territory. As a result, its policies were ambivalent and lacking in any sense of reality or 
commitment. Thus the opportunity was lost to create a party of the via media under some 
recognised political figure, such as Ahmed Muntasser, now destined to be prime minister to an 
ailing and increasingly unpopular monarch.
iii Libyan Independence and the B.M.A.'s Final Phase.
The defeat by a vote of 33 to 17 with 6 abstentions of the sub paragraph on Tripolitania in the 
Assembly of the United Nations led to the automatic defection from the Bevin-Sforza 
Agreement of the pro- Latin-American block. A statement in the House of Commons on 6th 
July, withdrawing British support from the Bevin-Sforza Agreement, along with an official 
inducement for the Emir of Cyrenaica to pass through Tripolitania in July, calmed Arab 
opinion on the subject of the territory’s imminent independence.
Such optimism was not dissipated when the General Assembly of the United Nations met 
for a Fourth Session at Lake Success from September to December 1949, where the 
independence of Libya was finally decreed. The conceding of Independence to Cyrenaica by 
Great Britain in the summer had put the Italians in an awkward position diplomatically with 
regard to Tripolitania. America had at this point intervened and insisted upon a ruthlessly 
practical solution without any further delay. Independence for Libya could not possibly be 
blocked further by either France or Britain, though both would certainly raise many queries 
over the method whereby it was to be granted. (58) y et even at this stage, no party could 
absolutely guarantee that proposals for the independence of Libya would gain the necessary 
two thirds majority. It was only following three weeks of further deliberation that the 
following document was drawn up to recommend:
a) That Libya be established as a single independent and sovereign 
state not later than 1 January, 1952;
57 I b i d p. 9.
58 Op. Cit., Becker, p. 173.
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b) That a constitution for Libya be determined by representatives of 
Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and the Fezzan;
c) That for the purpose of assisting the Libyan People in the 
formulation of the Constitution and the establishment of an 
independent government, there should be a United Nations 
Commissioner and a Council to aid and advise him;
d) That the Council should consist of ten members, namely the 
representatives of Egypt, France, Italy, Pakistan, United States of 
America, one representative each from the three regions of Libya 
and one representative of the minorities of Libya;
e) That the administering powers initiate immediately all necessary 
steps for the transfer of power to a duly constitutional independent 
government, administer the territories for the purpose of assisting
in the establishment of Libyan unity and independence, co-operate in 
the formation of governmental institutions and co-ordinate their 
activities to that end;
f) That upon its establishment as an independent state, Libya be 
admitted to the United Nations. (59)
This motion succeeded because it was essentially a compromise plan which satisfied both the 
pro-Italian, Latin-American amd the anti-colonial Arab blocs. It therefore directly issued in the 
setting up of Libya as an independent state on 21 November, 1949.
★ 4c *  *  ★ *
The idea that Tripolitania could be returned to the custody of the Italian flag for a second time 
in its history as a result of what amounted to a fait accompli engineered by Britain and America 
and sanctioned by the United Nations was an absurdity from the word go. The B.M.A. had 
been for more than six years little more than a cover for what any impartial observer must have 
known would never work. Unfortunately, as far as the political and social development of the 
territory was concerned, they had been six wasted years,and now, as a result of United
59 Ibid., p. 186.
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Nations' Resolution, 21 November 1949, two more years were to be allowed "to prepare 
Libya for independence". (60) The additional two years of Military Administration were 
ostensibly required to prepare the country for the implementation of a scheme of constitutional 
development, devised by the United Nations, that bore no relation to the reality of Libya and 
would quickly turn into a disaster. For this purpose, the Administration was required to "draw 
up a scheme of constitutional development" along with a special programme for training 
Libyans for entry into the Civil Service. (61)
The constitutional proposals required the setting up without delay, "a predominantly 
Libyan Advisory or Administrative Council to be followed in the summer by elections and the 
progressive transfer of power to a Tripolitanian government." (62) Due, however, to 
opposition to the proposals within Tripolitania itself, the Administrative Council was not 
established until the middle of May after which point it continued without impediment. Further 
delays, however, were experienced over voting qualifications and this delayed the setting up of 
the National Assembly until November, 1950t, when it consisted of twenty representatives 
each from Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and the Fezzan.
The Assembly resolved on 2 December that "the future state of Libya should be a federal 
monarchy under the crown of Sayed Mohamed Idris A1 Senusi." (63) This measure 
technically brought to an end the existence of the B.M.A., even though the United Nations 
Resolution of 1949 had in fact given it a further year to complete its work.
During this final phase, the B.M.A. was to operate in a purely executive capacity, with Mr 
Adrian Pelt, appointed on 10 December, 1949, as Commissioner in Libya for the United 
Nations, the principal means by which its decisions were to be implemented. In addition to the 
existing Administration of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and the Fezzan, Pelt was also to work in 
consultation with the United Nations Council which was "to aid and advise him" and the 
people of Libya. (64) As Pelt himself stated on his first journey to Libya in January and 
February 1950, "It is not my function to govern the territory; that remains within the 
competence of the administering powers, until you assume it for yourselves." (65)
In this final phase of the B.M.A., Commissioner Pelt rapidlu discovered what the Italians 
and British had known all along, namely that Libya lacked a stable economy, without which 
Independence would remain extremely fragile - until the discovery of oil changed everything. 
(66) peit also noted that there were not enough Libyans "trained in administrative processes to 
form the nucleus of a Civil Service." (67) The chief vehicle for dealing with this important
60 Annual Report, 1950, p.
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64 Becker, p. 196.
65 Ibid., p. 197.
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issue, the Council for Libya, representing the six governments most vitally concerned with 
Libya, lacked the capacity for making constructive proposals that might have alleviated the 
problem. Instead, they appeared to devote most of their time to political wrangling. (68)
Egypt and Pakistan in particular conducted an increasingly bitter criticism of the whole 
constitutional scheme for Libya as it had been devised by Pelt. Their most obvious and telling 
argument that it was "too elaborate and costly for a desert country of little more than one 
million inhabitants, whose per capita annual income is about thirty dollars” has a ring of truth 
about it, even today. (69) jn general, the disagreement of the Muslim countries with Pelt's 
plan, notes Becker, "stemmed from more fundamental causes. Egypt and Pakistan did not 
consider the plan provided for a really independent state and condemned the scheme as 
designed to turn Libya into a region completely dependent on Great Britain." (70) it was this 
kind of propaganda that the new state would find it increasingly difficult to rebut in the years 
immediately ahead.
The place of Italy, however, in the affairs of the new state was at a decided discount, 
although Italian schools, Churches and other institutions, including the demographic farms, 
continued to function, though in an atmosphere which offered no cast-iron guarantee for their 
future survival. Thus, whereas Italy was to have no political share in the running of the new 
state, the position of the Italians in the technical, administrative and economic fields was 
increasingly recognised as important "Libyanisation", therefore, was to be "tempered by an 
increasing recognition of the services that foreigners might render to the new state." (71) 
Meanwhile, the remaining officials of the B.M.A., with usual tongue in cheek, declared these 
final efforts to inaugurate the new state as "proceeding smoothly." (72)
iv. Conclusion: the B.M.A. in Retrospect.
"Decades or even centuries are the normal measuring span of political evolution, but in Libya. 
. . .  only months have been allowed." (73)
Diverse interpretations of the period of British Military Rule in Libya are as possible as for tthe 
Italian colonial period that preceded it. Some interpretations will no doubt recognise a certain 
similarity between both periods which other writers and critics would dismiss with contempt. 
In this respect, the historian's own views and even ideological commitment is perhaps
68 Ibid., p. 202.
69 Ibid., p. 209.
70 Ibid.
71 Annual Report 1950. p. 11.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., p. 23.
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paramount. Both, however, would agree that new light can only be cast upon an era if it is 
viewed by the writer frankly. Above all, whatever an individual's own belief might be, they 
should not necessarily turn him into a propagandist for one cause or another. However often 
this has been said, it needs to be said again for the period under review, in which objective 
treatment of the historical material is rare if non existant, with distortion for reasons of 
propaganda almost commonplace.
An attempt to interpret the period in terms of neo-colonialism is understandable if points 
are sometimes over-stated though few would deny that the factors making up such an 
interpretation are here in good measure. It would require wearing heavily rose-tinted 
spectacles not to recognise that the guiding principles of British and American policy in this 
region were based on self interest stemming as they did from rivalry with Russia and the "cold 
war". According to this line of argument, Libya lay over the geo-political fault lines of the 
great East-West divide and therefore must be retained within the western field of strategic 
interest at all cost. Otherwise, Russia might get a foothold in the Mediterranean region which 
would not bode well for future stability in the Middle East
On the other hand, Great Britain was anxious to avoid any further colonial commitments 
and would have preferred the Italians to more or less continue where they had left off, 
regardless of whether the Arabs wanted it or not. Official reports to London repeatedly 
warned that the indigenous population and its leaders were dead set against the reimposition of 
Italian sovereignty in the region. As, however, has happened on other occasions, the Central 
Government in Whitehall was much too preoccupied with big power politics and global 
concerns to pay much attention to the warnings it received from Tripoli.
Maybe they recognised that the rule of Dayed Idris was strictly confined to Cyrenaica and 
his acceptability in Tripolitania could not be guaranteed. The fact that the Muslim world and 
Egypt in particular were opposed to his rule was not only a bad omen for the new state, but a 
factor that made its foundations extremely shaky. Moreover, the tides of nationalism and 
socialism later compounded with Islam were producing a new climate with which the new state 
would not be able to deal very effectively.
Finally, what of the retiring B.M.A. personnel themselves? To what extent if at all can they be 
held responsible for a regime which was in so many respects a cover up for the maintenance at 
whatever cost of British and American interests in the area? This is obviously a difficult 
question to answer and, although surviving personnel were quick to deny that there was ever 
any blood on the carpet, none of the leading protagonists ever received a knighthood for their 
services. Was it simply a question of doing a good job in difficult circumstances, which was 
the opinion of many former B.M.A. personnel as they packed their bags for good in 1950, or 
did they really believe they were doing the right thing?
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The idea that 'decades or even centuries are the measuring span of political evolution" rings 
hollow when compared with the eight years, when they were in reality only helping the Italians 
to regain their sovereignty in the territory. Could not these years have been used to better 
purpose by Blackley and the British Government? Instead, we are led to believe that the 
B.M.A. only had from the date of the passing of the United Nations Resolution of 1949 to 
prepare Libya for independence. Before this time, of course, the territory was governed in 
accordance with International Law via Care and Maintenance, but this had not prevented, as 
was often pointed out by Arab critics of the B.M.A., Britain from unilateral political action in 
Cyrenaica.
In a more positive sense, however, whereas the B.M.A.'s political achievement in 
Tripolitania was a complete failure and there is no doubt this failure sadly limited what could 
be achieved on the educational front, on the administrative targets a great deal was 
accomplished. This was nowhere more apparent than in the final two years allotted by the 
United Nations for the preparation of the country for independence. The constitutional work 
for the Administrative Council was greatly to the B.M.A.'s credit, whatever one may think of 
the new Libyan Constitution itself.
Other measures, such as the training of Libyans for the Civil Service are more difficult to 
judge, since Libyanisation as such had commenced several years before. The main effort, 
however, education will be dealt with in the ensuing pages. At a more practical level, the 
B.M.A.'s activities were many and various, from medical and veterinary services to 
agricultural development, where its main achievement lay in feeding the country during the 
years of paralysing drought that occurred after 1945.
As it is only the task of this thesis to produce an interpretative account of educational 
developments under the B.M.A., a more comprehensive review of its failures and 
achievements is beyond the current brief.
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Chapter Two: Educational Policy and the British Administration 
1. Anomalous Position of the B.M .A. vis-a-vis Policy M aking Decisions.
The British Administration, officially set up in Tripolitania on 15th December, 1942,0) but 
not in fact before 23rd january, 1943, when British troops entered Tripoli, (2) was intended to 
be a purely temporary regime until such a time as the territory could be handed over to its 
proper governors. Who these would be was not known though it was generally assumed that 
Tripolitania would be returned to Italy, while Cyrenaica would remain under British control, 
though with its own ruler, the Seyid Idris Al-Senusi. These, however, were areas of no direct 
concern to the military authorities, at least in the immediate aftermath of Great Britain's victory 
over the Axis Forces in the deserts of North Africa.
In the meantime, the B.M.A., as it was known as, was to rule in accordance with the 
Hague Convention, while deriving its effectual powers from the Commander-in-Chief, Middle 
Eastern Land Forces, whose headquarters were in Cairo. In this respect, its position turned 
out to be quite "unique" in History as no "temporary military government" ever had "such a 
long life" or "to deal with so many and such a diverse range of problems", as one commentator 
put it. (3)
The B.M.A. therefore found itself faced with a situation, as its advocates would frequently 
claim, not of its own devising, and with the prospect of having to govern Tripolitania for "an 
indefinite length of time in a difficult post-war period when its future would have to be 
decided." (4) No light had been thrown during the war on the possible fate of the territory, 
other than Eden's announcement as Foreign Secretary that "H.M.G. would never allow the 
Senusi of Cyrenaica to again come under Italian rule." (5) (6)
As far, however, as the rest of Libya was concerned, the situation was hedged by the 
belief that the Italians would most probably be reinstated in the west and the Fezzan would go 
to France. This after all had been the pattern in most disputes involving European powers in 
recent history. Such presuppositions appeared to be strengthened followin g Mussolini's 
resignation on 25th July. 1945, and Italy's decision to "purge all its leaders" and completely 
reorientate her policy both at home and abroad." C7)
Logically, such a volte-face implied a return educationally in the former Italian colonies, 
such as Libya, to the policies of pre-fascist days, known as the Statutes of Libya upon which
1 See supra, p. 7.
^ Ibid.
3 R. Sandison, unpublished M.S. on Tripolitania and its recent history.
4 Ibid.
^ Ibid.
6 supra., p. 29.
7 Op.Cit., p.87.
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fascism had reneged when it took office in 1922. (8) It should therefore not be forgotten, 
when explaining British restoration of the former Italian educational system in Tripolitania 
where it had survived the war almost completely intact that in 1943, Italy was recognised by 
the Allies as a "co-belligerent" since her "resistance forces" in the North of Italy at least, 
worked with the allied armies and she was to be allowed, in Churchill's memorable phrase, "to 
work her passage home." (9)
In education, as in much else concerning their administration of Libya, the Italians wished 
profoundly "to draw a veil over the history of the previous twenty years." (1®) Unforunately, 
this was impossible as the Duce had left his mark indelibly stamped on the fortunes of the 
country for good or ill, and libya following his regime would never be the same again for both 
Arabs and Italians. This had the effect of placing the B.M.A. in an extremely ambivalent 
position when it came to the policy matters as it was "pledged to support the laws and 
institutions obtaining in the territory at the time of occupation." 01 ) Yet, barely seven months 
after it had undertaken this task, Italy "denounced the spirit which had animated their whole 
structure." (12) Furthermore, as soon as hostilities in Europe ceased two years later, the 
United Nations pledged themselves to root out Fascism and Nazism from the face of the earth 
and propose plans for the "democratic re-education" of Europe. (13)
The B.M.A.,therefore, was in the "anomalous position" of appearing to be "bound" to 
maintain and administration which even its originators did not wish to keep intact On the 
other hand, its temporary nature did not suit it for the "Herculean task" of "cleansing the 
Fascist Augean stables". (14) which, had it possessed the determination and energy to achieve, 
would have provided Libya with a modem and up-to-date educational system, such as was 
provided for the Arabs of Cyrenaica by the B.M.A. there.
Had Britain wanted to provide the Arabs of Tripolitania with a brand new educational 
system, it would have had to make a clean sweep of all the Italian legislation enacted since 
October 1922, but, in practice, it was unable to undertake such a change. (13) Initially, 
however, the B.M.A. repealed the most obvious Fascist legislation and removed the most 
blatant emblems of the Mussolini regime. It also disbanded the Gioventu'Araba del Littorio, 
whereby Arab youth had been enrolled in the Fascist Party, as an inevitable prelude to entry 
into the armed forces, lower ranks of the civil service, or other minor roles, which were the 
only channels of advancement opened to them by the Fascist regime.
® See, L.A. Appleton, Italian Educational Policy Towards Muslims in Libya. 
Unpublished M. Phil. Thesis of London University, 1980.
9 Op. Ci7., p. 87.
10 Ibid., p. 88.
11 Ibid.
^  Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
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The educational statues of the Fascist regime, however, were left intact by the yet
another indication of Britain's political intentions regarding the future of the territory with 
regard to Italy. The Italians had no hesitation defending their educational role in Libya before 
the United Nations, arguing that the fact that there were no secondary schools for Arabs in 
Libya had not legally prevented Arabs from attending the Italian secondary schools there. 0 ©  
Meanwhile, so as not to be seen openly to be taking sides or appearing to favour Italians over 
Arabs, the B.M.A. instituted a "non-fraternisation ban" on 13th August 1946, which upset 
many Italians who thought the British were turning against them, when in fact the reverse was 
the case. (17) (18)
ii. The B.M.A. treads a via media.
Perhaps one of the most important indications of Britain's future intentions for Tripolitania 
right at the start of the B.M.A. lay in A.J. Steele-Grieg's appointment as Chief Education 
Officer for Tripolitania by the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Brigadier Maurice Lush. Lacking in 
any teaching qualifications or experience, even in a school, but fluent in Italian and with a 
strong leaning towards the Italy of Mussolini, Lush saw Steele-Grieg as "the right man for the 
job." (19) As a student in Italy, Steele-Grieg had been a member of the University Fascist 
Association, something which may have been mandatory for Italian students, but must have 
been a voluntary response to the situation on the pan of Steele-Grieg. Lush would have been 
aware of his record and presumably could have had the pick of the young Arabists of the time 
as Director of Education for Tripolitania, if this had been his intention. (20)
Clearly, the appointment of an Arabist with an Arab-phile policy in education would at this 
point not have fitted in with the British Government's possible plans for the territory. If 
Tripolitania was to be returned to Italy, the difficult and delicate role exercised by the Director 
of Education would be an important factor in producing this result, hence the appointment of 
A.J. Steele-Greig to the post of Director of Education Tripolitania, with the rank of Major as a 
title he insisted upon to the end of his life. The lesser position of Assistant Chief Education 
Officer was given to the completely insignificant Captain N. F. Pengelly, but the most 
important man in the trio was undoubtedly the Director of Italian Schools, Cav. Sig. Fulvio 
Contini.
The appointment of these three men to educational positions, which in a normal developing 
country would have implied great trust and responsibility for the future of the educational 
service as such, instead underlines the uncertain and transitional nature of Tripolitania at this
16 see, infra, pp. 139 - 145.
17 Op. Cit., p. 88.
^  B.M.A. Annual Report, Tripolitania, 1943, p. 64.
19 Brig. Maurice Lush r'td to Appleton.
20 Major A.J. Steele-Grieg r'td to Appleton, Interview, Barbados, Jan. 1983.
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time. Commentators have sought to emphasise the strange social and psychological ambience 
of Tripoli in particular at this time, in which Fascism, although oficially banished, still lingered 
on in so many forms. Moreover, few if any new ideas percolated into the territory, with all 
intercourse having been cut with the main supplier, metropolitan Italy. @1)
It was this all-pervading uncertainty in the day-to-day situation that "paralysed initiative" in 
the Administration, where everybody except perhaps the Arab politicians "marked time." (22) 
There is no evidence of any serious attempt to produce an educational policy relevant to the 
needs of the Arabs, other than speculation, such as "whether the geographical position of 
Tripolitania, with its traditional connections with European civilisation, demanded education 
for the population to be based upon a European system. Either that or it should be grounded 
upon the traditional Arab schools, in respect of which the curriculum should include subjects 
such as Arithmetic. (23) These timid proposals which recall the educational laws of the 
Bertolini and Colosimo era at the former Italian Colonial Ministry. (24) are the only mention of 
educational policy to appear in all official reports for B.M.A. Tripolitania. One can therefore 
only assume that further discussion of the educational issue was declared to be taboo in official 
circles, Steele-Greig being merely left to get on with it, and take the rap if things went wrong, 
as indeed they were bound to do. Educational parlance could not however be entirely 
eliminated from the records or at least consideration of what it might involve; but instead of 
"policy", the expression "good colonial practice" became the catchword of those engaged in 
educational matters. (25) In the latter respect, Steele-Greig was himself to concede - 
"development" at the Educational Department was conducted "under very trying conditions" of 
"year planning" which was made even more dificult in the case of the "native schools" since it 
was far from clear at the time "what their future might be." (26)
iii. Arab Resentment at the seeming Italo-phile policy of the B.M.A.
The lack of any long-term policy on education for the indigenous population under the B.M.A. 
quickly communicated itself to the Arabs of the province. It was well known that Fascism had 
done nothing to prepare the mass of the population for the modem world, having instead 
communicated little more than a "region of vague ambition" which expressed itself in the desire 
for more improved educational services. (22) The fact that Libya had restricted contact with 
Europe through the medium of Italy alone, meant "self-appointed leaders of public opinion" (a
21 Sanderson, Op. Cit., p. 88.
22 Ibid.
22 Annual Report. Tripolitania, 1943, p.
24 L.A. Appleton, Op. Cit., Chapter Two: Direct Rule and the Government Schools, 1911-1919, 
pp. 26 - 65.
2  ^ B.M.A. Tripolitania, Annual Report, 1943, p.
26 A J. Steele-Greig, History o f Education in Tripolitania, Tripoli, 1948, p.8.
27 Ibid., p. 34.
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phrase often used in the B.M.A. with regard to its detractors) turned to the Arab League 
Organisation, especially in Egypt, where many Tripolitanian exiles had fled, for help and 
advice. (28) This inevitably resulted in dependence upon the only source of educated opinion 
available to them, namely the graduates of Al-Azhar University, who were strongly imbued 
with Arab nationalism and Pan-Arabism. As soon as permitted, these exiles from Egypt, 
Tunis, Turkey and Syria began trickling back, "hoping that a new era was about to begin."
(29) These people, who had in the intervening years come into close contact with the rest of 
the Arab world, "brought back news of changes in it which had only dimly been appreciated 
by the Tripolitanians, virtually cut off for twenty years from everything that was not Italian."
(30) Once returned, they were determined to exert themselves to the utmost to ensure that 
their country did not again fall under Italian rule through obtaining the self-government so long 
denied them. As early as September, 1944, occured the first of a series of political 
disturbances in Tripoli that betokened a new awareness of political and social affairs in the 
province. These disturbances resulted in the deaths of "one hundred and thirty unfortunate 
Jews" which forced the B.M.A. to recognise finally the hopelessness of trying to maintain the 
status quo ante bellum in Tripolitania. (31) It in particular made the authorities realise the need 
for a far less restrictive and "negative policy", even in the face of uncertainty about the future 
which the meeting of the four foreign ministers in September had done little to settle. (32) As 
a result, "planning" took on a more positive note at the Department of Education, despite the 
Director's misgivings at Libyan recruitment into the Administration. (33)
iv. A more positive response to Arab educational needs.
The realisation amongst the B.M.A. personnel that the ending of war in Europe and even the 
signing of the Peace Treaty with Italy, required a more positive attitude to preparing Libya for 
the future, produced several important changes between 1946 and 1949 at the level of 
educational planning in the territory. Planning in 1945 had in the Arab sector been primarily 
concerned with the reopening of the former Italo-Arab schools converted by the B.M.A. into 
lower elementary schools, teaching Arabic, Religious Instruction, Arithmetic, and Physical 
Training. In conjunction with the emphasis upon elementary education, an anti-illiteracy 
campaign had been started in the summer of 1945 aimed exclusively at Arabs. (34) in 
October 1946, a tentative move had been made in the field of Arab Secondary Education, with
28 Ibid.
29 PJ. Sanderson, Op. Cit., p. 89. 
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
33 A.J. Steele-Greig, Op. Cit., p. 41.
34 Ibid.
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the opening in Tripoli of a secondary school with 81 boys, the first of such schools since 
Turkish times. (35) These changes can be said to indicate the emergence of an educational 
policy of sorts for Libyans in Tripolitania and could not have been conceived by the B.M.A. at 
its onset in 1942. However, by 1945 it was considering a new initiative, no doubt generated 
by the circumstances confronting it, and backed by the developing realisation, that the 
Administration could find its stay in the territory considerably prolonged into the future, so it 
had become almost a quasi-government, albeit reluctantly. Various factors can be noticed in 
bringing about this change in orientation on the part of the B.M.A., both inside and beyond the 
frontiers of the territory, apart from the emergemce of a forceful Arab opinion.
v. External influences upon policy.
The arrival in the Spring of a working party, under the Presidency of Sir Bernard Reilly, 
K.C.M.G., C.I.E., O.B.E., who had been sent by the War Office to enquire into the 
conditions in Tripolitania, was not without implications for educational developments in the 
territory. Although Steele-Greig merely observed that the working party expressed a " most 
sympathetic opinion on Education", (36) jt \s m0re than likely that Steele-Greig’s replacement, 
as Director of the Educational Department, was mooted at this time. (37) Certainly the 
Commission made various recommendations which, according to Steele-Greig, were 
"incorporated into the activities of the department." (38) The recommendations in question 
concerned the general improvement and expansion of both primary and secondary education 
and a scheme for trainees, known as the "Trainees Scheme". (39) The idea behind the scheme 
was the training of a number of Arab boys who could later be "absorbed into the various 
departments of the Administration." In this way, Libyans would be given a chance to take part 
in the "working" of the territory. (40)
A further step forward towards the idea of a general educational policy resulted from the 
visit of the Four Power Commission of Enquiry on March 5th 1948. (41) The function of the 
Commission was to supply deputies of the C.M.F., then meeting in London, with the 
necessary data relating to the eventual disposal of Tripolitania, particularly with regard to the 
views and aspirations of the local population. (42) This was important for educational 
developments under the B.M.A., the planning of which had,, until this date, been solely 
determined by the Care and Maintenance policy or in deference to the wishes of the Italian
35 Ibid., also, see L.A. Appleton, Op. Cit., p.
36 Op. Cit., P. 41.
37 Steele-Greig interview, Barbados.
38 Op. Cit., p. 41.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 B.M.A.. Annual Report, 1948, p. 10.
42 Becker, Op. Cit., pp. 113 - 114.
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population of the territory. This had been guided by the former Inspector of the Eastern 
Province, Professor Fulvio Contini, and the Italo-phil Steele-Greig, which wouid have been 
good enough if all things had been even. Unfortunately, the Arab population had neither say 
nor influence upon educational policy and was for the first time consulted on such matters by 
the Four Power Commission.
It was a great pity for the Libyans that the visit of the Four Power Commission was a 
political issue long before it reached the territory, since the Soviet Union "with an eye on the 
Italian elections wanted the Libyan report to be made public before the elections so that the 
Italian Communists could exploit the fact that the Soviet Union was willing to return Libya to 
Italy." (^3) The Commission spent about six weeks in Tripoli (44) and, although rioting 
preceded its arrival in Tripoli, leading to the arrest of an "extreme nationalist leader, named Ali 
Fikki Hassan", (45) there can be no doubt that the energy of the security forces enabled the 
Commission to canvass a wide body of opinion within the territory. (46) On this account, the 
results were not surprising with a large body of Arab opinion unanimous fore the return of 
Italian sovereignty. (47) The Commission, however, in its Libyan report was primarily 
concerned to play down the desire of the Arab population for indpendence from Italy and this 
disappointed the native population who quite naturally expected a different attitude from the 
members. (48) Despite such limitations on the part of the members, the Commission was still 
able to reach "agreement" on several "important questions." (49) These are summarised by 
Becker, as the belief that "none" of the three colonies was ready for independence; that the 
majority of the inhabitants were "illiterate" and "completely lacking in political understanding". 
(50) The Commission was also agreed that the colonies lacked the necessary wealth to 
support independent status and that each colony was badly in need of "outside help both 
financial and technical for its basic needs and future development." (51)
vi. Four Power Commission - implications of visit for educational development of Arab 
population.
The visit of the Four Power Commission of Enquiry was seen by the Italian party both inside 
the territory, in Italy itself, and amongst Italy's various supporters, such as France and the 
Soviet Union, as a chance to maximise whatever opportunity it presented to gain credence for
43 Ibiil
44 Op. Cit., p. 10.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Becker, Op. Cit., p. 117.
50 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
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the Italian case to retain Tripolitania as a sovereign Italian possession. In all this, education 
was judged as a most sensitive issue, yet of immense propaganda value if used adroitly. 
Throughout the tortuous politics surrounding the Italian campaign to retain Tripolitania, Italy's 
supporters in the territory had a reliable and invaluable ally in Steele-Greig, as the Director of 
Education, who set out to present both his own efforts and those of his Italian predecessors in 
a most favourable light. Steele-Greig's premise emphasised that both Italy and the B.M.A. 
had done all they possibly could for the educational developmment of the Arab Moslem 
inhabitants of Tripolitania; but they were still a long way behind and that it would be the task 
of future policy-makers to prepare the country for self-rule. These views were initially 
expressed by Steele-Greig in his Short History of Education in Tripolitania of 1946, (52) later 
amplified into a more extended treatment of the subject, and published by the B.M.A. Press in 
1948, as History of Education in Tripolitania - from the time of the Ottoman Occupation to the 
fifth year under British Military Occupation. (53) The 1946 edition was explicitly intended to 
serve the information needs of the War Office Working Party which visited the territory in the 
Spring of 1947 and the Four Power Commission of Enquiry of 1948. (54) The second and 
larger work was prompted by a variety of factors associated with the increasing pre-eminence 
of education as a sounding board for general discussion of the territory and its future. There 
was also the general dearth of published material yet a need to satisfy enquiring minds and 
fend off criticism of himself and the Administration's educational policy. (55) Also, the 
publication by the B.M.A. in October, 1947, of P.J. Sandison's Italian Rule in Tripolitania - a 
critical study with documents (55) a work harshly critical of Italian Educational Policies 
lauded by Steele-Greig, (57) pointed to a wind of change amongst administrators as a class 
and seems to have prompted Steele-Greig's, otherwise unchanged, second history the 
following year. (58)
A J . Steele-Greig, A Short History o f Education in Tripolitania, Tripoli, 1946.
53 A J. Steele-Greig, A History o f Education in Tripolitania - from the time o f the Ottoman Occupation 
to the fifth year under British Military Administration, Tripoli, 1948.
54 Ibid,, p. 8.
55 Four Power Commission o f Enquiry, Education, p. and AJ. Steele-Greig, Op. Cit., p. 8.
56 P.J. Sanderson, Italian Rule in Tripolitania - a critical study with documents, B.M.A. Press,, Tripoli,
1947.
57 Teobaldo Filesi, Un Documento Dlncomprehensione e Inquistizia i Memoriale Sandison, I Dritti Del 
Scuola, Tripoli, 1 May, 1948.
58 A.J. Steele-Greig, Op. Cit., Part 11 Education under Italian Occupation 1911 - 1943, pp.17 - 23. Subsequent quotes 
are taken from the 1948 edition.
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Chapter Three. Educational Policy and the British M ilitary Administration
1947 - 1950:
1. Wind of Change.
The propaganda importance of A J . Steele-Greig's 1946 publication was immediately 
recognised by the Italians as a form of British government approval of their own educational 
policies throughout the colonial period and especially after 1922 when Libya became part of 
Mussolini’s Fascist Empire. 0 )  At a time of great delicacy in the negotiations for the hoped 
and awaited return of Tripolitania to the full sovereignty of the Italian flag, Steele-Greig's 
apparent official endorsement of all their own propagandists had said repeatedly over the long 
years of colonial rule was of considerable assistance to the Italian cause and given full press 
coverage in Italian, English and Arabic, too.
Steele-Greig's work, however, was not just a statement of propaganda for the B.M.A. and 
the Italians, it also represented what he himself believed and stood for as Director of Education 
for Tripolitania. Without any attempt at providing a relevant context or subjection to critical 
evaluation, he had merely collected for presentation the authorative statements on Arab 
education from such noted Italian protagonists and propagandists as Dr. Angelo Piccioli, 
Andrea Festa, Mario Tortenese and others of the same disposition and persuasion. (2) This 
involved acceptance of the following premise - the Arabs were essentially anti-Western - 
socially, culturally, politically and in the religious sense too - and following from the 
experience of other colonial powers, such as Britain and France, were not cut out for either 
assimilation or development in any sense understandable by a Western Power. Essentially, the 
only option open to Libya, it was seen, was some version of what the world now understands 
as "apartheid", though this word was never used and indeed Italian colonialism, for all its 
mistakes and faults, lacked a racist connotation to its policies in Libya. Instead, what was 
practised in Libya by the Italians was rather a form of "cultural separatism" in an attempt to 
isolate the Arab population from the Italian colonists and from the Arabs of Arab world beyond 
the frontiers of Libya. Educationally, it had been decided over a good many years and 
experiments the best way to preserve what the Italians termed as their "civilising mission" to 
the Libyans was to allow them to develop in their own way in their own schools. These 
schools would teach therefore, alongside the Italian language, Arabic, Arab History, 
Arithmetic and the Koran. An adjustment to the system in 1936 provided the means whereby
1 Quando Non Scrive per Propaganda, L’Istruzione Publica in Libia E L’Opera Meritoria Degli Italiani Un
Documento Ufficiale. As this source was part of a collection of press cuttings, specially loaned to the 
author by Major A.J. Steele-Greig, no other title, date or author is provided. However, it is almost 
certainly from the Corriere Di Tripoli, possible from 1946.
2 A.J. Steele-Greig, Op. Cit., Part II. Education During the Italian Occupation 1911-1943, pp. 17 - 23.
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selected candidates were enabled to attend the School of Higher Islamic Studies in Tripoli.
This was to provide entry to the traditional professions, such as Muft, Cadj or school-teacher 
and also to certain minor positions in the government service.
Such a policy was bequeathed to the B.M.A. by the former Italian Administration of 
Tripolitania and, it must be added, it was also the policy put into practice by the B.M.A. more 
or less unchanged until the middle years of its dispensation, when changes were forced upon it 
by the changed political situation in the territory and beyond. During this period, the Arabs 
were seen by the B.M.A. as essentially "a problem child with a growing inferiority complex" 
who "had Italy won the war would have been destined to be "lower class Italian citizens 
dependent on their masters for such scraps of amenities and graces of the modem world they 
cared to throw them." (3) Steele-Greig viewed the future of Arab education in Libya in a 
similar way to his Italian predecessors, especially Dr. Angelo Piccioli, W  and was apparently 
as anxious as they were to establish how "it is far from easy to graft the modem system of 
education onto the social structures of Tripolitania." Steele-Greig viewed the Arab mentality as 
being divorced from the requirements of "modem education" based as it must be upon 
"modem psychology" which to the Arabs "is not acceptable.. or even understood" since they 
regard the other sex as something improper." (5) Yet despite such doubts and misgivings for 
the future, even Steele-Greig recognised that things would have to be different if only on 
account of the B.M.A. having "no long-term policy" that could be implemented. (6) 
Unfortunately, by the time these words were published in 1946 and 1948, it was already too 
late for the B.M.A. to set up - if it could indeed - a system of education adequate for Libya's 
needs and the challenge of Independence. Such a policy would have had to be initiated in 
1942 or 1943 for it to have had enough impact by 1948 to make sense of independence and the 
modem world into which Libya was emerging. Belatedly, if rather sadly, the Director of 
Education seemed to realise that new wine could no longer be poured into old bottles, and set 
about the search for a Director of Education more in touch with the mood of the moment than 
Steele-Greig had proved to be.
ii. Care and Maintenance modified.
It had been clearly recognised from the outset that the legislative, judicial, administrative and 
political powers exercised by the Chief Administrator were roughly similar to those given to a
3 Ibid.
4 Steele-Greig quotes Piccioli, a noted Fascist educator in Libya, from 1924 -1928, after which he joined 
the Ministry of Propaganda in Rome - "The main problem of the Education Department is the schools 
for Arabs. . .  one of the most difficult problems a European power can face and on which depends the 
political future of the colony. A colonising power must decide if it will be better to govern people 
who are their inferiors or prepare them for the day when they must be treated as equals." Ibid., p. 24.
3 Ibid., p. 37.
6 Ibid., p. 50.
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colonial governor. (7) Thus Brigadier Blackley in such a role for almost the whole period of 
military rule, beside the power of life and death, had also the means to organise and shape the 
administration in a variety of ways, if only within the terms of ’’Care and Maintenance”, if he 
had chosen to exercise the options open to him which are not to be over-estimated in the 
circumstances and financial constraints of the time. In this respect, as far as the educational 
policy was concerned, Blackley seems to have followed the policy of least resistance until 
around 1947, when he decided upon a new course of action. Until then, he preferred to leave 
the educational desk almost exclusively in the hands of Steele-Greig and Fulvio Contini who 
as has been shown allowed the policies of pre-B.M.A. Tripolitania more or less uninterrupted 
sway. Such policies were, however, shorn of their fascist trappings, with the basic 
curriculum in Arabic, all Italian teachers in the former Italo-Arab schools having departed for 
Italy at the outbreak of hostilities in 1940. In retrospect, the sins of such a situation were 
clearly those of omission rather than the reverse. Blackley accepted Steele-Greig from his 
predecessor, Brigadier Lush, and if an opportunity to prepare Tripolitania for independence 
was missed, nobody was aware of it, least of all the chief protagonists who thought they were 
doing a good job. (8) With the benefit of hindsight, it is difficult to criticise those in power at 
the time from exercising imagination, objectivity or even enthusiasm when we might have been 
no better ourselves or even worse.
Diluted Italian policies in education were, however, clearly outdated by 1945, if not 
before. Yet even by then, there was as yet no decision in sight over the future of Tripolitania 
despite the obvious need of the B.M.A. to modify its "Care and Maintenance" policy. An 
increasingly frustrated and critical Arab political and social opinion inside and outside the 
territory was not alone in expressing dissatisfaction with the state of affairs. Both the War 
Office Working Party of 1947 and the Four Power Commission which followed it reacted to 
the increasingly critical tone of affairs if not being in respose to it. By 1947 some of the fruits 
of change were evident in the setting up of secondary schools for Libyans in Tripoli and 
Zawiar, something the Italians had never done and an act in itself quite contrary to the spirit of 
"care and maintenance" which had done so much to prolong the inequalities of the Italian 
colonial system. These tentative steps were quickly followed by the introduction of teacher- 
training programmes for Libyans begun by a Sudanese teacher at Brigadier Blackley's own 
behest - a rare instance of his intervention in the world of Steele-Greig and Contini, (9)- 
unfortunately, an initiative that had more to do with the efforts of the War Office Working 
Party and the efforts of Blackley's chief in Cairo, Brigadier Sir Duncan Cumming, than events 
in Tripolitania. 00 )
7 B.M.A., Handbook on Tripolitania compiled from official sources, Tripoli, April, 1947, p. 43.
8 B.M.A., Annual Report, 1950, p. 7.
9 Steele-Greig, Op. Cit., p.
10 Applcton/Steele-Greig, Interview, Barbados, Jan. 1981. Steele-Greig on this occasion confided that the
"Libyanisation Project" was the brain child of the late Sir Duncan Cumming, then Chief Civil Affairs
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It is arguable that such measures were essentially palliatives rather than cures and do not 
deserve to be regarded as reforms as such, which they probably were not, given that the 
B.M.A. was not a reform-constituted body. Moreover, they were much too slight to have any 
radical effect upon the passage of events in Tripolitania at this time. They could therefore 
easily have been introduced years before and it is sad to say they appear only to have been 
brought about by outside pressure upon the Administration. In this respect something clearly 
had been wrong which should have been put right at an earlier stage but was not for reasons to 
do with the personalities concerned. On the other hand, the realisation that educational change 
or the pace of educational development in Tripolitania which had been held up for so many 
years by the policies of Italian fascism, could not be forestalled any longer even by an 
Administration run on a policy of Care and Maintenance had fianlly penetrated the mind of the 
estblishment and something had to be done about it in the shortest amount of time. Such a 
rude awakening in 1947 made further revision of policy inevitable. Especially, since the view 
was now held in the ranks of the Administration itself that a reimposition of Italian rule would 
not be tolerated by the Libyans and would result in civil strife. If the odds were now seen 
to be weighted against any reimposition of Italian rule, then those who had interpreted their 
mandate in the light of its imminent arrival, could find themselves out on a limb. In these 
circumstances, a Direcor of Education with his head in the Arab world rather than the fast 
disappearing world of Italian colonialism was required to rechart the educational horizon in 
Tripolitania.
iii. Attempts to rechart the course.
With such ends in mind and unbeknown to the Director of Education, Major A.J. Steele- 
Greig, the Chief Administrator, during the summer of 1947 while the latter was on leave, 
began confidential sounding amongst his former "cronies” and associates of the Sudan 
Colonial Service to find a replacement for Steele-Greig with impeccable Arab antecedents. ( ^ )  
Obviously, not only had Steele-Greig offended the Arabs but he committed the unpardonable 
sin of embarrassing the Administration too. He must therefore be replaced with a person as 
Arab-phile as he had been Italo-phile - no easy achievement given the Administration’s uneasy 
past and uncertain future though, of course, the carrot could always be held out that he might 
be taken on by the incoming regime - whoever or whatever that might be which was far from 
clear in 1947.
Officer at Cairo G.H.Q.. It was not therefore the direct result of any initiative of the Department of 
Education in Tripoli, though listed under education in the B.M.A.'s Annual Reports of 1947,1948 and 
1949. At any rate, Steele-Greig did not think very much of the project which he judged a failure.
11 Annual report, B.M.A., 1947, p. 13.
12 From Farrell to Cox, 14 December 1949. Though difficult to date exacdy, Blackley appears to have 
begun actively canvassing for a replacement in 1947 and had fixed upon Scott by the summer of 1949.
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These moves were to lead in 1948 to Steele-Greig’s demotion to rank of mere Deputy 
Director of Education. (13) Shocked and furious at such brusque treatment and in particular at 
being "stabbed in the back" while being on leave (the news had been communicated to him 
from Tripoli by letter) he bitterly contemplated resignation. This mood, however, did not last 
and once back in Tripoli, he was urged by his friends "not to be such a fool" but to accept the 
new offer of a diminished role. (14) Time-server as he was it was inevitable that this would 
be his ultimate response to a situation beyond his control. No one in the higher echelons, it 
appears, came to his rescue and one must assume he had few aids at such levels.
In parenthesis, it is clear Blackley and Steele-Greig had never enjoyed a good working 
relationship and social ties did not exist. Undoubtedly, the decision at Lake Success, to make 
Libya an independent state, proved a catalyst in the situation. But for this Blackley would 
have allowed Steele-Greig to soldier on to retirement, whenever the B.M.A. came to a logical 
or historical close, which he was to do in any case despite his diminished position. ( ^ )  
However, in the changed circumstances, in not only Tripolitania but in Cyrenaica too, though 
the latter was much better prepared and more advanced than the former, it is clear the Chief 
Administrator needed a man with considerable experience of the Arabs who spoke Arabic 
fluently and knew what kind of education to relate to their needs. Moreover, as the contract 
could not be for more than two years or until the end of 1951, when the B.M.A. was to be 
wound up, it would be most suitable to a retired person or one comtemplating the end of his 
career. A retired colonial servant was what was being looked for - and preferably from the 
Sudan service at that. Time, however, was fast running out, and after several formal and 
informal communications, the former Sudan educationalist, Arabist, poet and Colonial Civil 
Servant, G.C. Scott, finally accepted the challenge - and indeed it was a challenge - and agreed 
to come out of retirement and head the Education Department in Tripoli for the prescribed two 
years that the B.M.A. still had left to do.
There is no doubt that by all ostensible criteria, Cuthbert Scott was the right man for the 
job and Travers Blackley rightly considered himself extremely lucky to have secured his 
services at such a delicate and fateful time in the B.M.A.'s history. 0 ®  Scott's appointment 
as well as his attitude to his new work both before its commencement and following its 
completion, cast an important light on the B.M.A.'s educational policy for Tripolitania in the 
final three years. Regarded by his contemporaries as an "outstanding Sudan Civil Servant"
13 Of the Scott appointment to replace him as Director of Education, Tripolitania, Steele-Greig writes,
"This was one of many Blackley blunders Blackley never received a knighthood following his 
resignation in 1951 and it came about like this. While I was on leave in the U.K., B. wrote to me, 
saying he had upgraded the post of D. of E. to Grade I , , but he was appointing a new man to take over 
the job and hoped I woujd carry on as Deputy. Of course I immediately resigned but was then 
persuaded by many not to be so foolish and returned to Tripoli, to find a certain G. Scott had taken 
over..." Steele-Greig to Appleton, Barbados, Aug. 6th 1982.
14 Ibid.
^  From C. Cox to K. Dickens Esq., no address, Colonial Office, London, 9th Dec. 1949.
16 From C. Cox to T.R. Blackley, Colonial Office, London, 8th Dec. 1949.
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who in the thirties and forties had "consciously pointed educational development towards 
independence," 0 ? )  he would no doubt in different circumstances and different times have 
done much for Tripolitania. Yet as was quite simply pointed out at the time of his 
appointment, the Mediterranean is quite a different place from the Sudan, (18) and there is 
every reason to suppose that he was a very sick man when he left retirement for his final 
appointment (19) Otherwise, he was of similar generation, background and training to 
Blackley himself, both having begun their careers in the colonial office as district 
commissioners in the West Sudan, where the former became an Arabic scholar of repute. (20) 
Scott had then after several years left the political service to become a full-time inspector of 
education, eventually going on to become Warden of Gordon College and becoming, during 
the final years of the war, a key figure in founding Khartoum University. Prior to taking up 
his Libyan appointment, he had, as semi-retired, been completing research on the adaption of 
intelligence tests to an Arab environment. (21)
The final two years of B.M.A. educational strategy for Tripolitania, under the not 
particularly active direction of Cuthbert Scott, who now functioned better as a "guru" than the 
active embodiment of any set of educational ideals, was far from happy and witnessed few if 
any new intitatives to what was now a tired and virtually redundant Administration. Originally 
intended as a three-year posting to have commenced early in 1948, bureaucratic confusion and 
delays had already resulted in the loss of one "valuable year" by the time Cuthbert Scott finally 
arrived in Tripoli, delayed until January, 1949. (22) Furthermore, it was still unclear, despite
17 Mr G.C. Scou, Times Obituary Column, Time of London, 1978. Robin Hodgkin writes, "in the 
thirties and forties, he was a tremendous influence on scores of young Sudanese and young British 
recruits to the educational service - such as me." Mr Hodgkin goes on to add, however, that he was 
widely regarded in the Sudan service as an "unreliable wet.. .  and he would often be seen walking 
about wearing sandals", a clear reference to having "gone native". Hodgkin to Appleton, Bareppa 
House, nr. Falmouth, 13.8.1983. Steele-Greig's opinion seems to reinforce this - "he spoke Arabic, 
which I didn't, but was not at all liked by the Libyan staff, and did not last very long." Steele-Greig to 
Appleton, Barbados, 6th August, 1982.
18 Farrell to Cox, Tibur, Castletownsend, Co. Cork, 14 Dec. 1949.
19 In his final days as Warden of Gordon Memorial College in Khartoum, Scott had complained to Cox
of being "tired of administration and cracking up under the tremendous strain." Scott to Cox, 3
short letters, written July and August, 1944. Perhaps it is no small coincidence that the "Tripoli job" 
followed almost immediately after his retirement from the Sudan, giving him little chance to 
recuperate from the strain of his former post This verdict is confirmed by his old friend and former 
colleague, Alan Theobald, who writes, "I knew he did not enjoy the experience Tripolitania and I 
believe he had some sort of nervous breakdown, although I know no details." Quoting Scott in the 
same correspondence, Theobald writes of him ,".. .they kept sending me experts to advise me on this 
and that, when all I needed was money." Theobald to Appleton, Leicester, 22nd October 1984.
20 Although Cuthbert Scott left no written legacy, he was a formative influence on many important 
tracts and primers on the Sudan. More particularly, he was associated with the setting up of Bakht er 
Ruda, the most effective means, whereby the British spread education in backward rural areas of the 
Sudan through the training of elementary schools teachers. There is no evidence, however, that he 
attempted to implement such ideas under similar circumstances in Tripolitania. Theonald to Appleton, 
Op- Cit.
21 G.C. Scotty Op. Cit.
22 The Annual Report of 31st December, 1949, lists Scott as "Grade I, Director of Education - to arrive 
from the U.K" and Steele-Greig as "Grade II C.E.O.", Annual report 1949, p. 71.
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excellent Arabic, that his ignorance of Libya could be redeemed other than by communication 
with Blackley as Steele-Greig refused even to speak to him although he was still Deputy 
Director. For some, however, Scott's ignorance of the country was conceived as an 
advantage, since he would be able to make a clean start without any preconceptions about the 
place. (22) {n this, Steele-Greig's silence was probably a mixed blessing though officially 
designated as "advisor on educational matters" it is clear the latter still basically ran the show or 
so he maintained. (24) Scott and all those concerned with his appointment were however in 
no doubt that he had been called to a "thankless task" for which there would be no laurels but 
which nonetheless had to be done "excellently". (25) Moreover, he would be on his own as it 
had been decided at G.H.Q. Cairo not to call on the direct support of either the Colonial or 
Foreign Office in case it be misinterpreted by others. (26) Obviously, the circumstances were 
not favourable for making a new appointment to so important and sensitive a post (22);and it is 
difficult to resist the conclusion that Blackley had procrastinated too long over the removal of 
Steele-Greig, given this was deemed by him to be necessary. Not surprisingly, it was 
belatedly recognised that Cuthbert Scott would "have difficulty in effecting any change" 
whatever. (28) it was also recognised that although there was much in the "Sudan System" 
that was "admirable" in its place, that place was "not in the Mediterranean region". (29) 
Furthermore, as Scott's mentor, Jerome Farrell, would often remind him, "It is barely possible 
to put education on the right track within two years with some faint hope that the track will not 
be tom up", as elsewhere in the Arab world, following the granting of independence. (20) 
Basically, as Cox concurred with Farrell, Scott would have little chance "to do much in 
Tripolitania at the present time, except to improve relations with the Arab population, at which 
he is likely to do better than anyone I can think of." (21) Also, it was clear that Scott would 
have "little money in the two years at his disposal, but it will be something if he gets across a 
feeling of good will, combined with sound educational ideas and practice." (22) It was thus
23 Farrell expressed his willingness to help Scott with advice, but averred that "he might prefer to be 
unhampered by other people's views?". Farrell to Cox, 14.12.1949.
24 Steele-Greig, in unforgiving vein, mercilessly describes "Scott" as "no good for the job, never having 
had any experience in Education, but could speak Arabic. He really had no policies and just kept on 
taking advice from me". It is likely here, however, that he was lumping Scott with Cyril Lea, who 
certainly had no experience of education before becoming D. of E. in Tripolitania. Steele-Greig to 
Appleton, Barbados, 7th August 1988.
25 Cox to Dickens, Colonial Office, London, 9th Dec. 1949.
26 Ibid.
27 Farrell to Cox, Tiburi, Castletownsend, Co. Cork, 14th Dec. 1949.
28 Ibid.
2^ Ibid.
30 Farrell's remarks on the fate of British educational efforts following the grant of independence, makes 
the "contemplation of Egypt, Iraq, Syria and the Lebanon", he adds, "not encouraging", Ibid.
31 Cox to Farrell, Colonial Office, London, 19th Dec. 1949.
32 Technically, the reason for Scott being on such a short financial rein lay in Blackley's submission of 
estimates for 1950, immediately prior to appointment of the new D. of E. Also, "neither Blackley nor 
F.O.A.A.T. seemed anxious", adds Farrell, "to face supplementary estimates." Farrell to Cox, Tibur, 
14th Dec. 1949. Also, see Cox to Farrell, Colonial Office, 19th Dec. 1949.
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made abundantly clear that the last thing the Administration needed at this point was someone 
who would try to push through desperate last-minute changes to the system as it had 
developed under "Care and Maintenance" or in any way "rock the boat" despite appearances to 
the contrary.
Instead, what was needed was a communicator or diplomatic-type figure who would seek 
to improve relations not with the Italians, as had been Steele-Greig’s initial role, but the Arabs. 
This is more or less in accordance with Steele-Greig's own estimation of Cuthbert Scott, 
viewing him rather as a talker than as a doer and consequently to be despised, Steele-Greig 
seeing himself in the former role as the man of action par excellence. This view of the new 
Director of Education appears to have accorded with his brief tenure of office in Tripoli, as he 
achieved nothing of real substance for the year he was "D. of E." in Steele-Greig's accepted 
parlance, though he probably improved Anglo-Arab relations somewhat
Yet even in the latter role, doubts are expressed, as Arabs are often surprised and even 
suspicious of people who speak their language with fluency and all Scott's experience had 
been garnered in the Sudan. Hence, Steele-Greig was probably right when he recorded that 
Cuthbert Scott was not liked by the Arabs at the Department of Education, though such an 
estimate of Scott cannot be entirely divorced from some degree of personal prejudice, perhaps 
natural in the circumstances.
However, further conjecture is pointless since at this point the post of Director of 
Education Tripolitania was handed over by Travers Blackley to another of his former "pals" in 
the shape of the ex-Sudan Colonial Service retiree, Cyril or "Sheikh" Lea. This appointment, 
however, like that of Cuthbert Scott was also a disaster, as Lea only survived in the post for a 
year though should have had his contract extended for at least a further term. (33)
iv. The dawn of the advisor-era and the demise of the B.M.A.
Cuthbert Scott's appointment in the final years of the B.M.A. to what can only be described as 
a communicatory rather than a constructive role in Tripoli, perhaps only serves to underscore 
the ending of one era and the dawning of another. As such, it marks the phasing out of the 
neo-colonialist-type policies associated with Steele-Greig and carried out by his friend and
33 Steele-Greig adds that "Scott was an old buddy of Blackley in the Sudan, who had just retired, on 
reaching the age limit SO in the Sudan Colonial Service, he had been in agriculture there possibly a 
reference to Scott's interest in rural education and knew nothing about education, jobs for the boys...." 
Scott's failure to survive very long as D. of E. led Blackley to "get hold of Lea, Ex-Sudan Service, 
Administration, 1 think, definitely not education confimed by contact with Cyril Lea, as Lea retired 
shortly before.", Steele-Greig to Appleton, Aug. 6th, 1982. Cyril Lea, known to his friends as 
"Sheikh Lea", had only worked ifor two years, 1933-1935, as Chief Inspector of Schools, Northern 
Sudan, whereas Cuthbert Scott had a distinguished record as an educator in the Sudan. "Sheikh Lea" 
took up his appointment as D. of E. on 30.1.1952 and lasted until the end of the year, when he was 
suddenly dismissed by the recently appointed Libyan Minister of Education, a former Al-Azhar 
graduate. Sheikh Lea to Appleton, Details of Education and Experience.
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confidant, the redoubtable Cav. Fulvio Contini. The inertia, however, associated with the 
passing of the B.M.A. ensured the survival of the Steele-Greig empire in Tripoli, so to speak, 
even to the very doorstep and threshold of the independence era itself.
It is therefore Steele-Greig, for all his qualities and faults, who must be regarded as the 
creator of popular education in Tripolitania in the post-colonial era, even if what he built can 
mainly be regarded as forming a bridge from Fascism to the self-determination that emerged 
after 1951. In this respect, Steele-Greig can be seen as not only getting the schools going, but 
also as presiding over their expansion too. This could not be said for obvious reasons of 
Cuthbert Scott who, while possessing executive powers, was primarily called upon to 
communicate and advise. Scott recognised this, seeing himself as the harbinger of the advisor- 
era - "the North African sky is black with aeroplanes carrying American experts," he confided 
sourly on leaving Tripoli to his former colleague, Cox. (34)
The problem was, as Scott's final comments infer, that although Britain and America, 
along with the United Nations, both would become increasingly involved in the funding of 
educational development in the years following Libyan independence, Scott had the 
unfortunate experience of lacking the essential funding for new projects. Blackley had already 
made this clear to him on his appointment, since the estimates for the year had already been 
submitted to London, before Scott's arrival in Tripoli. (35) Hence Scott's whimsical remark 
to a friend, "Whenever I ask for money, they simply send me more experts." (36) At this 
stage, any changes that occurred did not originate in Scott's mission, but were those 
"implemented by the United Nations Commission, helping to prepare for independence and 
paid for by the American Point Four Funds building schools, training teachers and finally 
introducing the Egyptian system". (37)
Thus in the final months of the B.M.A.'s existence in Tripolitania, Adrian Pelt, as the 
United Nations Commissioner to Libya, managed to get the B.M.A. and the Libyan 
Consultative Committee to agree on the introduction to the territory of the Egyptian system, so 
aligning Tripolitania with its sister province of Cyrenaica, where it had been going since the 
B.M.A.'s original inception there in 1942. (38) There is no doubt that this wise measure
34 Scott also confided to Cox that although he "didn't regret taking your advice to go to Tripoli neither
did I regret leaving it when the two years were up." He believed that now , the Libyans would have 
"to make their own mistakes" though commiserated upon the fate of Sheikh Lea who "had a frightful 
time with a pig-headed minister from Al-Azhar, who crowned a career of folly and failure by sacking 
him." It seems clear from this letter that Scott had nothing to say in favour of Steele-Greig who had 
still managed to survive on in an advisory role at Tripoli. Not surprisingly Scott places the blame for 
the state of education in Tripolitania on Steele-Greig. He did not hesitate to describe his predecessor as 
being responsible for the state of education in Tripolitania and education as being "in a mess" and 
Steele-Greig as "the lazy time-server British who made all the mistakes under the old B.M.A. It's sad 
to think," he adds, "of those wretched children. But there's nothing we can do about it...." Scott to 
Cox, Yarmouth, Isle of Wight, 28th June, 1953.
35 See infra, p. 41 and footnotes re 32
36 Theobald to Appleton, Op. Cit.
37 Steele-Greig to Appleton, Barbados, July 22nd, 1984.
3  ^ Annual Report, B.M.A., Cyrenaica, 1944, p. 8.
60
stood Cyrenaica in much better stead on the advent of independence by which time the Eastern 
province had almost ten years experience of a fully comprehensive system for which there had 
been no parallel in Tripolitania. Had the same policy been adopted for a similar period in 
Tripolitania, the province would have immensely benefited from such a measure. As a result, 
Tripolitania would have stood in a much better position politically, culturally and in every other 
way, on the eve of independence. Why this system was not adopted in Tripolitania is a 
mystery that cannot be easily explained, though it is hoped that the ensuing chapters will in 
some measure shed a modicum of truth on the issue.
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Chapter Four Elementary Education: Phase One 19423 - 1946
I. Introduction: the Choice of a system for Tripolitania
"It is against the background of frustration and 
muddled hopes and fears, now accentuated by the 
growing realisation of the poverty of the country, 
that a system of Arab education has been built up 
in Tripoli." 0 )
The term "elementary education" is of its nature extremely broad in meaning being variously 
understood to imply education in the essential elements prior to proceeding to either secondary 
education proper or some kind of vocational education or training. In an Arab or Moslem 
context such as Libya the essential elements are invariably seen to consist of the Arabic 
Language and the Koran, to which has been added in more modem tim es, Arithmetic,
History, Geography and Physical Education - or in the case of female education, the details of 
domestic economy. This was the programme, along with the inclusion of the Italian 
Language, adopted by the Italian colonial government of Libya prior to the setting up of the 
B.M.A. in December 1942. (2) Unfortunately for the B.M.A., the Italo-Arab schools, as the 
schools for Libyans were termed, were never really popular with the native populations of the 
two provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. This was because of the association of these 
schools with the Fascist Government of Italy and the tendency of these schools to Italianise 
and to be used as instruments of government propaganda by the Fascist authorities. (3) 
Therefore the British Government via G.H.Q. Cairo had little hesitation in suppressing the 
Italo-Arab schools in both provinces without having recourse to any form of promulgation. (4) 
In which case the B.M.A.S of the two provinces were quite free at their inception to make a 
fresh start in their two respective spheres of control with the vexed question of education.
This was in marked contrast to the situation obtaining in other areas and services where the 
military regimes were bound by International Law to preserve the status quo ante bellum even 
if this was contrary to the best interests of the indigenous populations of the territories.
The choice of a future pattern of education for both Tripolitania and Cyrenaica was to some 
extent simplified by the Italian failure in either province - or the Fezzan - to develop a 
comprehensive system of education for the Arabs during thirty years of colonial rule in Libya. 
Only elementary schools had been permitted for Arabs and the traditional Kuttabs were not
1 Steele-Greig, Op. Cit., 1948, p. 34.
2 See R.D. 21 giugno 1928, n. 1698. Norme reflettenti I'istmzione primaria per i musulmani della 
Tripolitania e della Cyrenaica, B.U.T., 19,1147.
3 See, De MArco, Italianisation o f African Natives, New York, 1943.
4 Steele-Greig/Appleton Interview, Barbados, 3 Jan. 1982. Also, Annual Report Tripolitania 1944, p. 5.
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included the government system, though subject to periodic inspection, (5) in which respect, 
they were seen as co-existing alongside the government sponsored Italo-Arab schools. In 
B.M.A. Cyrenaica, where Mr Eric de Candole, the Chief Administrator's Deputy, with 
considerable experience of the British Sudan, went in for the Egyptian system. (6) Thus, all 
primary schools, mainly situated in the towns and villages of the coast and the interior, as well 
as Benghazi and the principal towns of the coast, were subject to a specially designed four- 
year programme of vernacular education. 0)  This decision to adopt the Egyptian system had 
considerable advantages for the territory at all the interelated levels of educational development. 
It was also best adapted on the test of experience to the needs of Moslem Arabs and was 
capable of immediate implementation without any need for further adaption. As such, it related 
directly to secondary, vocational, teacher training and even university education, to the 
inestimable advantage of the Cyrenaican Arabs. Furthermore, by linking the system to Egypt, 
the B.M.A. at the most critical time for educational development in the territory, had instantly 
available, trained teachers, curriculum, examination systems, teacher training facilities in 
Egypt, and experts from a neighbouring country ready and willing to be recruited for the 
training of native teachers in Cyrenaica. Supplies of suitable text books and other such 
material for schools were also easily to be obtained. (8) There can be no doubt that the 
adoption, virtually lock stock and barrel, of the Egyptian system was of great value to 
Cyrenaica, in preparing for independence under Sayed Idris A1 Senusi. It relegated at a stroke 
the neglect and bad policies of the former Italian regime to the dust-bin of history where they 
rightfully belonged.
No doubt the adoption of the Egyptian system in Cyrenaica was to a large extent facilitated 
by the decision of the British Government in January 1942 "that His Majesty's Government 
are determined that the Senusi in Cyrenaica will not again be submitted to Italian domination" 
(9) though the principles of International Law were nevertheless to be applied particularly in 
respect of "enemy property". At which point, the historian, bearing in mind the tragic history 
of the sister province of Tripolitania, especially where education is concerned, is of necessity 
obliged to ask if similar provision could not at this point have been made available too? As it 
was, the Egyptian system was not to be applied in the sister province of Tripolitania until 1952 
when the two provinces were finally united under a single Arab flag. Was it the lack of a 
political decision over the future of Tripolitania in 1942 that was responsible for the Egyptian 
system not being adopted there, given that the Egyptian system was the best then available and 
eminently suited for adoption in either province? Without doubt, the decision not to use that 
system in Tripolitania too was a very important one and, it can be said, accounts to a large
5 See, Appleton, Op. Cit., p. 312.
6 E.V. de Candole to Appleton, Burley, Hants, 10.10.1980.
7 Annual report, B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1944, p. 8.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., p. 3.
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extent for the lop-sided, educational development of the two territories under British rule. In 
fact, there is almost a parallel with 1919, when the Italian Government of the day, with 
pacification through conciliation in mind, issued the two Fundamental Laws of Tripolitania and 
Cyrenaica. Unfortunately, the government failed to develop the liberal education provisions of 
these laws for the Northern coastal province because of the "political uncertainty" prevailing 
there at the time.(10) Or to put it plainly, did Brigadiers Maurice Lush and Travers Blackley 
ever possess the Egyptian option in 1942 and 1943? Or was this a decision to be taken by the 
higher echelons - G.H.Q. Cairo or maybe London Government?
One answer to this question is provided by Major Steele-Greig himself as D. of E., for 
most of the B.M. A., when he asserts that whereas the decision not to continue with the Italian 
system (for Arabs) was taken at a higher level, the decision what to put in its place was taken 
by himself. 0 1 ) It is certainly difficult otherwise to explain Steele-Greig's opposition to the 
Egyptian system in terms of Egyptian educational involvement in Tripolitania which he always 
opposed. At the time he may even have placed himself at variance with Blackley on the issue 
or at least with the "Zeitgeist". On the other hand, it is impossible to exclude political 
considerations entirely from this decision since they make so much logical sense. These 
would include whether it was more desirable for Cyrenaicans to be more closely associated 
with Egypt than with Tripolitania should the latter revert to Italy, as was generally supposed to 
occur before 1947. Should this happen, then it was desirable that Egyptian influence be kept 
to a minimum in the territory. Otherwise, the B.M.A. could be said to have pre-mandated 
Italian claims on the territory.
The latter had by no means been rejected by the Allies either before or after 1942 and had 
in fact grown more plausible with Italy entering the war on the side of the Allies following 
Mussolini's flight from Rome. This may cast light upon the true extent of Steele-Greig's real 
authority at the time - being seen rather as the official of the Military Occupation which had 
only endowed him with an administrative rather than a policy-making role in the affairs of 
Tripolitania.
Even if this hypothesis of Steele-Greig's role is accepted, he could still have had control over 
the curriculum and consequently the recruitment of teachers too. Certainly all communication 
with him confirms this point, as do his remarks that the reason for not adopting Egyptian 
teachers was deeply entrenched opposition to them by the population at large.
10 Appleton, Op. Cit., pp. 192 - 230.
11 Steele-Greig/Appleton, Barbados, Jan. 1982. Further confirmation that the choice of a curriculum was
Steele-Greig's, or at least appeared to emanate from him, is provided in his History o f Education in 
Tripolitania, Op. Cit., p. 32. For relevant extract, see supra, footnote 30, p. 52.
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II. Curriculum or "Syllabus"?
The decision not to adopt the Egyptian or Sudanese system for Tripolitania must have thrown 
Steele-Greig back on his resources which as an educator or administrator were slight Neither 
could the question of devising a suitable curriculum for Tripolitania be viewed as a purely 
pragmatic matter. Theoretically, the question was pu t "whether the geographical position of 
Tripolitania with its traditional connections with European civilisation demanded that education 
be based upon a European system, or whether it should be grounded upon the traditional Arab 
schools, of which the curriculum might be enlarged to include other subjects such as 
Arithmetic." (12) This was surely going back over old ground whether Steele-Greig was 
aware of it or not, as Contini certainly was. The question was somewhat simplified by there 
only being "elementary subjects" to consider. (13) Yet, as observation of developments in 
Cyrenaica has shown, the term is capable of considerable differentiation, unless divorced from 
its root definition, as "the essential elements prior to proceeding to either secondary education 
proper or some kind of vocational education." (14) in Cyrenaica, elementary education 
implied, besides the "essential elements", two curricula - for primary and rural education in the 
form of vernacular schools proper. Also, the primary curriculum was more structured than the 
vernacular curriculum in Cyrenaica, since it was based upon attaining a set of standards.
These were expressed as an upper and lower level and as such comprised a fixed number of 
years after which the pupils were appropriately tested before being allowed to proceed to the 
next stage. (15) Steele-Greig offers no such differentiation in his eventual choice of 
curriculum for the schools which in effect hardly differed from the former Italo-Arab schools. 
Instead, he merely states in what can only be described as amateurish language that "the 
syllabus was based upon that which existed and was in force in England, viz. language (Italian 
or Arabic), arithmetic, religion (according to the faith of the pupils), physical training, 
hygiene, arts (drawing, singing, handwriting, etc), history, geograsphy, science (in the upper 
classes only), each subject being graded according to the class, French being taught in class 
6." (16) The expression "that which existed" must be seen to refer, in the case of Arab 
education, to that which had existed in Italian times, namely the programmes in force in the 
former Italo-Arab schools. It is interesting to note that by 1946 the curriculum of the Arab 
schools had been extended in the province to include Italian again despite such a measure 
meeting the disapproval of the "extremist political parties." (17) It is far from clear, however,
what the reference to "the syllabus in force in England" can mean? Obviously the first
months of the occupation were a difficult time and it may simply have been inserted into the
12 Annual Report Cyrenaica 1944, p. 8.
13 Ibid., p. 65.
14 See, infra, p. 46.
15 Annual Report Cyrenaica, 1944, p. 8.
16 Annual Report Tripolitania, 1943, p. 65.
17 Steele-Greig, Op. Cit., p. 42.
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Annual Report to satisfy opinion in Whitehall that the Fascist system had been dismantled and 
replaced by something more familiar. It obviously does not refer to the Italian schools which 
were obliged by International Law to continue in accordance with the Italian system operating 
in Italy. (18) Therefore Steele-Greig’s remarks must be construed as referring to the schools 
for Arabs. He had of course been a preparatory school master and this is the kind of syllabus 
one would expect to find in such a school in the pre-war period. On the other hand, he may be 
referring to the need to broaden the existing curriculum or syllabus of the Italo=-Arab schools 
in the light of his English experience - through the addition of a "European language", which 
could only have been Italian and the introduction of the normal elements of the English 
curriculum such as Arithmetic, History, Geography, etc.,etc. One must therefore conclude 
that the B.M.A.'s blueprint for the Arab schools for the duration of the British Administration 
would be the same as had operated under the former Italian regime but shorn of the elements of 
Fascist proselytizing.
In respect of both the Italian schools and the Arab schools, the B.M.A. was following 
International Law for Military Rule in Occupied Territories for Tripolitania. In this respect, the 
British Government could be criticised for making an exception of the Eastern province or 
Cyrenaica, where the local population, since the Italian population had left en masse at the 
commencement of hostilities, was exclusively Arab and got a much fairer educational deal than 
their Tripolitanian compatriots, who, unlike the Cyrenaicans, had been active on the Italian and 
German side against the British. Tripolitania would have to wait until 1951 before similar 
education provision to that operating in Cyrenaica in 1941 could be made for them.
III. School Textbooks and Materials
Having decided not to put the Arab system onto an agreed curriculum as in Cyrenaica, Steele- 
Greig opted for a simplified syllabus for all elementary schools under his control. 09 ) A 
different approach would have to be adopted for the schools of the rural areas and the interior 
of the territory, though this was not an immediate priority in 1942. For the moment, it was 
better to concentrate upon the coastal areas in which the Italians had focused their main 
educational aim for the Moslem population. (2®) The results of going it alone at once began to 
become manifest as no textbooks other than those produced under the Fascist Ministry of 
Education were available for the Arab schools. This made nonsense of any talk about 
modelling the Arab schools upon the schools in England.(21) since textbooks for such
18 "The arrangement of the Syllabus for the Italian schools was simple, since the Italian system was good 
and required little alteration, except for the expurgation of Fascism.” Ibid.,
p. 34.
19 Syllabus for Arab Primary Schools in Tripolitania, See Appendix, p. 329.
20 See, Appleton, Op. Cit., Appendix - list of Italian schools for Arabs in Tripolitania, start of School 
Year, 1939 -
21 See, supra, p. 8122 Annual Report, 1943, p. 66.
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purposes, if available which was extremely doubtful in wartime, would clearly not be 
appropriate, apart from the language problem, for Arab children in a Libyan environment This 
is yet another nail in the coffin of the original schemes for the territory hastily drawn up in 
1942 which in retrospect must be seen as administrative poppycock.
In such circumstances the only option open to Steele-Greig was to make use of the 
available school text-books designed for Italian children in the colonial schools. In this his 
luck was in since "for the teaching of Italian there was a sufficient stock available." (22) in 
which latter respect he adds, "These had been scrutinised and expurgated of Fascist teaching" 
and "as there was only a small number of Arab language books available," (23) there can be 
little doubt that at least initially these books were used for both Italian and Libyan children.
Steele-Greig, therefore, had a problem immediately on opening the schools, a problem it is 
obvious he would have had in any case, but nonetheless a problem that would not go away but 
get worse and could only be solved by finding a suitable and easily obtainable supply in 
another Arab country, such as Tunisia, Egypt, Syria or Lebanon, where educational systems 
were already relatively well advanced. Fortunately, this solution sems to have been adopted 
and "in consultation with the Palestinian Inspectors", orders for further supplies of "selected" 
books were placed in Palestine, Syria and London, though none in Egypt which would have 
been the most readily available source of supply. (24)
By the end of 1943 about "60% of those ordered," wrote Steele-Greig, "have arrived and 
have been distributed to the schools." (25) It is far from clear, however, what the texts were 
that arrived in 1943. Even by 1948, in Steele-Greig's outline of educational developments in 
the territory, (26) t "The only book of any use to Arab scholars," was described as being, "a 
primer for the first class." Steele-Greig continues, "There were no Arab text-books on 
arithmetic, history, geography, etc.,etc., nor any copies of the Koran. Due to the state of war 
existing in 1943, it was impossible to obtain any from outside, but for the 1945 school year 
and subsequently, sufficient school books have been purchased from Egypt" (27) Thus by 
1945 the authorities had finally turned to Egypt for a supply of suitable books, but still had not 
opted for the Egyptian curriculum for which they were tailor-made. Furthermore by 1945, in 
view of the dearth of "Arabic books of educational value" in the territory, a committee was set 
up "to compile a much needed history and geography of Tripolitania." (28) Unfortunately, 
none of the manuscripts submitted met with Steele-Greig's approval, apart from the history 
book. (29)
22 p. 84.
23 Ibidl
24 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
26 Ibid., p. 33.
27 Ibid., p. 33.
28 Ibid., p. 38.
2  ^ Ibid.
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Text-books produced outside the territory at best could hardly be expected to meet the 
needs of Libya's children, as soon became obvious, in the case of history and geography for 
which special texxt-books would have to be prepared. Again the pivotal problem was the lack 
of a relevant curriculum in place of which there only existed Steele-Greig's homespun 
''syllabus". Therefore whatever text-books were acquired from abroad they were bound to 
appear like fish out of water in so far as they could not relate to the educational purpose for 
which they were presumably written. Whether Steele-Greig could have rendered educational 
arrangements in the territory more effective through moving a step in the direction of securing 
the appropriate curriculum for which the books were originally devised is open to speculation. 
It seems such a small step to make and one cannot help surmising that had the D. of E. 
exercised enough pressure in such a direction official acquiescence might have followed; but it 
must not be forgotten that he was a relatively small fish in the Administration and overall 
control was exercised in London and Cairo.
IV. The Italian Connection.
Between the arrival of the Eigth Army in Tripoli, 23rd January 1943 and the appointment in 
June 1943 of Steele-Greig, with the rank of m,ajor, to the position of D. of E. Tripolitania, the 
Northern province was without any kind of educational authority. (30) During this interlude, 
the schools of the territory were badly damaged and in some cases completely looted. (31) 
Consequently, school materials, books, teaching materials, desks, blackboards, tables and 
chairs were almost non-existant when, in the uncertain circumstances of 1943, the recently 
appointed D. of E. re-opened the schools. (32) This situation was to a considerable extent 
mitigated by the discovery of much equipment "walled up in buildings scattered around the 
territory." Such discoveries of equipment unfortunately did little to redress the situation as 
most of the material disappeared due to army requisitions of objects such as chairs, pianos and 
almost everything else of value to the war effort. (33) Fortunately at this point an enormous 
cachet of school materials was discovered and Steele-Greig was able through the good offices 
of Cav. Fulvio Contini to gain access to it. (34)
30 Steele-Greig's initial brief was "to open primary schools for the teaching of pupils through the medium 
of the Italian and Arabic Language; survey existing school buildings for repairs, etc.; prepare estimates 
of expenditure and a suitable Curriculum; and to screen and appoint teaching and administrative staff.”
See, Op. Cit., p. 32.
31 Annual Report B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1945, p. 64.
3^ Op. Cit., p. 31.
33 Ibid., p. 31.
34 Contini had taken good care of this material consisting of a good two year's of school supplies. Originally the 
cargo of a ship destined for Eritrea, Somalia and Ethiopia which had been diverted at the outbreak of war to Tripoli 
where it had been promptly relieved of its cargo. Steele-Greig to Appleton, Interview, St. James, Barbados, Jan., 
1982.
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Originally received in Tripoli in 1941, this material, which was quite considerable, had not 
yet been unpacked when the British expeditionary force first arrived, and though first stored in 
the town was later removed to Bianchi and Ma’amura. (35) According to Steele-Greig this 
store in 1943 provided "a sufficient supply of exercise books, pencils, pens, etc., etc., to last 
well over three years, notwithstanding that large quantities had been requisitioned by the army 
in 1943." (36) This cache undoubtedly "saved the B.M.A. much money" (37) besides 
providing the school population with basic materials otherwise virtually unobtainable from 
England because of the war. In Eritrea and Somalia, for want of equipment, reading, writing 
and simple calculation had to be performed in sand-boxes. (38) Unfortunately, lucky find as it 
was, it did not solve the problem of providing suitable text-books for the schools, which was 
not resolved until 1951.
Even shortages of vital equipment persisted, especially of teachers' desks and cupboards. 
(39) Moreover, while a considerable amount of damaged furniture was repaired, "there was a 
lack of equipment", Steele-Greig notes meticulously, "for the doctor's rooms." (40) These 
shortages of basic equipment were, by the commencement of the new school-year, October 
1944, starting to have a telling effect on any further school expansion programmes, "the 
supply of banches, desks and other fumitire being exhausted." (41) The same trend continued 
into the 1945 school year, when financial cuts in the education programme, just as the 
numbers were reaching former Italian levels, reduced further growth expectations, though the 
Administration considered the targets reached as sufficient for Care and Maintenance. (42)
The shortages were, however, beginning to affect the quality of education provided. This was 
apparent for the school-year 1944 -1945 when LST 2,300, reserved for the purchase of 
school texts and equipment, now in short supply as the Italian stores began to run out, had to 
be "dereserved", causing "so serious a shortage of school equipment that most schools had to 
be run with both morning and afternoon sessions, which adversely affected attendance." (43) 
There is no indication in the Annual Report for the School Year 1945 - 6 of any general 
improvement in the situation, despite other improvements, and one must therefore assume, the 
original targets having been reached, only a new policy directive would change the situation 
and produce further expansion so badly neded. (44)
3  ^ Steele-Greig, Op. Cit., p. 33.
36 Ibid.
37 Steele-Greig to Appleton, Barbados, Jan. 1982.
38 Kynaston-Snell to Appleton, Interview at Poole, Dorest on 22 May, 1982. The late Dr. Kynaston- 
Snell had been Director of Education in Eritrea during the whole period there of the British Military Rule 
1940 - 1949.
39 Steele-Greig, Op. Cit., p. 33.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Annual Report Tripolitania, 1945, p. 34.
43 Ibid.
44 Annual Report, Tripolitania, 1946, pp. 33 - 34.
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V. Schools.
Basically, the aim of the B.M.A. during the first, four years of the Administration was to 
"revive" education, which had ceased entirely at the time of the Expeditionary Force's arrival 
in Tripolitania. By "revival" was meant the reopening of all those schools still functioning in 
the final year of the former Italian Administration in 1941 or at the outbreak of war with the 
Allies in 1940. In this work the ethnic and cultural balance inherited from Ottoman times was 
to be maintained in the schools. Thus, Arab, Jewish, Italian and various expatriate elements, 
such as Cypriot, Greek, Maltese and European, were to have their schools restored in the exact 
pre-war pattern. Moreover, while the pupil numbers, teachers and schools were to be the 
same as in 1940, these levels were not to be exceeded, and indeed if necessary cut back, as in 
fact occurred though for financial reasons, in 1946. The B.M.A. therefore, while anxious to 
honour its commitment to International Law, had no "civilising Mission" in mind, such as the 
Italians claimed to have, when they invaded the territory in 1911. The Administration would 
do what it had to do in the field of education as elsewhere; but no more in view of its very 
temporary nature and pecualir character as a military, not a colonial, administration. We 
should not therefore be particularly surprised to note that the B.M.A., neither in 1943 or 
subsequently entertained the idea of launching into a school building programme. Tripolitania, 
where few buildings had been destroyed and which had become in Italian times virtually a 
European capital had its stock of educational building more or less intact. Cyrenaica, on the 
other hand, had been utterly devastated by the war and required to be entirely rebuilt before it 
could begin to function as in former times. Also, as has been noted, many new departures 
took place in education which were not extended, for reasons that will never be entirely clear, 
to the sister province. Colonial times, therefore, tended to live on in Tripolitania, though the 
prosperity of those times had evaporated, as recession gripped the province after the war, and 
austerity measures began to bite. In such an atmosphere, few changes were envisaged in 
education, which had dificulty even remaining within the narrow constraints determined by 
Care and Maintenance.
VI. Buildings.
Given such aims and the essential character of the regime, it was necessary at the start, if 
colonial levels of school population were to be reached, for all the former schools to be 
brought back into service as educational institutions, through making the needed repairs to 
their fabric in 1943. This was important, as many schools in the First six months of 1943 had 
suffered from vandalism, looting, military requisitioning and bomb damage. Steele-Greig's 
first task, on becoming D. of E. in June 1943, was to carry out a "comprehensive survey of
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the schools and equipment in the territory." (45) The six-month delay in appointing an 
education officer for Tripolitania had led to more damage taking place in schools in rural areas. 
This was due to military requisitions and the simple fact that "not all soldiers appreciated the 
future use of school furniture and equipment." (46) The general situation was summed up by 
Steele-Greig as "following the evacuation of Italian troops, a certain section of the Arab and 
Jewish population took advantage of the abandonment of school buildings to loot and destroy. 
In the former case, the five large schools were stripped of everything moveable and 
immoveable, even the electric and latrine fittings, doors and windows, while marble steps and 
floor tiles were tom up, leaving the buildings as mere empty shells." Steele-Greig concluded, 
"Whether this action was done for gain or spite will never be k n o w n ."(47)
Such was the situation at the start of Steele-Greig’s appointment as D. of E. Tripolitania. 
Yet it was most important that these buildings and others like them be brought back into use, 
since they represented the total stock of educational buildings in the territory, without which 
even colonial levels of schooling could not be arrived at. Steele-Greig’s survey of the former 
Italian schools revealed they numbered 214, most of which had been closed since June 1940. 
Of these 120 had been open in 1941, but only 60 in 1942 and then for a mere two months, so 
making educational activity virtually non-existant when the B.M.A. took over in January 
1943. (48) In Tripoli city, the 22 existing schools were either occupied by the military or 
R.A.F. units (49); or had been so badly damaged by air raids and looting as to be unuseable 
without urgent repairs. (50) The same was true in the provinces but here schools were intact 
but badly looted. The school situation at the end of 1943 was given as follows: "There are 
now 106 schools open, 54 Italian and 52 Arab distributed as follows:
Tripoli City .............. . . .  14- 8 Italian & 6 Arab
Tripoli Province......... . .  27- 17 " 10 "
Central Province......... . .  16- 2 14 ’’
Northern Province 15- 9 6 ’’
Eastern Province......... 12- 12 ’’ 5
Western Province. . . . . .  22- 11 " 11 ’’
This tally of schools in 1943 for Tripolitania coincided more or less with the position at the end 
of 1939 when there were probably 64 government primary schools for Arabs with a total roll
45 Annual Report, Tripolitania, 1943, p. 64.
46 Steele-Greig, Op. Cit., P. 31.
47 Ibid.
48 Op. Cit., P. 31.
49 The Arts and Crafts School still continued to function even though partly occupied by a Royal Air Force Balloon
Unit. See, Steele-Greig, Op. Cit., p. 31.
50 Annual Report Tripolitania, 1943, p. 64.
Ibid., p. 65.
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of 6136 pupils. (52) Until 1945, it was the objective of the B.M.A. to restore to what it had 
been like prior to its arrival in 1942. This meant the same number of schools and pupils or 
around 64 elementary schools in full operation attended by 7988 pupils. (53)
VII. Difficulties in Meeting the Swelling Demand.
By the end of the first educational year for the B.M.A. in the summer of 1943,50 schools had 
been opened and 4848 Arab children had been enrolled in them. (54) These, however, were 
insufficient to meet the demands of the population and in October when the new educational 
year began, a further 29 schools were opened for Arabs, expanding the rolls to 7988 - a 3140 
increase over the previous year. (55) At this point, the D. of E. drew to the attention of his 
superiors, the fact that it was impossible for the education department to satisfay the swelling 
demand of the Arab population for school places and a further 30 or 40 schools at least were 
required. (56) The reason given was that the buildings available were "in such a bad state that 
the cost of repairs cannot be met from available funds. Moreover, the supply of benches, 
desks and other furniture is exhausted." (57) To alleviate some of the problems stemming 
from post-war austerity measures, where rationing was of course in force in Britain itself, and 
shortages of all kinds dogged people and administrators alike, Steele-Greig was obliged to 
introduce "double sessions" into a number of schools. (58)
The demand for school places from the Arab population, however, continued unabated 
despite the overcrowding and recourse to evening sessions in the schools. This is very 
apparent in the 1945 - 46 school year where the same pattern repeats itself and the demand for 
more places shows no sign of being met by the Administration - a modem phenomenon in 
Libya and other developing countries with educational need outstripping supply, right down to 
the present day. By 1945 - 6, however, it is clear that for the time being at least the B.M.A. 
had reached its ceiling as far as educational expansion was concerned. This is very apparent if 
one compares the picture at the end of 1945, when the number of schools had increased to 79, 
whereas the 1946 school-year witnessed virtually no advance on this figure peaking at 80
52 Steele-Greig, Op. CiL, 1948, p. 56. Although it is impossible to verify these sources, acquired by 
Steele-Greig from his Italian collaborators, they do offer some comparison with the figures given in 
the first Annual Report for Tripolitania see, footnote 51. Other Itaslian sources do give a lighter 
figure for the schools and the pupils attending them until the end of the colonial era itself. These read 
as 77 schools for Arabs, including 13 girls schools, with a total of 6,850 pupils, including 963 girls, 
in attendance. See, L.A. Appleton, Op. Cit., p. 56.
53 Steele-Greig, Op. Cit., P. 56.
54 Annual Report Tripolitania, 1944, p. 77.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., p. 34.
58 Ibid.
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schools, though the number of pupils continued to advance to 9104. "Up to this point, the 
expansion in the number of pupils has been steady," the Annual Report of that year 
announced, "rather than spectacular." (59) Italian and Jewish attendance figures, on the other 
hand, "were approaching saturation point," added the D. of E., "many more Arab pupils could 
have been enrolled but financial restrictions, shortage of equipment and above all the dearth of 
qualified Arab teachers, forced the Department to discourage an influx of pupils for whom 
there would be no proper provision." (60) This, however, was not the case with girls' 
education, and it was anticipated that 1945 would be a "turning point for girls' education in the 
territory." (61)
Vni. Reasons for the Slow Down in Expansion.
The reason for having to apply the brake on further educational expansion at this point lay in 
financial limitations imposed by the War Office which had "narrowly circumscribed the 
educational programme." (62) Until this point the only real limitation upon expansion had 
been the yearly intake itslef. This, however, had been cut to Lst 11000 as the most the budget 
would allow. (63) Instead, therefore, of taking on more teachers, the D. of E. had been 
obliged to lay them off. The statistical evidence for 1946-7 again shows how financial 
limitations were having a noticeable effect in suppressing the demand for education amongst 
the Arab population, the number of schools only increasing by 6 to 86 for the year and the 
number of pupils by 592 from the previous 9104. Again the bright spot in this otherwise 
gloomy situation was girls’ education, at least in Tripoli, where the main girls' school, "had 
made unpredictable strides" from a small insitution with under 60 pupils in 1943 to 500 girls in 
1946-7 distributed between two schools. (64)
1947 was the year when the War Office Working Party visited the territory and although 
this had no immediate impact upon Arab education there it was a harbinger of change of sorts. 
Initially, however, it gave approval to Steele-Greig's proposals for reducing the number of 
pupils in the elementary schools frrom 50 - 40in a class, so ensuring the maintenance of 
acceptable standards through an improved pupil-teacher ratio. (65) Otherwise, little of 
educational significance occured during 1947, the number of schools increasing by six, and 
the school population to 10,224 which, though well above colonial levels, was still below 
Italian totals, the latter having increased to 11,643 and Jewish to 5,000. (66) At this point,
59 Ibid.
Annual Report Tripolitania, 1945, p. 34.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid., p. 34.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Annual Report, 1947, p. 44.
66 Ibid.
73
the picture is of a relatively small number of Arab children being able to receive an elementary 
education in the B.M.A. schools, whereas the Italian or Jewish child expected it of right.
Even so, those children attending the B.M.A.'s schools could almost be regarded as part of a 
new and almost privilege elite, as the B.M.A. never viewed it as part of its mandate to provide 
anything approaching universal education, an impossibility in any case at this time. Instead, 
the Administration aimed only to re-eatblish educational levels as they had existed in colonial 
times of until 1939. This had already been exceeded by 1947 and many wondered where the 
Administration was now heading.
On the other hand, the B.M.A. had originally been expected to last for only three years 
and, having already exceeded this estimation was thereafter expected to make decisions and 
initiate policies, in the manner of a colonial government, which it was not in its nature to be. 
The prospects for the Arab child, as a result of it, destined under the former Italian 
dispensation, as only to become "hewers of wood and drawers of water to their colonial 
masters," was infinitely brighter under the B.M.A. Perhaps it is no accident of history that the 
Libyan leader, Colonel Muammer Qadaffi, and many fof his colleagues, were educated under 
the B.M.A. in one of its schools. (67) These children can therefore with some justification be 
described as an elite who would shortly become the objects of policies that would eventually 
enable them to become the masters and administrators of the new Libya.
IX. The Move away from Care and Maintenance.
This tendency becomes apparent for the first time in 1949 when more Arab children were 
receiving government-sponsored education than at any time before in the territory. Indeed, the 
numbers in the schools exceeded those of the existing Italian and Jewish schools combined, 
though the latter began to decline after 1948. Even so, the figure is impressive in the 
circumstances, with 19,536 enrolled in the Arab schools, an excess to 7,766 over the 
combined total in the other schools of the provnce. (68) Also for the first time, the Annual 
Report separates the statistics for the native population from those of Italian or Jews. The new 
Arab Secondary School also appears in the 1949 Report, indicating the emergence of a two-tier 
system of education, whereas before there had only been elementary education for them if they 
were lucky. (69) The 1948 figures for the Italian and Jewish schools are perhaps misleading 
though not without some political significance. The increase in numbers especially of the 
Italian school population for 1948 reflects Italian attempts to regain control of Tripolitania; 
while the Jewish school numbers were to decline rapidly following Jewish emigration to
67 Steele-Greig to Appleton, El-Alamein, Barbados, 17th Jan. 1986. The former D. of E. Tripolitania, writes, "I
suppose I met Ghadafi as he was a pupil in one of my schools in Sirte some years ago."
68 Annual Report, Tripolitania, 1949, pp. 75 - 76.
69 Ibid.
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Palestine in 1948. 1949 should, however, be seen as the year when Arab education finally 
brike loose from the constraints of the past with "an appreciable all-round increase in school 
attendance during the latter part, due to two factors: first the approval of the financial estimates 
covering the school year, October 1948 - June 1949, and secondly an increased enthusiasm on 
the part of the Arab population to have their children educated." (70)
X. Initial Functioning of the "New System".
Judged in terms of the average Arab child, who had entered the B.M.A.'s Arab schools in 
1943, he would be the end of the school year in 1948 have completed five years of schooling, 
or the "original primary course", as devised by Steele-Greig on re-opening the former Italo- 
Arab schools in 1943. (71) This would have enabled the Libyan primary school graduate to 
proceed to the newly opened Arab secondary school. If, however, he was unable through 
financial reasons to go on to secondary education, he was now able to improve his primary 
education to the level obtaining in Egypt by a further two years of elementary schooling. "This 
move was popular," writes Steele-Greig, with 106 boys in 1948 attending the sixth year of the 
primary class. (72) Steele-Greig’s enthusiasm for the importation of the Egyptian system in 
1948 seems ironical in view of his earlier opposition to its employment in the territory in 1943. 
One must conclude that political factors connected with the possibility of Tripolitania's return 
to Italian sovereignty were the determining influences to which in 1948-9 no longer existed in 
view of the United Nations decision to grant independence to Libya.
Despite being able to increase the number of school places from 17,638 in June, 1949 to 
19,557 in December 1949, the increase in the number of schools and pupils was judged "small 
in comparison with the number of requests received from the rural population." (73) At this 
juncture, it is observable that the B.M.A. has become apparently committed to some form of 
universal education. Unfortunately, the shortage of trained teachers at either elementary or 
secondary level made it impossible for the Administration to go much further at this stage. (74) 
The predicament is a common one in developing countries and Libya would have to wait until 
the 1950s, when the availability of wealth from oil, made it possible to recruit extensively from 
abroad, especially in Egypt
The B.M.A. did not have this facility, being constantly plagued by financial inadequacy, 
such as prevented the opening of new schools in rural situations, the cause of considerable 
disappointment amongst the rural population who did not like their sons to have to pursue their 
secondary education in Tripoli. It is to Steele-Greig's credit that in this situation, when he was
70 Annual Report, Tripolitania, 1948, p. 48.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 B.M.A. Annual Report Tripolitania, 1949, p. 30.
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in fact due to be replaced by the ailing and psychologically dispondent Cuthbert Scott, who 
had not yet arrived by the end of 1949, he set about reorganising the rural schools. Steele- 
Greig's reorganisation enabled boys who had started class 1 in 1943 and passed out of 
primary school, to recontinue their education. The alternative would have been to set up small 
secondly schools in rural areas but these could not have been managed properly at the time in 
view of the lack of resources.
Instead the "new System" which was a makeshift attempt at preparing the way for a full­
blown introduction of the Egyptian system into Tripolitania as soon as was judged feasible, 
sought to bridge the gap by enabling a child, starring school at the age of six, to attend a 
preparatory class, (Tamida), so that aged seven he or she could then proceed to the primary 
(Awali) school. From class I - IV, he could proceed to the intermediate (mutawassati), classes 
V - VI. Thus, as Steele-Greig observed, "he can attend school from the age of 6 - 12 whilst 
obtaining an elementary education." (75) Moreover, he continues, "should the parents so 
desire, he can attend school for a further two years, when he will be taught amongst other 
subjects, simple gardening, botany, hygiene and, where possible, English." (76) English 
thus appears in this context and at this rime as a replacement of Italian, which until that time 
had been the second language in the territory, since as far back as the initial Italian occupation 
in 1911.
Secondary education was also by this rime finally available but only in Tripoli and Zawiea. 
Unfortunately, despite many notable improvements in both the scale and range of educational 
amenities available, Secondary education was also by this time finally available but only in 
Tripoli and Zawiea. Unfortunately despite many notable improvements in both scale and range 
of educational amenties available to the Arab child, the quality remained poor. This was 
especially so in rural areas where trained teachers were reluctant to tread, a feature just as 
pronounced in Italian times, and today too. Consequently, standards were uneven and 
inadequate despite the enthusiasm of the population for schools. Again, as in Italian times, an 
initial, large registration was inevitably followed by poor attendance and numbers fell away. 
(77) This was connected with the very pattern and demands of rural life where emigrant 
labour had not yet been introduced. Hence, the male child was still not free to pursue his 
education and future career, leaving the heavier work to the emigrant worker and the lighter 
work to the girls and the women of the household.
1950 was of course the B.M.A.'s final year during which it was officially committed to 
preparing the country for indpendence. By this time, it had become quite clear that the decade
75 Ilbid. Steele-Greig seems at this point to have been receiving advice from an educational expert who
arrived for this purpose with the War Office Working Party of 1949.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid., p. 31.
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from 1939 - 1950 was to be a watershed in Libya's development, however unprepared the 
country might be for independence itself. During this period, the Italian era was eclipsed never 
to return by new voices with new demands which had remained dormant or repressed under 
the Italian occupation itself. Yet during this decade Italy was ever-present as before especially 
in education with the Italian schools still being fully financed by the Italian government for 
pupils of Italian nationality. Moreover, the Jews who had by 1949 mostly fled the country had 
managed their own schools, though under nominal B.M.A. supervision, issuing in a new age 
that ended the long centuries of uneasy toleration between Arab and Jew that had characterised 
life in the territory until that point.
Educationally, these momentous events, produced a change more radical than at any time 
in the past. There were 800 fewer Italian children in the Italian schools by 1949 than before 
and the number of Italian schools had declined in the province. Libyan school numbers, 
however, had risen by more than 4000 and Jewish declined by 3790, signifying the end of the 
Jewish tradition in education in Tripolitania. To assist the creation of a Arab national system 
of education, an additional grant of Lst 50,000 was secured from the British government for 
training teachers and improving secondary education. ((78) Future developments it seemed 
would depend upon securing an adequate supply of native Libyan teachers though at this point 
the competition for educated manpower was already developing from the new civil service.
78 Annual Report Tripolitania, 1950, p. 33.
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Chapter Five Elementary Education.
I. Examinations.
Unlike Cyrenaica, where the Egyptian system was in operation, no formal system of 
examinations existed in Tripolitania under the other than that devised by the Director
of Education himself, for the yearly promotion of pupils from class to class, the method 
inheritied from Italian times. As no copies of these examinations were preserved, it is 
impossible to say what they were like. Most probably such examinations or tests were 
prepared by individual teachers in the various subjects which they taught, or generally, after 
which they were discarded. Each school would then collate the marks and these would be 
forwarded to Tripoli for statistical and general use by the Department of Education.
Examinations were to become under the B.M.A. an increasingly important measuring rod 
of social progress and adaptability in the urban centres where tribal links were either non- 
existant or very weak, at least, in Tripolitania. Hence, they became more relevant to the 
running of the schools. This of course had always been the case in the Italian schools which, 
as in colonial times, were carefully regulated by the Ministry of Public Instruction in Rome.
(1) The lack of effective examinations for Libyans under the B.M.A. in Tripolitania was 
regretable and would have to wait for remedy until Independence itself, when the Egyptian 
system was adopted in the territory.
An attempt to mitigate the effects of this shortage was in 1945 presented in the from of an 
Arab Teachers’ Examination to enable Libyans employed as teachers by the Department of 
Education to qualify as certified teachers and obtain a risae in salary. (2) The failure in 1945 
of the Administration to set up an Arab boarding-school outisde Tripoli led the authorities to 
permit pupils who had passed the fifth form examination to be allowed to continue their 
schooling at the Teachers' Training School in Tripoli without having to undertake any further 
examinations. (3) In this respect, we at last see Libya perhaps turning into a developing 
country in which social and economic priorities become increasingly determined for both 
individual and nation by the quality and quantity of school life.
Basically, the aim of examinations at this stage of Libya's development was the assessment 
of general educational competence, especially literacy, rather than any form of technical 
proficiency for which few if any Libyans were receiving education or training. This was the 
pattern too for the selection of teachers either for direct employment in the schools or for entry 
into one or other of the B.M.A.'s training programmes. This was the pattern even as late as
1 This was even so until the "evacuation" of all Italians from Libya in 1970> To this day, all records relating to
education of former Italian residents in Libya between 1950 and 1969 are fully preserved by the Italian authorities
in Rome.
2 B.M.A. Tripolitania 1945, p. 34.
3 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1946, P. 36.
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1946 when a public examination was held for the appointment of Arab teachers. On this 
occasion, out of 142 candidates who sat the examination, only 12 were successful "possibly 
due to the high standard demanded of them", opined Steele-Greig, despite "the papers being 
easier than an English Common-Entrance Examination" (the entrance examination to the 
English public schools), he went on to conclude scornfully. (4) Thus, even at this stage, 
basic literacy was a rare commodity, even for entrants to the teaching profession, and in a 
country that had undergone Italian rule since 1911 and with Turkish rule going back much 
longer. No wonder indeed that the Libyans seemed so united in their determination to avoid 
any repetition of colonialism. Yet by 1947, Steele-Greig was able to note that "the general 
tone of the Arab teacher is improving, due to the increasing experience of classes, lectures and 
examinations which have been held". (5)
Yet it should be noted that up to this time, no no special provision had existed for the 
training of Arab teachers and whatever training they did undergo was extremely similar to that 
used in Italian times. Hence the emphasis upon control rather than skills. Only a "small 
proportion obtained a pass" in 1947 and the results of existing courses were declared to be 
"disappointing". (6) So at this stage, with the worst literacy rate in the Arab world, and 
desperately short of elementary teachers, the Department of Education in Tripoli’s main 
concern was to "weed out a number who were teaching merely as a livelihood" - an 
extraordinary and unreal preoccupation one might surmise - and increase the number who were 
really interested in teaching". (?) Matters at this point were made worse with a declared 
shortage of funds for further educational development so that even evening classes for adult 
illiterates, commenced in December 1946, had to be scrapped, since provision for the payment 
of the necessary teachers was no longer available from the 1947 treasury estimates. W  
Again, it must be at this point emphasised, education for development was not a direct policy 
and the country had been exposed to several years of severe drought, causing serious food 
shortages which could only be alleviated from British government funds and resources. "Care 
and Maintenance" still applied and indeed was mandatory by International Law in Libya and as 
such had been more than fairly and adequately applied in the territory. That international 
pressures, along with events in Libya itself, were pressurising the B.M.A., albeit reluctantly, 
along the road to developing the territory in the direction of eventual independence is another 
story, but one which increasing cognisance must now be taken of. Certainly, from a technical 
point of view, a political and educational solution for Tripolitania should by this time have 
been arrived at, instead of the latter especially being relegated by International Law to a 
secondary issue. Unfortunately, when this moment arrived the B.M.A. had no time to prepare
4 Ibid.
5 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1947, p. 44.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
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the country adequately for independence, which policy had not been originally a part of its 
mandate., in 1942. This fault must be laid at the feet of the Great Powers whose task it had 
been to asceratin the future of the country; but in the final analysis Libya fell victim to the war 
itself and the prolonged negotiations, based upon the stalemate of the Great Powers, which 
followed its outcome.
* * * * * * * *
The world, however, was changing and with it Tripolitania, so even while the B.M.A. 
continued to exercise its mandate there, the visit in 1947 of the War Office Working Party, 
signalled the need of the Administration to begin to adopt an alternative to Care and 
Maintenance. (9) Yet, even at this comparatively late hour, the B.M.A. could not abandon 
completely, if at all, Care and Maintenance. This meant that at the educational level, it became 
necessary to distinguish between development programmes and the ordinary running of the 
educational service as such. Steele-Greig cannot be blamed for insisting that the new 
development programmes were : Blackley’s pigeon" and therefore a separate issue from 
running the schools. (10) His attitude, however, to Libyanisation and the general move from 
Care and Maintenance to Development was conditioned to a large extent by beliefs such as 
those expressed in his two short histories of education in Tripolitania. (11) Steele-Greig's 
major key was always that the future of the territory lay with the reimposition of Italian 
sovereignty. He had little real faith, if indeed any, in the idea of a Libya run for and by 
Libyans. This was completely contrary to the yearning of the indigenous population though 
not necessarily of the Administration which was technically neutral. Yet despite sentiments of 
an unsympathetic nature as far as Arab political aspirations were concerned, Steele-Greig 
probably did more to aid their development at this time than any other member of the 
Administration. In this respect, Steele-Greig was a paradoxical figure, on the one hand the 
architect of the post-colonial education system for Arabs, on the other hand unsympathetic to 
their political aims and culture. Also, divorced from the semi-collonial milieu of which 
Blackley was the centre, instead he was left to cutivate Italian society. This apparent divorce 
between Blackley and Steele-Greig meant that, even if his hour had passed as an educational 
influence in the territory, he would cling on for the pension and gratuities which would 
provide his only source of income on leaving the service. Furthermoerre, as time was to 
show, in both the role of advisor without portfolio and educational administrator, Steele-Greig 
was without parallel equipped to deal with day to day matters and virtually indispensible at this 
point.
9 Ibid.
10 Appleton to Steele-Greig.
11 Op. Cit.
Given that Arab secondary education would take "several years" before "turning out 
students who have completed their full secondary education" it followed that the examination 
system, relevant to education, would be the sole vehicle of educational development for the 
country as a whole. Unforunately, unlike Cyrenaica, where care and Maintenance does not 
appear to have prevented the adoption of an effective educational policy for the territory as a 
whole, Tripolitania was to continue more or less in the same position as it had been in before 
the visit of the War Office Working Party, almost as if the visit had never occured. The only 
formal qualification still to be gained was a "qualifying certificate" for those teachers who did 
not hold a recognised diploma. (1 2 )
As the educational system itself gradually became more firmly established at the primary, 
secondary and tertiary levels, so an examination was devised to meet the requirements of the 
different levels of attainment. Unfortunately, as this was devised in and administered from 
Tripoli for Tripolitanians, it is impossible to make valid comparisons with the Eastern 
Province. Libya, by 1949, had finally become recognised as a developing country in its own 
right and not as an appendage of either Great Britain or Italy. Not surprisingly, the most 
promising students began to be sent overseas for training, so exercising a new option, that of 
obtaining a qualification not otherwise obtainable at home. In fact, as early as 1945,16 
teachers from Tripolitania attended a course at Dar-El-Ulum Training College in Cairo. The 
party was under the charge of the Superintendant of Education for Cyrenaica, and was run by 
well-known Egyptian educationalists. The results of the course were declared "a success both 
educationally and culturally" and as such mark a minor watershead as such - an event that had 
never occurred before. 03 ) As it was, however, such examples of joint participation between 
the two sister provinces of Treipolitania and Cyrenaica were, and still are, extremely rare. 
There is in fact no recorded instance of any Cyrenaican teachers visitng Tripolitania for the 
pupose of furthering their educational expertise up to this point.
By December 1944 "following four years of work the foundations of a sound educational 
system have been laid" announced the Director of Education for Cyrenaica. (W  This work 
included the successful adoption of the Egyption curriculum for the territory and the 
establishment of an examination system which corresponded to that curriculum. Steele-Greig 
could make no such claim for the Arab sector of education in Tripolitania, in which case the 
fault was either his or that of the higher authorities, who at the level of provincial 
admionistration had their hands tied politically and financially. Whatever the explanation the
12 The Annual report states "only 13 per cent of Moslem teachers have recognised diplomas and 16 per
cent hold the education Qualifying Certificate. The remainder have no qualification other than having 
passed out of the fifth year primary class and are not really fitted to teach, although in order to meet the
demand for new schools, these have of necessity had to be employed A training course was held
in the summer and over 300 candidates entered for the final examination in September./ Only 16 per 
cent were able to obtain a pass. B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1949, p. 32.
13 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1945, p. 6.
14 Ibid.
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practical results for the territory were appalling and boiled down to the adoption of an esoteric 
home-made type curriculum or "syllabus" constructed almost entirely on the advice of Fulvio 
Contini, the former Italian superintendant of education, so clearly motivated by the desire and 
determination to restrain Arab educational ambitions within the constraints imposed by the 
colonial times. Such policies, as practised by both colonial and British Administrations, the 
Italians hoped, would lead eventually to the restoration of Italian sovereignty in the province.
It has already been noted that such policies were mercifully absent from the B.M.A.’s aims in 
Cyrenaica where by 1946 "senior boys" in senior classes "took examinations"^)
H. Teacher Training and Supply.
As the Italians had never trained Libyans as teachers, even for the Italo-Arab schools, the 
B.M.A. was not legaly required to undertake such training in Tripolitania at least. The 
abolition of the Italo-Arab schools, however, combined with the flight to Italy of the Italian 
teaching force radically changed the situation. The Arabs too had changed and were no longer 
so quiescent as before. They had developed a new sense of political and social awareness 
which required a new type of teacher for the Muslim schools.
To develop such a force was not per se an easy task, especially in view of the fact that the 
Arab teachers had now to conduct not only Arabic Language lessons and the Koran, which 
had been their principal task in the former Italo-Arab schools, but also the other subjects of the 
curriculum formerly exclusively taught by Italians in the government schools.^) Therefore, 
Steele-Greig was not only concerned to ensure that the new teachers were equipped for their 
task with suitable teaching methods but also with the necessary educational background, 
sufficient for such an enlarged role. ( ^ )  In Cyrenaica, Major W.O. Foreman, the Director of 
Education under the B.M.A. there, along with his Arab Superintendant, Mr Ali Assa El-Jerbi, 
accomplished this difficult task because of their clear understanding and appreciation of the 
issues involved. Steele-Greig, on the other hand, cannot at any point, at least in the early 
stages when all the mistakes were made, be said to have been in possession of such insights or 
if he was kept them to himself or was secretly briefed by higher authorities to proceed 
differently. Instead, the latter preferred to to rely upon the uncertain advice of enthusiasts of 
the previous regime, such as the Italian school teacher and inspector of schools, Fulvio 
Contini, the longest serving Italian teacher in Libya, whose notions of native educational 
development in the former colony were extremely restrictive, preventing in a diffemet climate 
of opinion the adoption of new ideas and methods, such as the B.M.A. had espoused in 
Cyrenaica.
^  B.M.A. Tripolitania 1943, p. 65.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
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The almost total absence of disinterested objectivity, idealism and even professional 
competence, hung like a black cloud over the whole issue of teacher preparation under the 
B.M.A. in Tripolitania at this delicate point in the history of the territory. Until the arrival of 
the British in Libya education, and in particular the training of teachers had been viewd as a 
political rather than as a purely educational matter. This required, according to the essential 
Italian premise, the distancing and separation of Tripolitania from any form of Egyptian 
influence. Egyptian teachers were in particular regarded as anathema, as was the sending of 
Libyans to be educated in Egypt, except under the strictest supervision. Similarly, the 
importation of Egyptian ideas at the educational or political level was carefully censored and 
restricted. 0 ? )  This was the basis upon which Steele-Greig in 1943 set about interpreting his 
role in Tripolitania and constructing an educational system that would make sense of the post­
colonial era.
III. Teacher Training.
As the recruitment of Egyptian teachers to work in the B.M.A.'s schools or even operate as
teacher trainers appears to have been virtually taboo, experienced teacher manpower had to be
attained from other sources. The most obvious place to obtain teachers was either Palestine,
then like Libya under a British Mandate, or that other British Protectorate, the Sudan, where
Travers Blackley, as a former "Sudan Hand" had links. In this instance, however, two
Palestinian inspectors were given a temporary contract to work in Tripoli for six weeks during
the summer of 1943 and "lectured for six hours a day to as many teachers as could attend." 
(18)
The main aim of this and other summer-courses was both educational and pedagogical. 
Intending teachers, as well as those who were already engaged in the schools, as well as the 
interested public, were instructed in basic subjects of the curriculum, such as Geography, 
History, Arithmetic, Physical Hygiene, English Language and Teaching Methods. Such 
novices were then declared "capable of teaching, although their standard is low" and "the 
majority leave a lot to be desired." (*9) Similarly, the women teachers in the girls’ schools 
were somewhat unflatteringly described as a "poor lot" though Steele-Greig expressed the 
hope that "a capable inspectress" would improve matters." (2 0 )
The method whereby a "summer course" would be held to "raise standards" appears again 
to have been employed in 1944 though on this occasion for the preparation and training for 
candidates for the girls' schools. (21) During 1945, evening classes were also planned and
17 Italian Educational Policy Towards Moslems in Libya 1911 -1922. Op. Cit., pp. 130 -158.
^  Annual Report, Tripolitania, 1943, p. 65.
*9 Annual Report, Tripolitania, 1943, p. 66.
20 [bid.
221 Annual Report Tripolitania, 1944, p. 35.
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subsequently held for the training of teachers with the particular aim of laying "greater 
emphasis upon pedagaogy, athletics and general knowledge." (2 2 )
It was during 1944 that 16 teachers were sent to Egypt for a short course in "school 
management and educational psychology." (23) Yet, as in previous years, the main aim was 
the training of teachers via the annual summer course. In the summer of 1945, the course was 
followed in September by an examination for those Arab teachers then employed in the 
schools, though it was also declared to be open to the general public or more specifically those 
aspiring to teacher status with the requisite modicum of formal education. (24)
Overall, as a result of these efforts, the standard was described as being "quite high" for
the circumstances as only 36 out of the original 120 candidates were successful. Only the
successful ones were then allowed to receive certificates and in exceptional cases book-prizes. 
(25)
The method whereby the "summer course" or "evening course" became the principal 
means for the preparation and training of teachers, whether male or female, continued on year 
after year as the B.M.A. itself continued to operate long after its real sell-by date had long 
expired. In this way, "keen applicants" also continued to come up against an apparently 
insupperable obstacle course leading inevitably to failure for most of them. Perhaps this was 
unavoidable because the basic standard was so low; nonetheless, the Chief Administrator 
should have enquired why the failure rate was so high.
Thus out of 142 candidates for the September Teachers' Examination, only 42 were 
declared successful, despite the desparate need for more teachers in the schools. (26)
Producing teachers of the required standard for a burgeoning school population was to become 
an uphill struggle and was clearly beyond the capacity of the B.M.A. at this time. Official 
sources admit this the following year when it was admitted for the first time that although the 
"general tone of the Arab teachers was improving", the examination results were 
"disappointing and only a small percentage had obtained a pass." (22) By this time, however, 
the authorities had got the message (28) but dropping the pilot by demoting Steele-Greig to 
Grade II could hardly be expected to help matters very much at this stage as in fact transpired. 
(29) Therefore the first officially designated teacher training class was opened in November 
1948. (30) As the Annual Report for the year stated, it had been "urgently needed, even since 
1943," and was to consist of "36 selected candidates." It was anticipated that "in two or three
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
^  Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1947, p. 44.
28 Steele-Greig/Appleton, Barbados, 6 Aug. 1982.
29 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1948, p. 48.
30 Ibid.
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years these will be able to take over in the primary sector and gready improve the standard of 
these schools in the territory." (31)
"Lack of finance" is given as the main reason why this "important side of education" has 
been slow to emerge. (32) Yet, This was only half the story, since it was not until 1948 that 
the neglect of the early years was rectified by the adoption of measures that had proved 
successful from the commencement of the B.M.A. in Cyrenaica. From 1948, however, the 
recruitment of Egyptian teachers was allowed to proceed upon a very limited basis, an issue 
that nor surprisingly was quick to attract the attention of the Egyptian Government, which was 
concerned to establsih its influence in this important field. (33)
No teacher training centre had by 1948 as yet been established, though in this year it was 
announced that the territory would go on to the Egyptian system. (34) This decision was of 
political rather than immediately practical nature. (35) Hence, the teacher-training classes 
were to continue on as before until as late as 1951, after which candidates had to be secondary- 
school graduates first. (36)
The transition from one system to another is never easy; but the B.M.A.'s failure to adapt 
the Egyptian system in 1943 occasioned much confusion and delay even when that system was 
finally adopted in 1948, though it did not becaome a practical reality until much later. In 1950, 
the fear of Egyptian interference in the running of the new state led Palestinians, who would 
most probably have been educated under that other British Military Administration in Palestine 
itself, neing offered contracts to staff the two Teacher Training Colleges set up in that year.
(37) (These opened their doors in November for men and in January of 1951 for women.)
(38) By this time, independence had finally dawned though the schools were as woefully 
short of trained teachers as ever, a situation that would certainly have been less dire, if the right 
policies had been adopted at the outset. The frequently made excuse of "lack of funds" as has 
been shown was not altogether accurate. (39)
The same cause, "lack of funds", also appears to have applied in Cyrenaica but there it 
does not seem to have had the same drastic effect upon educational progress as in Tripolitania. 
Thus, in 1945, 35 out of 45 applicants passed the Teachers' Examination, whereas only 36 out 
of 45 applicants passed in the more populous Tripolitania an examination bearing the same 
name but entirely different in content. (40) This is apparent when we consider that by 1946,
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1950, p. 34.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Op. Cit., p. 35.
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two centres for training teachers, one in Bengasi and another in Dema were set up with another 
in the pipeline for El-Abiar. Moreover, in 1947 an Advanced Teacher Training summer course 
was organised by Egyptian teachers in Benghazi. (41) 1948 saw a Teachers' Centre for men 
opened in the El-Amir School in Benghasi City, which was later transferred to the spacious El- 
Amira School, where it was to concentrate upon the training of Elementary Teachers only. A 
centre for training women treachers followed in the next year, 1949, again at Bengasi in the El- 
Beski School. (42) in addition to what could be trained locally, Cyrenaica differed from 
Tripolitania in the import of Egyptian teachers, considered anathema in the latter province. 
Precise figures are not always available but 50 teachers a year were being imported from Egypt 
into Cyrenaica, so that by 1948 the B.M.A. had successfully completed its task there, with the 
result that when independence was finally declared in 1949, education in the province was 
entirely in Libyan hands.
IV. Teacher Supply.
Teacher supply, it could be said, did not comprise any problem under the Italian regime, since 
the colonial authorities after 1911, limited the educational role of Arabs in the schools to that of 
teaching the Arabic Language and the Koran. With hindsight this could be regarded as an 
extraordinary political blunder on their part since it presented to those most opposed to their 
cause an apparently open field for ideological and political conquest. Before 1922 a wider role 
had been envisaged for the Arab teacher but Rome repeatedly explained failure to develop the 
Arab sector upon lack of suitably trained native teachers. After the demise of the Italian 
colonial regime in 1943, the supply of teachers again became a problem, since once again there 
were no Arabs qualified to teach apart from the Koran and Arabic itself. At this point, Steele- 
Greig deserves qualified praise for creating a system of education in Tripolitania that was not 
shunned by the local population as the Italo-Arab schools had been in part shunned. This is 
not, however, to attribute the popularity of education in the province at this time to Steele- 
Greig himself since it was not created as such by the Administration itself. So much so that 
the demand for education created by the fall of the Italian regime - and it had never existed as 
such under that regime - created demands it was impossible for the B.M.A. apparently to 
satisfy or at least Steele-Greig himself thought so. Like the colonial regime before it, the 
B.M.A. ultimately failed because it was unable or unwilling to create a sufficient supply of 
teachers to cope with the problem even when not looked on as an absolute. The inability to 
produce enough elementary school teachers to satisfy quite limited goals was in some respects 
unavoidable given the expectations that emerged amongst the Arab population after 1942. 
Libya in this respect had suddenly developed an appetite for education, long no doubt
41 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1947, p. 10.
42 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1948, p. 8.
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dormant, that placed Libya in a similar situation to other countries of the Arab World and 
Africa, where indpendence had either been achieved or was on the not too distant horizon. It 
was therefore a matter of degree since there was no way a transient body such as the B.M.A. 
in Libya could satisfy the demand for education then being manifested there. Our question is 
whether it could have done more with the limited resources at its disposal than it did? Whether 
it adopted the right measures and policies to suit the circumstances before it? The argument 
here in the critical sense is that whereas in Cyrenaica the B.M.A. passed with honours the 
same is not true in Tripolitania where the case for the B.M.A., despite many other 
achievements, such as a peaceful and orderly transition to independence, is much less plausible 
in education, where mistakes occurred and the end-product was not as good as it might have 
been if different policies and measures had ben applied.
In 1943, the first educational year under the B.M.A., "education was practically non- 
existant." (43) in this first year, 151 Arab teachers were appointed including 15 women. (44) 
though by the end of the year this figure had dropped to 146. (45) Another 146 Arab teachers 
were however still needed to staff the schools. (46) This figure was achieved in 1944 when 
the number of Arab teachers in the schools rose from 146 to 271 (47) being as such described 
in the Annual Report as "a very mediocre stock". (48) Two years were then to follow during 
which the number of Arab teachers in the schools remained virtually static while pressure on 
the schools to increase their rolls increased dramatically. Thus 1945 saw the number of Arab 
teachers employed in the B.M.A. schools actually fall to 265 (49) on account of "financial 
limitations imposed by the War Office which narrowly circumscribed the educational 
programme." (60) Consequently, the proposed expenditure on the expansion of the teaching 
staff was "drastically cut to L st 11.000". The financial situation in fact was so bad that 
Steele-Greig could hardly afford to pay the provisional teachers taken on for the adult illiteracy 
classes designed for the summer vacation. (61) Moreover, he was obliged to reduce the 
existing staff (62); and no contracts to foreign Arabs were issued in that year.
1946 was the year when the Chief Administrator, Brigadier Travers Blackley, intervened 
in the running of the Education Department to Steele-Greig's chagrin, appointing a Sudanese 
Arab as a superintendant. (63) The teacher supply problem was however slightly alleviated
43 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1943, p. 64.
44 Ibid., p. 65.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1944, p. 77.
48 Ibid.
49 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1945, p. 34.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1946, p. 34.
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with the number of teachers employed in the school rising from 265 - 310. (54) 1 9 4 7  saw 
numbers increase by 70 to a total of 334 (55); but this was still nowhere near the numbers 
required if the pupil ratio was to be reduced below 50, (56) a figure not achieved in many 
developing countries even today. Meanwhile the inability of the B.M.A. to provide funds for 
the patment of teachers scheduled to work on the Adult Illiteracy Programme meant pupils 
themselves had to pay and not surprisingly, in the words of Steele-Greig, the courses "fizzled 
out".
By the commencement of the 1948 school year, the B.M.A. had been running the schools 
for 5 years and in this year finally opted for the Egyptian system. This was a decision not 
without financial implications as new funds needed to be drawn upon for the financing of such 
a development. The previous two years had not been without defficulty for the Administration 
on account of the great drought that had ravaged the territory, a factor which must be taken 
account of in explaining how the lack of new monies for education occurred. Instead, money 
was channelled into relieving the famine caused by the lack of adequate rain in what were 
always harsh climatic conditions.
Progress in education, however, was again resumed in 1948 with the number of teachers 
rising from 335 to 519. (57) in 1949, education in Tripolitania seemed at last to be turning a 
comer as the number of teachers rose to 609 from 519. (58) Unfortunately, many of these 
new entrants to teaching in the province were untrained but, employed of necessity to meet the 
demand placed upon the schools, which popular demand, now expressed as political pressure, 
began to insist be opened wherever there was a need. (59) Where an educated cadre of 
teachers wasrequired, as in the secondary schools, non-Libyans were employed. (60) The 
final year of the B.M.A. saw the number of teachers rise to 698, an increase of 547 teachers 
from the first year of the British Military Administration in 1943. (61)
Unfortunately, despite this considerable improvement in the overall question of teacher 
supply, the shortage of teachers was still a key problem and a "major obstacle to progress." 
(62) q^is is apparent from the Annual Reports which show that even in 1 9 4 8 (6 3 ) there were 
not enough qualified teachers of Libyan nationality for the classes then in existence". 
Moreover, as independence drew closer, a new phenomenon not unusual to developing 
countries began to manifest itself, as more and more Libyans trained as teachers were drawn
54 Annual Report Tripolitania, 1947, p. 44.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 See, infra., p. 326.
Annual Report, Tripolitania, 1949, p. 75.
59 Ibid., p. 31.
60 Ibid.
61 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1950, p. 87.
I 62 Ibid., p. 33.
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88
away from teaching to more lucrative and promising employment. (64) By this time, 
however, the penny had finally dropped and the Administration began to inaugurate policies 
which relied increasingly upon the employment of foreign teachers, yet another phenomenon 
not uncommon to richer developing countries. This Libya certainly was not at this stage of her 
economic history and the recruitment of such teachers was not always successful as the cost of 
living in the country was high and the shortage of housing discouraged many from applying. 
(65) ^  such a climate independence was finally declared and the B.M.A. replaced by an 
indigenous regime.
V. Administration.
The administration of the Arab schools in effect involved two periods, 1943 - 1946, during 
which time it seemed more likely that Libya - or at the very least Tripolitania - might revert to 
Italian sovereignty; and 1946 - 1951 when independence became increasingly the assumed 
fact, governing political and administrative practice in the territory as a whole. The 
administrative policies, measures and personnel of the Department of Education in particular, 
during both periods, to a large extent reflect the assumptions more or less prevalent Between 
1943 - 1946 the position was virtually the same as between 1922 -1940 with the Education 
Department being responsible for administering Arab, Italian and Jewish schools in the 
territory. The personnel were exclusively Italian nationals apart from Steele-Greig himself 
who was of course British. As Director of Educational Services Tripolitania, Steele-Greig was 
assisted by Captain E.T. Hall, (6 6 ) who was also British, though with no previous experience 
of education. In 1944, the Arab Inspector appointed by the previous colonial regime was 
reappointed to his former post on the recommendation of Cav. Fulvio Contini, the former 
Director of Education for Cyrenaica and the longest serving Italian teacher in Libya. Not 
surprisingly, Steele-Greig pronounced him to have "proved satisfactory" in the report of that 
year. (67) Two other promotions to the rank of inspector followed of teachers serving in the 
B.M. A.'s schools, one as Inspector of Schools in the Western and Central Provinces, and 
another as Inspector of Schools in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The nationality of the 
men is not stated, unlike in the Eastern Province, educational personnel go unlisted, though 
they would most probably have been of long-serving teachers, in which case they would have 
been Libyan Arabs formerly employed in the Italo-Arab Schools. (6 8 )
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1944, p. 46. There was virtually no change in administrative personnel until 
Captain Hall was replaced at Tripoli by Cpt. N.F. Pengelly in 1948 and AJ. Steele-Greig by Cuthbert 
Scott, though Steele-Greig remained on as Deputy until 1951. See Annuario Delle Scuole Italiane,
Tripoli, Anno 1948, p. 13.
67 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1944, p. 35.
68 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1944, p. 51.
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As far however as the general working of the education office was concerned, the most 
important individual, apart from Major A.J. Steele-Greig himself, was undoubtedly the former 
Director of Education in Cyrenaica and already referred to as Cav. Fulvio Contini, bearer of a 
special gold medal bestowed by the Duce for distinguished service in the colonies. As 
Inspector of Education for Italian schools in Tripolitania, the former now having ceased to 
exist with the complete evacuation of all Italian nationals from Cyrenaica, Fulvio Contini was 
Steele-Greig's friend, confidant and right hand man. Even in the official report, Contini was 
described as "a very competent man" whose "advice and cooperation have been most valuable 
in the establishment and running of the Italian schools. (69)
Fulvio Contini, however, was not only important in the running of the Italian schools; but 
was the key figure in determining the policy and management of the Arab schools at the vital 
early formative stage. With Steele-Greig he remained on at the Education Office until the 
period of transition to Libyan rule when he was somewhat summarily replaced by the Italian 
Government with another of their nominees. (70)
In this first year of the B.M.A. a number of "experiments" were tried out at the 
administrative level. An English woman was appointed to inspect the girls' school and four 
sub-inspectors were appointed for the Arab boys' schools. Steele-Greig, however, was 
clearly not going very far in the field of administrative experiments. Not only was Contini his 
one and only advisor on Arab affairs, which could only mean the continuance of pre-B.M.A. 
policies in an area that required quite radical alternatives, but no Arabs were given posts of 
administrative responsibility as such on the grounds that they had not exercised such 
responsibility in Italian times. (71) This method of proceeding was completely different from 
that of Steele-Greig's opposite number in Cyrenaica, Major W.O. Foreman, who had gone all 
out for Arabisation at the start of the new regime there. This was a policy not available in its 
entirety in Tripolitania on account of the still considerable Italian and Jewish minorities still 
there, though a version of it could have been adopted for the Arab majority to their incalculable 
benefit (72) Whether this omission can be put down to sheer caution on the part of the 
Authorities or because they considered such measures as in contravention of their mandate is 
debatable. Certainly, it did not seem as such to the Arabs who were quick to detect anything 
smacking of bias or as favouring the Italian minority and national interest. Not surprisingly, 
relations between the Administrative section of the Education Department and the Arab teachers 
whether Libyan or foreign soon began to deteriorate. Steele-Greig was repeatedly to bemoan 
the fact that it was the Arab teachers who were increasingly turning the schools into a forum of 
political debate and even having recourse to strike action as well. Unfortunately, the D. of E.
69 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1944, p. 35.
70 See, Steele-Greig to Appleton, Conversation, Barbados, 1981-2.
71 Op. Cit., p. 35.
72 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1944, pp. 8 and 54.
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did not recognise in this manifestation of apparent political dissatisfaction any criticism of his 
policies with the result that he became more cautious than ever, refusing either to promote 
Arabs or see anything good in their cause. Blackley seeing the danger inherent in such a 
situation and anxious to reduce the danger of open confrontation used every expedient to 
render the Education Department more responsive to Arab desires and aspirations.
The first evidence of this commences as early as 1945 when a policy of decentralisation 
was introduced, whereby Arab inspectors were given greater authority in their domain. (73) 
Decentralisation also implied local residence for the new inspectors - contact being maintained 
with Tripoli through monthly meetings and occasional "tea parties" which Steele-Greig notes 
had "good results". (74) Such measures, however, were not sufficient to prevent the first 
teachers' strike in the history of the territory. This was "in sympathy with the provisional 
teachers whose holiday pay could not at once be approved", an incident with which Steele- 
Greig "dealt firmly" managing to leave "no ill feeling." (75)
Such apparently sanguine comments leave perhaps a doubt in the mind, as this was to be 
the first of a series of such "strikes" involving the Administration with Arab teachers. Also, 
the relationship, never good, between Steele-Greig and Blackley was taking a turn for the 
worse. This tended increasinly to be expressed as the D. of E. and Signor Contini with the 
pro-Italian lobby favouring the cautious policies pursued until then, against the "old buddy 
net" pressing for the employment of more Sudanese and even the odd Egyptian teacher. (76) 
Blackley, however, though concerned to clip the D. of E.'s wings must have realised that 
he could not at this stage do without him completely and was therefore anxious not to rock the 
boat too much by pressing for changes of which Steele-Greig disapproved. Improving the 
image of the B.M.A. with the Arab population by adopting a more populist line in education 
would more likely have been Blackley's position at this point. This is apparent from 
developments during 1946 when various staff changes were engineered in the Department of 
Education described as having "proved beneficial to education generally". (77)
Most important of these changes involved the appointment of a Sudanese Superintendant 
of Education for the Arab Schools, who was also to act as director of the new Arab Secondary 
S c h o o l.(7 8 ) Such changes as these were fiercely resisted by Steele-Greig backed by Contini 
who saw them as underminig their authority with the Arab teachers and introducing a different 
element into the situation which was completely contrary to policies which had been pursued 
until then. It was a case of Blackley acting against their advice and without their endorsement; 
but clearly it meant that the writing was on the wall for Steele-Greig if he persisted in opposing
73 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1945, p. 14.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Steele-Greig to Appleton, Op. Cit., Conversations, 1981-2.
77 Annual Report, Tripolitania, 1946, p. 33.
78 I bid.
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such measures. On the other hand, one should perhaps distinguish between Arabisation of the 
educational services which Steele-Greig did not oppose in principle and fear of being taken 
over by elements from the former Sudanese Coloniasl Service - "the old buddies" as he called 
them.
Again, we are looking at the old problem of the recruitment of foreign teachers and in this 
respect until 1946 the B.M.A. had clearly endorsed the Steele-Greig-Contini approach to the 
subject which must have reflected political policy at a high level. This clearly wanted to see 
Italian sovereignty reimposed upon Tripolitania and therefore favoured the strict application of 
International Law as regards Education. There was however another emergent attitude to the 
issue which favoured a more open and flexible approach to the problem. The latter would gain 
in strength at the expense of the former from 1946 onwards but both faced the same problem 
from where to recruit Arab teachers?
It is interesting to note at this point that the jolt to the running of the Education Department 
administered in 1946 by Blackley's appointment of the Sudanese Superintendant may reflect 
desire for a more flexible approach to the subject of teacher employment than events on the 
world political scene where the issue of Libyan independence was then dead-locked. (79) 
Educational issues were important in Libya itself and were not necessarily sounding boards for 
events on the wider stage of international politics. At this level, therefore, the B.M.A. 
continued to show interest in educational developments within the territory during 1947, when 
not only was an Inspector of Koranic Schools appointed, but in June of the same year an Arab 
committee was specially delegated, as "Advisory Board to the Controller of Education". (80) 
This committee consisted of a number of prominent citizens and leaders of the political parties. 
(81) As such it was perhaps unique in the history of the territory as no such body had existed 
in either Turkish or Italian times.
The Arab Committee, however, should be seen for what it was primarily intended to 
achieve, which was the improvement of relations between the Administration and the emerging 
political and social foci within the territory. This was all the more important at this moment 
when the polotical situation inside Libya was particularly tense, as the opportunity of obtaining 
a political settlement in favour of Libyan national aspirations seemed to be fading. This was a 
situation the Administration was powerless to affect in any decisive way but was faced with 
having to hold the ring until it was finally sorted out by the Powers concerned. The much 
publicised meetings of the Arab Consultative Committee was one of the few ways of keeping 
the parties talking on a subject close to their hearts, namely the educational development of the 
country. As such, the meetings were called at the behest of either the Department of Education
See, supra, pp. 22 - 48.
80 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1947, p. 44.
81 Ibid.
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in Tripoli or the Board of Arab Education. (82) in this way a much needed forum of 
discussion enabled frustrations to be vented and ideas of possible practical import to be 
discussed. "All branches of Arab Education", wrote Steele-Greig, "were openly discussed". 
(83) Lacking, however, any executive power meant that few of the Board's recommendations 
were ever followed up or even recorded. Yet there can be no doubt that the meetings were the 
first of their kind in the territory, attracting serious attention, with discussions that were often 
"very heated". (84) in this way, they served the purpose intended for them, by enabling the 
participants to feel that they were playing a part in developing the educational service, towards 
providing equal opportunities for Arabs, something consistently denied them in the past, but 
still some way ahead in practical terms. It also served to save the Administration's face at a 
time when it had no magic solutions or panaceas on offer. (85)
Other measures aimed at increasing the degree of Arab participation in the educational 
administration of the territory were also introduced at the time. Frequent meetings of 
inspectors and headmasters were held partly in an attempt to improve the general climate of 
opinion in favour of the Administration. (8 6 ) This policy continued into 1948, it only 
becoming clear in the summer, which way the political future of the territory would develop. 
The departure of the Sudanese Superintendant on leave and the refusal of the Egyptian 
Authorities to allow him to re-enter Tripolitania, (87) enabled Steele-Greig to replace him with 
his own nominee. This was a Pastinaian Inspector of many years' experience, described by 
Steele-Greig, in his usual way for those of whom he approved as a "capable man", whose task 
would be to supervise Arab education as well as being headmaster of the Arab Secondary 
School in Tripolitania. (8 8 )
The appointment of the Palestinian Inspector was Steele-Greig's final coup, Blackley 
communicating to him while on leave, his dcision to "sack" him, later commuted to a demotion 
to Education Officer, Grade II, having replaced him with a new man. (89) it is interesting to 
speculate on the possible implications for general changes of the Administration's orientation 
and policy inherent in Steele-Greig's removal from the sensitive position of Director of 
Education, coinciding as it did with the dashing of hopes for the restoration of italian 
sovereignty in Tripolitania. (90) Unfortunately for the Administration, Blackley's "new man" 
in the shape of the Arabphile former "Sudan hand", G.C. Scott, did not arrive when wanted 
and expected, postponing his departure from England for more than a year. Steele-Greig,
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1948, p. 48.
88 Ibid.
89 Steele-Greig to Appleton: Conversations.
90 See, supra, re failure of Bevin-Sforza initiative, pp. 26-48.
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therefore, continued to run the Education Department as before though presumably with even 
less disposition for change than before. Maybe because of this, few if any changes could now 
be expected to take place, despite the surrounding atmosphere, politically and socially having 
changed considerably towards the Arab side. As before, the Arab Advisory Committee 
continued to meet in 1948 on a monthly basis, offering advice still either accepted or rejected 
by Steele-Greig who basically had as little or less sympathy with their essential aims and 
objectives than before his demotion. (91)
The final two years of the B.M.A. saw few changes of a fundamental kind to the system 
established in the first year of british occupation which still reflected many problems of a long­
term nature going back to Italian times and before and not therefore susceptible to instant 
solutions. So, although the period saw the appointment of two new directors in the 
educational field and finally a Libyan Minister of Education, few initiatives were attempted.
The belated arrival of G.C. Scott, as Director, Grade I, ostensibly to replace Steele-Greig and 
after a mere year of his tenureship of Steele-Greig's former position, C.E. Leigh - "Sheikh 
Leigh" from the Sudan - had virtually no practical effect on the educational situation. Their 
aim was primarily to improve Anglo-Arab relations, as they were both fluent speakers of 
Arabic. Otherwise, the old problems continued as before, the sheer vastness of the country 
defying the puny efforts and miniscule resources of the Administration, now on its last legs, to 
extend modem educational facilities into remote areas.
Consolidation of what had already been achieved was clearly required to prevent earlier 
initiatives from dissolving into nothingness, due to lack of resources. Thus, the three recently- 
appointed provincial inspectors found themselves "unable to carry out their dutires through 
lack of transport" to out-of-the-way schools. (92) To try to bring these areas into line, new 
sub-inspectors were appointed at the commencement of the school year in October 1949 for 
each administrative district (93) Each sub-inspector was responsible to the provincial 
inspector while also being expected to work closely with the District Commissioners. (94)
The inevitable consequences of these "experiments" was that they tended to fall foul of 
"political extremists". This was the term used by the Department of Education to describe 
those Libyans who wished for a discussion of political matters which the Administration 
regarded as the sole preserve of the British Government in London. (95) Despite such fears 
on the part of the Administration, 3 teachers were selected in 1949 to take a two-year course in 
the College of Education in Cairo and 6  other students were sent abroad on special courses. 
Relations between the Department of Education and Arab teachers still continued to be tense
91 Op. Cit., p. 48.
92 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1949, pp. 31 - 32.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1950, p. 33.
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and another strike by teachers took place in May. (96) The latter can best be understood 
within the context of the times and were undoubtedly pan politically inspired, as a means of 
pressurising the Administration., and also apn economically motivated due to poor pay and 
conditions. At least the Administration continued its positive upgrading of Libyans to more 
senior status in the education service. October 1950 saw the upgrading of about 80 Libyans 
to the rank of inspector, headmaster or secondary school teacher as part of a final drive before 
independence, to "improve the terms of service for teachers in Tripolitania". (97)
VI. Kuttabs.
As in Italian times, information on the Koranic Schools was extremely scant under the 
B.M.A., not because there was anything secretive about the nature or running of these 
schools, but mainly on account of their essential nature, as the means whereby the Mosques 
taught the holy book to the children of the prophet This was an area which the British, like 
the Italians before them, wisely left ot the religious authorities, not seeking to interfere. As a 
consequence of such a policy, statistics wre not collected on these schools, since there was no 
need to refer to them in the Annual Reports, though this policy was changed in 1948 - 1959 
when for reasons that are not clear the following figures were provided for the Koranic 
schools:
Year ! Pupils ! Teachers
( j
1943/4 ! 14897 ! 358
1944/5 ! 15101 ! 385
1945/6 ! 14986 ! 358
1946/7 ! 15468 ! 358
1947/8 ! 15532 ! 358
1948/9 ! 14861 ! 358
1949.50 ! 14398 500 *
1950/51. ! 13983 ! 503**
* B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1949, p. 76.
** B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1950, p. 87.(98)
96 Ibid., p. 35.
97 Ibid.
98 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1948, Appendix "H"
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Generally speaking, however, the Koranic schools were regarded by the Administration as 
"private schools"and as such were classed with other schools of a similar nature, namely the 
Jewish and Greek schools. These were traditional religious schools and quite different from 
the Italian religious schools under the control of the Vatican which had been a feature of 
educational life in Tripoli, especially since Ottoman times, and would still be well represented 
in Tripoli on until the Revolution when they ceased to exist As such, the latter taught the 
Catholic Catechism alongside the ordinary syllabus during elementary education. Under the 
B.M.A. all Italian schools were reagreded as government schools regardless of whether they 
were Catholic or not.
The B.M.A.'s policy towards the Koranic schools hardly differed from that of Fascist 
times, that is after 1922, whereby these schools were left to their own devices apart from being 
subjected to the occasional government inspection. (99) Such a policy was also followed in 
Arab countries generally, though the Koran was and still is often taught in the elementary 
schools as part of the general curriculum, the policy followed by the Italians in Libya before 
1941 in the Italo-Arab schools. (100)
VII. Conclusion: Elementary Education in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica 
The Case for Comparison.
Any attempt to compare educational developments in tripolitania under the B.M.A. with similar 
developments under the B.M.A. in Cyrenaica requires somce form of initial qualification, 
since while there were undoubted similarities, and therefore possible policy options, there 
were also many dissimilarities between the two coastal provinces. Geographically and 
historically, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica had been bound together, however loosely, by ties of 
blood, language and religion, despite strong particularism which would continue into modem 
times. Under the Libyans, especially after 1922, the attempt had been made to treat Libya as a 
single political entity. This was so at the educational level as at other levels with similar 
policies being pursued in both provinces. 001) At the onset of the B.M.A., however, 
virtually all vestiges of Italian colonisation had been wiped out in Cyrenaica so that there 
remained "the ghost of the country that had cost Italy so much money, blood and moral 
reputation to convert into a progressive Italian colony". Not only was the former colony 
materially devastated by the disabling effects of the war, but "all Italian officials and all but an 
unwilling band of Italian nationals had been withdrawn when the battle of El-Alamein was 
lost." (102) Moreover, at the political level, Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden's celebrated
99 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1947, p. 47.
100 See, Appleton, Op. Cit., Chpt. 3. Direct Rule and the Libyan Schools 1911 - 1919. Italian Policy 
and the Koranic Schools, pp. 69 - 74.
101 Ibid., Chpt. 10, P. 309.
102 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1944, p. 3.
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pronouncement to the British House of Commons in January 1942 that "His Majesty's 
Government are determined that the Senussi of Cyrenaica will not again be subjected to Italian 
domination" had a marked effect upon the relative attitudes of the B.M.A., the people of 
Cyrenaica and their leaders, and the world in general. (103) Tripolitania on the other hand, as 
has already been shown (104) was blessed and cursed in this respect, having a territory 
virtually untouched by war, but from the Arab point of view, still almost as Italian as it had 
been under the former colonial regime. Moreover, Eden would not make a similar statement 
on the future of Tripolitania, as he had made on Cyrenaica, to the intense chagrin of its 
inhabitants, so leaving their future considerably in doubt
Moreover, at the educational level, the situation in the provinces reflected this disparity of 
political feeling over the question of the possible reimposition of Italian rule. Whereas 
Cyrenaica was prepared positively for independence from the start of British rule, Tripolitania 
became a vacuum of frustrated expectations and desires. Whereas in Cyrenaica, the Egyptian 
system was adopted in 1948, in Tripolitania no system was taken up, with the effect that no 
clearly indentifiable standard was obtainable at any educational level. This is to be compared 
with Cyrenaica where the school year started on 1st October 1944 with the adoption of the 
school system and curriculum of the Egyptian Government Primary Schools. (105) This was 
a properly geared six-year course after which pupils might take an examination equivalent to 
the Egyptian Primary Certificate. Passing this examination entitled them to entry into the 
Egyptian Government Secondary Schools, Schools of Agriculture and Trade Schools. It can 
at once be seen that although it would take some time before Libyan equivalents could be 
developed, there was a tremendous advantage to be gained in modelling educational progress 
upon that achieved in a developed neighbouring Arab state.
Outside Bengasi, Dema and Tobruk remained 20 other schools which were really village 
schools, offering a four year elementary course designed to cater for "rural needs". (106) So 
successful was the adoption of the Egyptian system in Cyrenaica that it continued on well after 
the unification of the country in 1950 though indeed as early as 1940 a "sound educational 
service" could be said to have been founded. (107) Furthermore, the problem Steele-Greig 
encountered in obtaining suitable text-books for the Tripolitian Arabs did not arise in Cyrenaica 
as these were easily obtainable in Eygpt. Only after 1948 did the B.M.A. start to experience 
problems in obtaining books from Egypt, "the best and most convenient source of supply of 
suitable books in Arabic" and this was due to "long delays in getting export permits from the 
Egyptian G o v e r n m e n t " . ^  08) it may seem gratuitous at this point to argue that if Steele-Greig
103 Ibid.
104 See, supra, Chpt. Two, p. 27.
105 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1944, p. 3.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1948, p. 8.
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or the B.M.A. had availed itself of books.from Egypt at the start in 1943 the possibility that 
the supply at some later date might have been cut off by the action of a hostile foreign 
government need not have presented a practical problem since the B.M.A. in Tripolitania had 
at its disposal excellent printing facilities in the form of the Pliny-Maggi Press at the School of 
Arts and Crafts in Tripoli. (109)
When comparing the number of schools relative to Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, reference 
must be made to population totals for the two sister provinces. In this respect, whereas 
Tripolitania had a population of 690,377 Moslems in 1944, to rise in 1950 to 711,960 
Moslems (110); the population of Cyrenaica in 1944 was 254,004 which by 1950 had 
dropped to 72,496 due to administrative reorganiation. (111) Relative areas for the two 
provinces saw 106,471 square miles for Tripolitania in 1944 which was unchanged in 1950 at 
106,471 square miles. 012) with 254,004 square miles for Cyrenaica in 1944 which had 
altered to 72,496 square miles in 1947. (113) These statistics are reflected in the educational 
distribution of schools, teachers and pupils for the two provinces. Hence the numerically 
superior Tripolitania in 1944 had 79 schools, 271 teachers and 7,988 pupils,which figures by 
1949 had risen to 127 schools, 632 teachers and 19,557 pupils. (H4) Meanwhile in 
Cyrenaica in 1944, there were 28 schools, 59 teachers and 3,257 pupils to rise to 127 schools, 
632 teachers and 19,557 pupils by 1949. (115) These figures, as can be seen, reveal only 
marginal difference between the two territories, given that in both the aim was a pupil-teacher 
ratio of 50 pupils in the elementary sector. This relatively high figure for a developing country 
was subject to rapid population growth, shortages of every kind, most of all in the field of 
teaching personnel.
The adoption of the Egyptian System, complete with syllabuses, textbooks and 
examinations, by the B.M.A. in Cyrenaica meant unavoidably, reliance upon Egyptian 
expertise and teachers to manage, direct and run it..This does not appear to have been 
accompanied as in Tripolitania by manifest fears that such a step would reap a harvest of 
political interference from the same source. In Tripolitania, on the other hand, the situation 
offered little from Italian times and the same prejudices existed against the employement of 
Egyptians. The political fears over Egypt continued in Tripolitania yet, despite the absence of 
Egyptians in the territory, the disturbances ovber the future of the country inevitably left their 
mark on the schools. This was not so in Cyrenaica, where only the positive effect of 
employing Egyptians was apparent.
See, B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1948, p. 8
110 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1944, p. 53 and ditto, 1950, p. 80.
111 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1944, p. 31 and ditto, 1947, p. 41.
112 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1944 & 1950, pp. 53 & 86 respectively.
113 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1944 & 1947, pp. 31 & 41 respectively.
114 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1944, and 1949, pp. 77 & 30 respectively.
115 Annual Report Cyrenaica, 1944, p.8.
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Gradually, links were extended with Egypt in Cyrenaica and graduates initially from the 
primary schools were sent for training at the Dar El-Ulum Training School in Cairo. This 
resulted in the First group of Cyrenaican headteachers being ready for employment in the 
schools as early as 1944, more than 5 years ahead of any similar development in Tripolitania. 
(116) j o  Speed up the pace further, two Egyptian certified teachers were employed in 
November 1945 to train Cyrenaicans as elementary school teachers in the territory itself. (H?) 
The dependence upon Egypt was extended in 1954 when both Cyrenaican and Tripolitanian 
teachers attended courses given by Egyptian educational experts at Cairo. (118) Moreover, 
three mistresses were employed from Egypt for the Libyan girls' schools at Bengasi, Berka 
and Barce. (H9)
During 1946, the shortage of qualified Libyans for the schools was having a deleterious 
effect upon the expansion of the elementary schools in Cyrenaica, as in Tripolitania, with the 
result that plans were laid to employ more Egyptians in the schools. (120) These were put 
into action in 1947 with the employment of 17 more Egyptians in the schools of Cyrenaica. In 
1948, despite problems with the Egyptian government over the supply of school books and 
equipment, 42 male and 10 female teachers were imported from Egypt which, states the 
Annual Report, "did much to ease the situation and will continue to be an indispensable 
measure until such time as the territory is in a position to train a sufficient number of its own 
teachers. (1 2 1 )
So, already ahead of Tripolitania in many aspects of the development of a modem 
educational service by 1948, Cyrenaica was to move yet further ahead with the setting up in 
this year of a training centre for male teachers at Bengasi. (122) jh is  was an event not 
equalled in Tripolitania until the dawn of independence. (123) and even then was without the 
backing of the Egyptian educational infrastructure; and years of solid development, such as 
had already occurred in the neighbouring coastal province. From the start, the Bengasi 
Training Centre was a success with "one class of 15 pupils" and a programme designed to 
provide "a 2-year course of training". Arrangements were also complete for the opening of a 
female tachers' training centre at the El-Berka school in Bengasi City from january to train 
elementary teachers for the girls' schools. Before opening in 1949, it had already enrolled by 
January of that year 5 trainees and a second class for 15 girls who were already teachers and 
needed more advanced instruction was also on the agenda for later in the same year. (124)
116 Annual Report Tripolitania, 45, p.
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Thus by 1949 the training of teachers was already well established in Cyrenaica with the 
establishment there of two centres, one for each sex, whereas in Tripolitania, the first faltering 
steps had hardly been taken in this direction.
As in Tripolitania so in Cyrenaica, the Koranic school or Kuttab was the chief if not the 
only form of indigenous education. As such, it was usually attended by Arab boys, though 
statistics on these schools in both territories are inconsistent if not elusive. Primarily the 
concern of these schools was to teach the Koran through repetition rather than by any other 
method. This was probably the best way in the circumstances and given that subsequent levels 
of Islamic education almost entirely depended on familiarity with the text of the holy book 
itself. In this respect the aim of the Koranic schools was to get the pupils to recite the text of 
the Koran by heart and the most successful pupil in any age range was he who was best able to 
do this.
For pupils desirous of proceeding to the next stage of an Islamic education or of pursuimg 
a religious or legal career in the Islamic world, the work of the Koranic schools w as, in the 
above sense, an indispensable prerequisite, which was the main reason why the colonial 
authorities could not close them down, or supersede them with another more modem form of 
education. Islam itself was in many senses grounded upon the work of the Koranic schools, 
and an attack upon such institutions would, in the eyes of Muslims, be conceived as an attack 
upon Islam, involving confrontational politics which the colonial authorities were most 
anxious to avoid at all costs.
It was success at the Koranic school that enabled a pupil to proceed to the next stage of an 
Islamic education which took place at the Medressah of which there were several attached to 
important mosques or Zawias in both Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. Success at the Medressah 
allowed students to proceed to the Islamic University of which there were several in Libya. 
However, the most prestigious of these institutions were located in the surrounding Arab 
countries. Al-Azhar University in Cairo was a particular favourite with Libyan students, 
though they also went to established places of Islamic learning in Tunisia, Algeria and Syria.
The Koranic schools therefore were normally the first or attendant phase of education in 
Libya as elsewhere in the Islamic world, after which pupils continued a more or less 
exclusively Islamic education or went on the study secular subjects in the government schools. 
In its attitude to the Koranic schools, the B.M.A.'s of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica differed little 
from the policies followed in Italian times. As in Italian times, the Kuttabs were occasionally 
inspected by government nominees but little or no attempt was made to control their inner 
workings, which were left to the religious authorities. Both the Italian and British regimes 
basically preferred to treat the Kuttabs as private institutions. In this way they followed 
established precedents that equally applied to the other denominations - Catholic, Jewish or 
Greek.
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By 1946, the Administration in Cyrenaica observed that there were 26 Koranic schools 
"scattered around the territory, mainly in the remoter areas, which give some 400 boys a 
religious course of instruction". 025) This is an important point, as it indicates that most 
Libyan boys, and most Libyan girls, received no education at all, outside the home, and, if the 
parents were illiterate, none in the home, which explains to some degree the high illiteracy rate 
in the country as a whole, where reading and writing in Arabic were minority skills.
A different approach, however slight, can perhaps be detected towards the Koranic schools 
in Cyrenaica on the part of the B.M.A. where a more Arab-phile policy was in any case being 
carried out. There the Administration aimed at "giving every encouragement to these schools" 
even if they were "entirely maintained by the tribes themselves". (*26) Even so the numbers 
of these schools and those of pupils attending them appears to have remained fairly constant.
(127) However, it had always been recognised that the educational problems of Libya would 
never be solved until illiteracy in the country as a whole became less widespread. Given that 
the government schools, even when functioning with maximum efficiency, could do no more 
than scratch the surface of the problem, any real attempt to progress out of the illiteracy 
impasse, depended to a large extent upon reforming the Kuttabs and making them an integral 
part of a reshaped national system. 1949 witnessed an important move in this direction due to 
the approval of a new policy by the Emir, Sayed Mohammed El-Senusi himself, whereby 26 
Kuttabs situated in the Zawias or Senusi Lodges, maintained by the tribes, were to be 
transformed into "instructional centres", under the control of a specially appointed Inspector of 
Zawias, who was also to act as liaison officer with the education office situated in Bengasi.
(128) Maybe one is anticipating too much by recognising in this move, the beginning in 
Libya of some form of Islamic state, since such a move would have been unlikely under a 
colonial regime. This perhaps explains why there was no emulation in Tripoli, though it 
should be recalled that the Sayed Idris had as early as 1922 called upon the Italian authorities to 
involve the Kuttabs in the government system of education, especially in the rural areas, where 
there was little or no hope of establishing government schools. (129)
There can be no doubt, it must be categorically stated, Cyrenaica got the better deal under 
the B.M.A. both educationally and politically. For whatever reason, and this in the final 
analysis must have been political, education in Cyrenaica developed in accordance with criteria 
that were absent in the sister province of Tripolitania. This is particularly apparent in the 
administrative aspect, since on the Arab side at least, the presence of the Emir Idirs A1 Senusi 
in the eastern province, as in Italian times too, ensured that Muslim interests were well cared
12  ^ B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1946, pp. 6 & 7.
126 Ibid.
127 The number of such schools tended to remain the same while the number of pupils rose slightly from 
400 in 1946 to 500 in the next year. See, B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1947 and 1948, pp. 11 & 9.
128 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1949, p. 15.
129 Op. CiL, Chpt. Six. The establishing of a Protectorate in Cyrenaica and the Final Formulation of 
Liberal Educational Policy, R.O. 1922 and D.M. 14 Sept. 1922,1919 - 1922, pp. 158 - 191.
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for. For the British, the Emir represented the status quo in the province with whom they 
would have to deal in the future. Whatever happened to the future of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica 
would remain a client state, dependent on Britain both politically and financially. As such in a 
volatile but important part of the world, it would safeguard British interests, should Egypt fall 
prey to the nationalists and revolutionaries.
The important thing for Britain was to get Cyrenaica set up as a small but effective state 
with a modem educational system under a conservative but wholly Islamic head of state in the 
form of Sayed Idris A1 Senusi who had been such a prominent figure in its history so far. 
Hence there was no hesitation in appointing a Libyan, Ali Assas Al-Jerbi, as Superintendent of 
Education in Bengasi to assist the British Director of Education, Major W.O. Foreman, and 
eventually take over from him. Such an appointment in 1944 was way ahead of similar moves 
in Tripolitania where such a step would have been virtually unthinkable at the time. (130)
Such a devolution of authority was fully in accord with British Government policy for the 
region and could not have occurred had International Law been strictly adhered to, as was 
frequently proclaimed as part of a stance of non-interference by B.M.A. officials. Instead, at 
least for Cyrenaica, devolution of authority took place at all levels of the administrative 
machine. (131) Thus, the Al-Jerbi appointment was quickly followed by two other 
nominations at a senior level in the form of two Arab inspectors for both provinces who 
accompanied a party of Libyan teachers from both provinces to the Dar-Ulum College in 
Cairo. (132)
By 1944, the Department of Education in Bengasi was virtually being run by Libyans, 
though Major W.O. Foreman remained on in a semi-supervisory role which had more to do 
with advising rather than controlling. (133) However, it was not just the presence of Libyans 
at a relatively high administrative level that was responsible for the difference in the quality of 
education in the two territories. British Administration at the top-most level was in the hands 
of personnel of a very high calibre. Hence Brigadier A. Kirkbride's replacement by E.V. 
Candole in 1947 as Chief Administrator could not have been more inspired to ensure the 
continuance of sound educational policies for the territories, so lamentably absent in 
Tripolitania. (134)
On 15th November, 1949, a Minister of Education was not surprisingly appointed, so 
more or less completing the process begun by the B.M.A. in 1943. (135) Such developments 
were in marked contrast to those in Tripolitania where the B.M.A. had largely marked time
130 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1944, p. 8.
131 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1944, p. 8.
132 Ibid.
133 Op. Cit p.l.
134 Ibid.
135 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1949, pp. 30-32.
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until 1948, after which developments were too late to have any immediate impact upon the new 
Libya then emerging.
103
Chapter Six Secondary Education
"The Italians intended that the Arabs in Libya should be hewers of wood and
drawers of water The Arabs knew this and knew that the Italians were
achieving their intention. They realised that they are one of the most backward 
Arab Communities in the Middle East." (*)
Secondary Education for Arabs was not developed under the B.M.A. in Tripolitania until 
1946; or in Cyrenaica until late 1947. The reason for this discrepancy lies in planning for 
Cyrenaica between 1943-1949, whereby the Egyptian System was adopted and entry to 
secondary education only followed six years in the elementary schools. In Tripolitania, on the 
other hand, there was no lower or higher elementary education, only elementary education, 
which in the case of a few selected schools provided a fifth year course, followed by 
secondary education. (1) The reason, however, for the late development of secondary 
education in Libya for Arabs can only be explained in terms of the ambivalent attitude of the 
Italian authorities to any form of secondary education for them.(^).
If secondary education for the Arab population had existed in Libya, when the B.M.A. 
was first inaugurated, then International Law would have clearly required the British 
Authorities to continue the same service as had existed in Italian times. The British did not 
need to have this explained to them, and had gone ahead in the first year of the B.M.A. in 
Tripolitania, with the reopening of the former Italian Secondary Schools in Tripoli itself. @) 
The fact they were unable to open such schools for Arabs again underlines the virtual non­
existence of such institutions there. The only exception to the rule was the former school of 
Islamic studies in Tripoli opened in 1936, as an integral part of Mussolini's Islamic Policy for 
the Italian Empire in Africa, which was never reopened by the British apparently owing to 
"bomb damage’".(4)
Unfortunately, Italian propagandists for reasons connected with the attempt to obtain the 
return of Tripolitania to Italian sovereignty did not abandon entirely their attempts to deceive 
the general public over Italy's efforts to provide education, and particularly secondary 
education, for Arabs under the Fascist Regime and before. Not only did they continue to
* B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1943, p. 16.
1 See, B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1946 and B.M.A. Cyrenaica ,1947, pp. 34 and 10 respect.
2 See, R.D. Giugno 1928, n. 1698, Norme reflettenti I'lstruzione primario e per i musulmani della 
Tripolitania e delle Cyrenaica, B.U.T.
3 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1944, p. 35.
4 There is no reference to this notable institution in any of the B.M.A. reports for Tripolitania though
Steele-Greig h stated that the building fell into disuse under the B.M. A. and suffered from "bomb 
damage". Op. Cit. Steele-Greig/Appleton: Conversations.
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maintain that Arabs had been well treated at the elementary level of education; (5) but also had 
been provided with adequate secondary education as well. (6 ) It would therefore be helpful at 
this point to get the facts clear regarding secondary education for Libyans before the B.M.A. 
took over in Tripolitania. Without this understanding it is not possible to understand B.M.A. 
policy towards secondary education within its proper context or the implications for Libyans in 
the territory.
n. Reasons for Italian Failure to Develop Secondary Education.
"Of particular interest amongst the Arab schools are the girls' schools of 
education and domestic work along with the 'IDADIA' of which there are only 
two - one at Bengasi and the other at Dema." (*)
Initially, at least, Italy's "civilising mission" to Libya had been intended by Italian legislators 
(7) and indeed for a wide range of writers on colonial matters (8 ) to provide for all forms and 
degrees of education, including secondary education. Unfortunately, these historic good 
intentions did not survive the passage of history itself, founded as they were upon a basic set 
of misconceptions about Muslims and the Arab world. This may seem extraordinary in 
retrospect considering Italy's history, culture and extensive trading contacts with Arab 
countries. Unfortunately it is true and Italy would pay dearly for the price of ignorance in such 
matters in Libya, where the civilising mission was unwelcome.
In Libya it soon became apparent that Italy lacked both prior experience of Arab countries 
and knowledge too of the people and civilisation that Italian intellectuals and politicians had so 
ardently desired to change. There was also a dearth of officials trained and desirous of 
running a colonial empire in an hostile e n v ir o n m e n t.^ )  Instead, the early aim, it can hardly be 
called a policy, was simply to extend to the Arab population, the system operating in Italy 
itself. This policy had already proved to be successful in the numerous Italian speaking 
schools set up and sponsored by the Italian Government throughout the Middle east or 
wherever Italian communities existed. 0®)
5 See, Appleton, Op. Cit., pp. 344 - 348.
6 See, Fulvio Contini, Storia delle istituzione scolastiche delle Libia, Libia, Rivista Trimestrale Di Studi
Libici, Luglio - Settembre, 1952, pp. 52 - 54.
* Dr. Angelo Piccioli, Relatione Finale, Anno Scolastico, 1922 - 3, A.S.E. II Governatore della Cyrenaica, Bengasi, 
19 Agosto, 1923, p. 39.
7 Camera dei dcputati, Atti Parliamentari, Legislatura XXIII, Sessione 1909; Desegno di Legge, Riodinamento delle
scuole Ilaliane all estero, Seduta del 18 Novembre Roma, 1909
8 See, Claudio Segre, Fourth Shore, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1974, pp. 26, 30,42,14 and
148.
9 Cachia, AJ., Libya Under Ottoman Rule. Tripoli, 1946, p. 82.
10 Ibid., p. 92.
These policies referred to initially as "westernisation", "assimilation" or simply 
"Italianisation", when applied to the native population of Tripoli and the coastal areas 
rebounded, demoralising and confusing their originators. At the practical level, the initial 
attempt at elementary education, bent on Italianisation, outraged Muslims in Tripoli, so 
alienating those they were intended to win over to the Italian side. 0  *) Italianisation was 
therefore from its start a disaster and quickly recognised as such. Also, never a very practical 
proposition, the policy failed due to the shortage of suitable trained and motivated teachers.
Having in the first few years of colonial experience burnt their fingers, Italian educational 
policy, thenceforward, retreated to whatever position of vantage was considered to be 
politically expedient. The authorities now recognised how difficult it was to come up with an 
educational policy for Muslims in their new colony of Libya. Attention therefore shifted to 
what other colonial powers had successfully attempted to achieve wherever the situation 
seemed similar to Libya. In particular, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Educational Section, 
sought to borrow ideas from the educational policies and practices of the French in Morocco, 
Algeria and Tunisia, or the British towards the Muslim population of the Sudan or Egypt. The 
Ministry also turned for support and advice from its own Arabists, in particular the notable 
Professor Nallino of the University of Rome. Both the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of 
Education in Rome were taken aback by Nallino's recommendations, which sought to remove 
education from the realms of the political ideas that were virtually anathema to colonial-minded 
officials. 0 2 ) Education for Arabs not surprisingly failed to get off the ground in the colony 
dependent as it had become upon so many conflicting opinions amongst the originators of the 
policy. Worse, however, was the burgeoning political, economic and social crisis within Italy 
itself matched as it was by political and military weakness within the colony. The first ten 
years of Italian rule therefore can only be seen as one consisting of intellectual debate and 
political and educational stalemate. Many policies were discussed and even written about but 
no real progress was made in practical terms. Even the famous Fundamental Laws were never 
put into practice sufficiently, especially in Tripolitania where they were not even implemented. 
(13)
Yet, despite this tangle of aims and motives, some high some low, but for the most part, 
confused and uncertain, there were strident tones that would eventually become the dominant 
chord. Beliefs themselves were coalescing against the colonists and their representatives in 
Rome to the effect that a workable strategy could only be found of relevance to Libya if 
colonialist criteria of service to Italy were adopted there. In this respect the ideas of the 
founder of the colonial Ministry, no less than Pietro Bertolini himself, are of fundamental 
importance and a continual source of reference to the founders of scholastic policy there. As
11 Op. Cit., Appleton, P. 41.
12 See, Appleton, Op. Cit., III. Nallino's development o f an Orientalist Policy, pp. 114 - 123.
13 Op. Cit., ChpL Seven, Arab Reaction to the Statutes o f Libya in Tripolitania, pp. 192-229.
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such, they received constant expression in the reports of Dr. Rodolpho Miccachi, whose 
lieutenant in Libya, Dr Angelo Piccioli, and after him Mario Tortenese were to put Bertolini’s 
colonial nostrum into educational practice.
It is Bertolini, Miccachi and Piccioli who are the three primary authors of Italian colonialist 
theory as an educational ideology for Libyan Arabs and indeed wherever else the Italian flag 
flew and Italian Africa. It is not too much to say that whatever Italy did or failed to do in Libya 
in the educational sense was in direct measure to their response to the colonial imperative of the 
times. Starting with the so-called Bertolini Legislation of 1914-1915, never as such 
subsequently repealed, it represents what could be seen as the limited approach to native 
education in a colonial situation. Such a policy sought to capitalise on the scarce resources of 
money and manpower with a view to providing no more than a basic structure which was all a 
poor country like Italy could afford.
In this way the Italo-Arab school became the matrix of Italian colonial educational policy 
for Libya later added to with the School of Higher Islamic Studies in Tripoli but clearly 
indicated by Bertolini as early as 1913. No mention was made of any other form of 
educational institution other than the Koranic schools or Kuttabs; and these were to continue 
functioning as in Ottoman times without any government subsidy, though subject to 
government inspection^ 14) Bertolini’s decree made no mention of any form of secondary 
education for Arabs though apologists of Italian rule in Libya seized upon the notion of a 
School of Higher Islamic Studies or Medersa as providing a special form of education for 
Arabs suited to their religion and culture. Yet to refer to the Medersa in Tripoli as a form of 
secondary education for Arabs is to misunderstand entirely the philosophy of colonial thinking 
on the subject of Arab education. In this respect, history shows Bertolini and his successors 
as highly suspicious of secondary education for Arabs, since such a form of education was 
undesirable economically and also politically dangerous to Italy as a colonial power. 06) 
Instead, only specially crafted colonial institutions, such as the College of Higher Islamic 
Studies, should be permitted to exist in the colony. These institutions, by fostering cultural 
separatism would enable the Arabs to develop in accordance with their own language religion 
and culture so removing any threat to Italian colonial interests by preventing Arabs from 
becoming equal to Italians in educational opportunity.
It was, however, left to Rodolfo Miccachi, following his extensive tour of all the schools 
of the colony late in 1918 and early in 1919 to formulate the definitive policy for Libya based 
upon the premises of Bertolini and the colonialist thinkers. In this respect he clearly 
supersedes Alfonso Nallino, the noted Arabist, whose ideas unfortunately enter into 
prominence in Libya in association with a succession of weak centre coalitions such as
14 See, R.D., 15 Gennaio 1914, n. 56, "con quale vienne approvato il regolamento scolastico della
Tripolitania e delle Cyrenaica. B.U.C., 268.
16 Angelo Piccioli, Op. Cit., P. 39.
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characterised Italian post-war politics. They sought to appease the Libyans, particularly in 
Cyrenaica, by fulfilling their aspirations through a pro-Arab social policy. In this way, they 
hoped to remove the threat of a further colonial war and gain Arab support by "moral means" 
for the continuance of Italian sovereignty in Libya.
In some ways, Miccachi attempted to take account of both streams of thinking by rejecting, 
like Nallino the westernising approach which offended the Arabs and the eastemising tendency 
(a blend of Arabisation and Islamisation) that was equally unpopular with the Italian 
nationalists. The important point for Miccachi was not to endanger in any way the retention of 
Italian sovereignty in Libya. This seemed to be endangered by the Liberals represented in 
Libya by Nallino, especially in the aftermath of the First World War, whereas Miccachi knew 
circumstances would change once Italy emerged from the post-war deparession syndrome of 
1919. He therefore sought to frame an educational policy for the future that would allow for 
the restatement of a colonialist identity for Italy in the post-war era by restating the original 
Bertolini Policy of 1913. 0 ? )
For Miccachi the future development of Italian Educational Policy in Libya should take the 
following form:
1) An elementary instruction to the mass of the indigenous 
population consisting of reading, writing in Arabic and, where 
possible, Italian, elementary arithmetic, hygiene, agriculture and 
manual work, all to be imparted without any form of restriction 
in conformity with their own particular aspirations;
2) An instruction, also elementary but a little wider, for those who 
would benefit from secondary education and who intend to enter 
a trade or become even minor officials or clerks in the 'zaptie1;
3) A secondary education for the sons of notables, such as will 
place them in a position that they will be able to exercise their 
functions in public life amongst the native population;
4) A higher education for the training of Imam, Cadi, etc.,etc. 0 8 )
17 Dr. Ridolfo Miccachi, Rilazione Finale, Anno Scolastico 1919 A.S.E. II Governatore della 
Tripolitania, Tripoli, Luglio, 1919. pp. 141 - 152.
18 Ibid., p. 146.
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Unfortunately, he recognised the existing policy and practice did not as yet meet these 
requirements on account of the then fashion for the said principles of Professor Nallino of 
Rome University. 09)
It should be noted that the finishing touches to Micacchi’s blueprints for Libyan education, 
especially in respect of secondary education, were to be left to his successor, Dr. Angelo 
Piccioli, who was to add the commas and dot the i's. By the time that Piccioli took over as 
superintendant of education, the March On Rome had taken place and any serious notion of 
secondary education for Arabs had gone into complete reversal as Year One was proclaimed 
and the decades of Fascism commenced. Now the very mention of the "scuole medie" or 
"Idadia" was frowned upon as being the poisonous fruit of the hated Statutes of Libya. Such a 
climate quickly reneged upon the surviving Arab secondary schools at Bengasi and Dema 
which were now declared by Rome to be "no longer necessary." (20) This had been foreseen 
by Piccioli in his report of 1922, when sensing the direction in which the wind was now 
blowing, jhe was quick to recognise them as "politically dangerous". They were, he had 
decided, despite their limited curriculum, responsible for fostering notions of intellectual and 
cultural superiority amongst the Arabs. (21)
No attempt was made either to revive the "idadia" or introduce some other form of 
secondary education for Arabs, such as the French successfully attempted in North Africa and 
the British in Egypt and the Sudan. Instead, during the remaining 15 years of Italian 
colonisation in Libya, education policy drifted between the often stated intention of setting up 
the long-promised School of Islamic Studies or Medersa; and the idea of adding a few higher 
(post-elementary) courses to the existing italo-Arab schools. These were chiefly designed, as 
Miccachi had intended, for the sons of notables or those wishing to became small tradesmen or 
clerks in the Italian administration or "Zaprie". (22)
m . Initial British Response to the Problems of Secondary Education.
" little provision was made for Arab Secondary Education and before 1946 it was 
impossible to consider the opening of a Secondary School. In the first place there was 
no staff available and secondly the Primary School pupils were not to the required 
standard". (*)
19 See, R.D. 1 Giugno 1919, n. 931, "che approva le norme fondamentali per I'assetto della Tripolitania, 
B.U.C., 289; & R.D. 31 Ottobre, 1919, n. 2401. Norme fondamentali per I'assetto della Cirenaica, 
B.U.C., 601.
20 Op. Cit., R.D., 21 giugno 1923, n. 1698.
21 Dr. Angelo Piccioli, Op. Cit., p. 39.
22 Ibid.
I * Steele-Greig, Op. Cit., p. 38.
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It can only be postured rather than argued that as "little provision was made for Arab 
Secondary Education before 1946", therefore the B.M.A. was ipso facto absolved of making 
it. Moreover, even if secondary education had for whatsoever reason not been provided 
before 1946, this was no reason why it should not have been made available after that date. 
This would require the pupils to be of the "required standard" and the teachers to be made 
"available" for secondary education. In other words, given that neither the Moslem Turks or 
the Catholic Italians had seen fit to provide scondary education for Moslem Arabs in Libya 
they were extremely fortunate and should per se be extremely grateful that the mainly 
Protestant British were ready to provide it in 1946. However idiosyncratic this position may 
seem in retrospect it was in fact the "gut reaction" to the situation of the British on the spot 
from common soldiery to Oxbridge educated officials. These largely "civilians in arms" knew 
as a matter of fact that the Libyans had received a raw deal from their Italian over-lords and it 
had fallen on them in the role of liberators to put them back on the road to "democracy and 
progress" again.
The Libyans appreciated this attitude and were well enough aware that neither Moslem 
Turk nor infidel Italian had done much if anything to benefit them - to whom Allah in his 
Mercy had given the country of Libya - despite the ample legacy of material progress that the 
Italians had bequeathed to the victors amonst whom they undoubtedly, even at this early stage, 
included themselves. In the meantime, the Libyans believed, however emotionally or indeed 
with the full force of Islamic determinism, that the British had been sent by Allah, not only to 
deliver them from the hated yoke of the Italian appressors, but also to bring - in the sense of 
development - them into the light of the twentieth century. This was an aspiration that the 
B.M.A. could neither fully live up to or completely fulfil. It was not however easy to escape 
from once implanted ideas and made no sense in terms of International Law, which the Arabs 
failed completely to understand. Educationally, however, the inevitable result of what had 
become a matter of political fact and daily expectation was a commitment on the part of the 
B.M.A. to set up secondary schools.
Thus, whether the politicians likd it or not, the B.M.A. was left with the need to provide
some sort of secondary education for Arabs and quickly. As has been shown in the previous
chapter, the matter of secondary education did not seem to pose any particular problem for the
B.M.A. in Cyrenaica and a fine system of secondary schools was soon brought into existence.
However, this was not to be so in Tripolitania, for reasons that have never been made
adequately clear. Instead, policies associated with the defunct Italian colonial regime were
allowed to persist long after all trace of their existence had been said to have been removed. 
(23)
23 See, supra., p. 52.
110
The question most central to this issue was the question of the employment of Egyptian 
teachers. How was it that they were the unquestioned hub of the system in Cyrenaica, yet as 
in Italian times virtual anathema in Tripolitania, where they were as much, if not more needed? 
The deteriorating political relationship with Egypt did not appear to have much effect upon the 
employment of teachers in Cyrenaica, but as in Italian times, still counted for much in 
Tripolitania. Hence, guided by the indefatigable Fulvio Contini, Steele-Greig all but refused to 
accept Egyptian teachers at the elementary level, so making it much more difficult to set up a 
system of Arab secondary schools in the territory.
Steele-Greig’s task of creating a modem educational system, which role he would have 
viewed with reluctance, would have been easier if some degree of chronological continuity had 
existed from the Fascist era in the territory. However, as has been shown, the Italian Fascists 
had no intention of providing any form of general education at the secondary level at least in a 
modem context for Arabs. Even the so-called higher-elementary schools which, according to 
Italian propaganda, were supposed to pressage the eventual arrival of secondary education for 
Libyans, failed to survive the demise of Fascism itself in the territory.
It was nonetheless the idea of higher elementary schools that first appealed to Steele-Greig, 
no doubt at the suggestion of Contini who would have been fully familiar with the original 
such schools, as a possible solution to the problem of providing secondary education for 
Arabs in the territory. Otherwise, it was generally realised that the B.M.A. could not get away 
with merely imitating the Italians in this area; but would have to start at some point, almost * 
from scratch if a suitable secondary programme was to be devised for Arabs. Such ideas went 
against the grain of International Law but had to be initiated if Britain was to preserve her 
reputation as a progressive Colonial Power.
In facing the problem of devising a suitable programme of secondary education for Arabs 
in the territory, while at the same time assuming a political interest in the territory which would 
continue long after the demise of the B.M.A., Britain was in effect adopting the guise of a 
colonial power. This was fatal as far as the development of secondary education was 
concerned - however expedient from a political point of view - since it paradoxically placed the 
B.M.A. in almost the same position as its Italian Fascist predecessors - the govemements of 
Volpi, De Bono and Marshalls Badaglio, Balbo and Graziani.
The B.M.A. therefore, was incapable in its own terms of solving the problem of secondary 
education in Tripolitania and its attempt to come up with a solution under Steele-Greig was a 
complete failure. It was only when the political future of the territory had been determined that 
a solution could be attempted; but, even then, the problem did not go away, and probably 
contributed more to effect political change in the country in 1969 than any other single factor. 
But it was the nature of this change that both the Italian and British Occupations - and their 
successor regime too - was most anxious to avoid; and we see reflected in the cautious 
educational planning of the first half of the twentieth century in Libya.
I l l
Flushed with victory in the circumstances of 1943, however, it was never imagined that 
the B.M.A. would last long enough to have to grapple with these issues. Secondary 
education, therefore, was viewed at least initially as a political palliative rather than a lasting 
solution. Italy would again have the chance when returned to Tripolitania to make up for the 
faults and omissions of the past Instead, however, contrary to all the machinations on the part 
of Britain and America and the predictions of the "conoscenti" in Tripoli, the Egyptian 
curriculum was belatedly adopted in 1948 - a policy already accepted in Cyrenaica as early as 
1943.
IV. A Curriculum for the B.M.A.'s Secondary Schools.
"The curriculum followed is that of the Egyptian secondary education, except for the following 
modifications in history and geography teaching, Libya instead of Egypt is the central subject; 
the first foreign language taught is English; up to October 1950, French was the second 
language, but since then Italian has gradually taken precedence over French." (*)
Given that some form of secondary education was required to be provided for Libyans in the 
changed circumstances and expectant atmosphere created by the fall of the Axis in Africa, it 
remained for the B.M.A. to determine what shape this secondary education should take or 
what curriculum be adopted, given that there was nothing of relevance from Italian times that 
could still be adhered to in 1943.
It would also be necessary to establish what the aim of the secondary schools should be 
now that Fascism had been officially at least abolished, even though not all of what had been 
attempted was necessarily considered wrong in the circumstances of the time, since much had 
in fact been culturally taken by Italy from the education programmes of neighbouring colonial 
powers, particularly Britain and France.
In the latter respect, the task of the B.M.A. was rather to reorientate the programmes of the 
Arab schools to what was considered best in the circumstances while at the same time ensuring 
that as much as possible of what Italy had attempted was still taught - even if the most blatant 
aspects of Fascism were removed from the Curriculum and activites of the schools. This 
process was as important for secondary education, as it had been in the elementary sector and 
perhaps even more so, given the political connotation that secondary education always 
assumes in Arab countries, leading as it often does either directly to the universities or military 
academies and sometimes even to supreme political power itself.
Unfortunately, as in colonial times, no satisfactory answer emerged to what should be 
either the aim or curriculum of the secondary schools if and when they were establsihed in
* Professor R. Le Toumeau, /. Libyan Education and its Development in Educational Missions - V.
Report o f the Mission to Libya, UNESCO, Paris, 1952, p. 23.
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post-Italian Tripolitania under the B.M.A. As before the commencement of the Occupation 
itself, it proved just as hard for the Administration to resolve all the political and cultural 
contradictions inherent in providing a curriculum for the secondary schools. The fact that the 
Italians had not left any secondary schools for the B.M.A. to service seemed to shelve the 
problem for the B.M.A. at least initially.
Yet the problem would not go away, and given that a colonial model became increasingly 
irrelevant and that there was momentarily at least a seeming vacuum on the subject, the 
Administration had a chance to come up with its own ideas. In this respect it had an advantage 
over its neighbours, the Francophone colonies of North Africa, where the past would continue 
to shape the future for a considerable time into the post-colonial world. In Libya, on the other 
hand, the question should have been resolved in terms of the linguistic traditions of the 
country, aided by contemporary relevance to the modem world.
The B.M.A., however, lacked the knowledge and experience to tackle such a question 
head-on without running into political and cultural problems on all sides. There was therefore 
no first-hand answer to these questions yet the aspirations of the people were clear.
Instead, in the circumstances of 1943 other priorities took precedence over the provision of 
secondary education for Arabs and it was not until 1946 that secondary education became a 
serious administrative option. Even at this point it was far from clear what the aim should be 
as Tripolitania was still under International Law and the independence of the country had not 
yet been determined. Certainly, various areas couuld be ruled out: reversal to the colonial 
situation was out of the question, linguistic considerations, which had dominated so much 
thinking on Arab education were no longer relevant, given the predominance of Arabic; also 
religion it could be assumed would no longer be so important in the future given that Islam 
was virtually the state religion.
The Italian propagandists, such as Fulvio Contini, made much of the pre-Fascist legacy 
associated with the Statutes of Libya, so derided by empire builders, and it was both 
unavoidable and desirable that the new secondary schools be founded on the past aspirations 
of the Arabs in Libya. These had been well summed up by Professor Nallino who had in 
1919 formulated the following options which had been approved by Idris Senusi himself. 
Such a policy was very similar to that espoused by the B.M.A. in Cyrenaica and known as the 
Egyptian system. In both systems, the Kuttab is viewed as the key element in solving the 
educational problems of the region for the:
"improved "kuttab", which would constitute the Libyan elementary school, would 
teach exclusively in the Arabic Language (or Berber/Arabic Language), with an 
educational programme similar in all respects to that of the government Kuttabs in 
Egypt. This would be on the following lines: a) religion and morality...b) reading, 
writing and dictation; c) arithmetic (limited to the four basic operations); d) the
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committing to memory of a section of the Koran. Text books must be urgently drawn 
up to deal with the subjects relevant to Libya and an adequate syllabus must be 
constructed.The school will operate on the basis of a four-year system to which a fifth 
year will eventually be added in areas where a secondary school exists. The pupils 
who attend the school will be between the ages of six to none or between seven and 
ten " (24)
The continued relevance of even the Kuttab to the basic functioning of the secondary system
was fully recognised at this early stage by Nallino who added:
II, Lower Secondary Schools.
"These schools would offer a course lasting for three years and be open to the pupils 
who had completed the three years at the Kuttabs. They are intended to provide an 
education for the lower middle classes through training postal and telegraph operatives, 
police, small-time officials, etc., etc. Instruction will be provided in the Arabic 
Language in the following areas: religion and morality, grammar, writing, arithmetic, 
elementary geometry, general studies (comprising laws and duties of general 
applicability to Libya), knowledge of local agricultural conditions,, geography and 
Italian history, combined with the history of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. Where Italian 
is taught, it should be confined to reading and ordinary spoken Italian." (25)
III. Higher Secondary Schools.
"Candidates will be admitted to this school who have obtained the leaving certificate of 
the secondary (lower) schools, or have otherwise satisfied the entrance requirements. 
The course will have the duration of four years, and the final year will be divided into 
two sections: one will provide a general course for the education of merchants and 
Libyan officials, along with accountants, land surveyors, etc. The other for the 
preparation of teachers to work in the Kuttabs and lower secondary schools. The 
teaching will be in Arabic but a course in Italian is obligatory. Moreover, the 
programme of individual disciplines will be devised to respond to the particular needs
of the Libyan population." (26)
24 C.A. Nallino, Post-War Commission's Report, Roma, Jan. 1919 in Istruzione Nelle Colonie, p. 135.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
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Unfortunately, Nallino's "motu proprio" on the subject of Arab education were only quoted 
by Contini, to present Italian educational policy in Libya from its most favourable aspect, with 
a view to winning over support or disarming antagonism towards efforts then being made to 
win over support for Italian attempts at obtaining the return of Libya, or at least of Tripolitania 
to Italian sovereignty. There is no evidence that Contini ever presented such ideas to Steele- 
Greig as the basis of policy, and it is extremely unlikely that Steele-Greig had ever even heard 
of Nallino, though he had certainly heard of the Egyptian system. This is unfortunate for 
Nallino's policy was by no means irrelevant to the circumstances of Tripolitania under the 
B.M.A. It could after all have presented some form of alternative to the Egyptian system, if 
non-Egyptian Arab teachers could have been recruited to put it into practice; and it would have 
been a good preparation for the future; yet without compromising the present, because of its 
close similarity with the Egyptian system being put into practice in Cyrenaica.
As some sort of authority on educational developments in Libya under the Mussolini 
Regime, he was well aware at least that the celebrated, so-called "reform" of Muslim 
education, carried out by the fascist colonial authorities in 1927 and 1928, could have been 
used as a starting point for the future under him. This measure had abolished the two then 
existing secondary schools and sought to remodel the Italo-Arab schools in certain areas of 
population by creating in addition to the normal 3-year course, a further 2-years in particular 
schools, termed higher-elementary schools for Arabs. (27) These higher-elementary schools 
were only conducted in places importance such as Tripoli and Bengasi and as such represented 
were the closest the Fascist authorities got to providing lower secondary schools in the 
territory for Arabs. Unfortunately, Steele-Greig neglected to reverse the crime whereby the 
two "Idadia" had been abolished; but finally in 1949 got round to to adding a further two years 
on to certain elementary schools in remote areas where secondary education was not yet 
feasible. (28)
Again, in devising a suitable curriculum for the projected secondary schools in 1945, when 
secondary education first became a serious issue in Tripolitania, the B.M.A. was in a quandary 
as it was still impossible, on account of the political uncertainty facing the territory, to 
determine what should be the aim of these schools. The general lack of teachers, the paucity 
of books and other materials indeed invested the whole debate upon the future aims of the 
schools with an ethereal quality which bore no relationship with the pressing educational needs 
of the people. The lack of clear aims was determined by the general ignorance on which 
direction education would take in the territory,. Cyrenaica on the other hand had adopted a 
definite system and knew in which direction it was going, whereas in Tripolitania the mention 
of the Egyptian system was still anathema at the Department of Education in Tripoli. Lack of
27 Slcele-Grcig, Op. Cit., 1948, p. 23: Contini, Op. Cit., p. 47.
28 Annual Report, Tripolitania, 1949, pp. 30-32.
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finance, suitable buildings, laboratories, workshops and skilled personnel were again 
inhibiting factors preventing the emergence of a coherent system and philosophy.
In such circumstances, the most the new schools could do was to continue with the 5-year 
elementary syllabus so far put into practice, adding to it a 3-year period of further schooling, 
conveniently termed "secondary education" for carefully selected pupils. (29) Therefore, a 
general syllabus was envisaged, academic in nature, with the same type of bias towards 
traditional subjects that would have been found at this time in the typical Arab secondary 
school in Egypt, Syria, the Lebanon and even French North Africa. In comparison with the 
Franco-phone schools, however, the new Arab schools, like their equivalents elsewhere in the 
Arab world, did not contain any European element and were weak in scientific and practical 
disciplines. The absence of European administrators had a hidden implication that should not 
go unremarked, since it meant that educational practice was not referred to the standard or 
model operating in the metropolitan country. A European contry would never have tolerated 
science lessons which were without the opportunity to conduct experiments in a modem-style 
laboratory but this became the pattern in most Arab countries. It was these factors that we find 
reflected in the following syllabus, originally introduced in 1946 with the opening of the first 
secondary school for Arabs in Tripoli, and continuing in practice more or less unchanged until 
the Egyptian Curriculum was finally adopted in 1948. (50)
29 "Only boys who had successfully passed their fifth year primary examination were eligible for the 
entrance examination but of the 68 who sat only eight failed". See, B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1946, p. 34.
30 See, Steele-Greig, Op. Cit., 1948, p. 61.
! SUBJECT i SECONDARY SCHOOLS: TRIPOLI
! YEAR ! I !
i I
Arabic ! 10 !
Religion ! 2 !
Mathematics ! 5 !
History ! 2 !
Geography ! 2 !
Science ! 4 !
Drawing ! 2 !
Hygiene ! 0 !
Handwriting ! 0 !
English ! 5 !
Italian(op) ! 0 ! 4
Physical ! !
Training ! 2 !
Total hours per weeek 34 36
H ! in
i
9 ! 11
2 ! 1
4 ! 4
2 ! 2
2 ! 2
4 ! 2
2 ! 1
0 ! 0
0 ! 0
5 ! 5
! 4 !
i
2 ! 2
36
(31)
The final phase of development, affecting the Tripoli schools, is the most important in 
historical terms because it marks a clear transition from the colonial era as such and also its 
immediate aftermath (1943 - 1946) when the B.M.A. hesitated to open a secondary school in 
the province. In this final phase an attempt was made to End a solution to what had been in 
effect a recurring crisis since Turkish times, namely the absence of modem secondary 
education for Muslim Arabs in the territory, without which Libya could not hope to develop.
(32) As expected, even this transition from the educational deprivation of the colonial era to 
the relative uplands following independence was not smooth. Tripolitania was still in most 
respects still in an epoch that had more to do with the colonial era itself than with the post­
colonial modem world. In Tripolitania, life seemed to stand still, nothing really changed under 
the years of the B.M.A., as far as the ordinary inhabitants of the territory were concerned.
This was in stark contrast with Cyrenaica where the Egyptian curriculum had been embarked 
upon which would enable pupils at the end of the 1948-9 school year to take examinations 
equivalent to Egyptian Government Primary Certificate. (33) As has already been pointed out
31 See, B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1946, p. 34 and B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1948, p. 48
3^ Supra, Op. Cit., P. 38.
33 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1944, p. 18.
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this would enable them to gain admittance to the secondary schools of Agriculture, Arts and 
Crafts and Trade Schools either in Libya or Egypt.
In Tripolitania on the other hand, a five-year system of education as had existed in Italian 
times but by no means identical to it, permitted those pupils fortunate enough to be able to avail 
themselves of it to have longer schooling than would otherwise have been possible but little 
more. The examinations that they took were of little significance outside Libya and led to no 
where inside the country, as developed secondary education did not as yet exist in the territory 
except in extremely rudimentary form as with the Tripoli Secondary School set up in the 
school year 1946-7. (34) (35) This school not only lacked trained teachers, but also a 
recognisable curriculum of relevance to any pattern of educational development in the sister 
territory of Cyrenaica, or anywhere else in the Arab world. The pupils knew this, which 
would no doubt in large measure account for the high student waste rate.
If the B.M.A. could have got away without having to set up a secondary school with all its 
associated problems, such as the need for a better qualified teacher, relevant text-books and of 
course the added expense, it would have deferred the event until independence. Why the year 
1946 was chosen is not altogether clear, as the five-year curriculum then being followed would 
have logically led to the appointment of 1947-8 as the most suitable time. Various 
explanations are possible for 1946 being the date for the opening of the new school. 
Educationally, the fact that certain pupils were advanced beyond the average and required some 
form of secondary education especially in Tripoli. This option, however, was not open to 
them in Tripolitania, whereas in Cyrenaica they could have been sent to schools in Egypt. It 
was not open to them in Tripolitania because they lacked the relevant entrance requirements on 
account of the curriculum then being followed in the elementary schools of the territory.
Hence, special schools had to be set up to cater for their needs. (35/B)
Another reason would take a political form, as 1945 saw the '’pogrom" of November of 
that year which resulted in the deaths of 130 Jews. This certainly amounted to a turning point 
not only in Arab-Jewish relationship in the territory that could not be ignored by the 
Administration but also reflected a major change in the region without any historical parallel or 
precedent. It forced the regime to put its house in order by considering reforms that would 
alleviate Arab feeling in the territory, such as the introduction of a secondary school a year 
ahead of schedule. (36) As a crisis measure, they were "secondary" in name only, being seen 
as essentially as higher elementary schools. As such they were set up in 1946 in Tripoli and 
Zawia where their programme offered little that was not obtainable in the higher elementary 
schools. (37) Neither can they be compared with the secondary education offered by the
34 See, Steele-Greig, Op.cit., p.61
35 B.M.A. Cyreanica, 1947, p.6 and B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1946, p.l 
35/B
36 Sandison, Unfinished Memoires, Op.cit., p.81
37 Infra, p.239
118
Statutes of Libya or even the Idadia subsequently abolished by the Fascist Educational Codes. 
Again the coming of Secondary education would have to wait for political change in Tripoli.
The adoption of the Egyptian curriculum in 1948-9 was quite definitely in response to 
Libya. This of course had been on the cards since 1943 in Cyrenaica and had it not been 
granted would have led to the setting up of British backed kingdom or Emirate in the Eastern 
province and the Italian protectorate in the Western province of Tripolitania. Eventual union of 
the two provinces would have followed after a number of years to allow time to develop to a 
sufficient level of political maturity. It is within this context that the establishment of secondary 
education in Tripolitania should be viewed if the nature of the challenge and shock is to be 
properly gauged. At the initial practical level the two fledgling secondary schools now had to 
be transformed and developed in accordance with the requirements of the new curriculum, as 
had the elementary schools too.
This was the final blow to the department of Education in Tripoli, already reeling and in 
chaos from Steele-Greig's sacking and still further demoralised by ailing Cuthbert Scott's 
postponement of his departure from England for a further year, so leaving the aggrieved 
Steele-Greig still in charge. The new schools were as follows:
a) Secondary schools;
b) agricultural schools
c) arts and crafts schools
d) trade schools
As the curriculum of the final three of these schools is the subject of Chapter Six (38), 
concluding remarks will attempt to deal with some of the problems associated with the 
adoption of the new curriculum from the point of view of general education in the B.M.A. in 
its last years.
Again we see in the adoption of this measure, the effect of political pressure indicating that 
4 secondary schools must be set up in the territory, namely Tripoli, Zawia, Zuara and Nalut, 
though as the latter only had two classes they were abolished in 1951. This left only Tripoli 
and Zawia as in 1946 as a result of which selection procedures had to be intensified to reduce 
the number of applicants to an acceptable level. Hence by 1952 not only did applicants for 
secondary school places in Tripolitania have to be in possession of the primary school leaving- 
certificate; but they also had to pass a qualifying examination set by the schools themselves. 
Shortages of laboratory equipment, books and even a sports ground continued as before. (39)
Improvement, however, was on the way and the 1952-3 school year saw the two schools 
included in the educational budget for that year. Even so the really expensive type of 
equipment required by a secondary school needed funding from an additional source. The
38 Op.cit., 1944, p.8
39 Professor R. Le Toumeau, Op.cit., p.23
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Four-Point Plan therefore agreed to fund the installation of laboratories.C40) The United 
Nations Technical Assistance Programme funded a library for the Zawia School with the Four 
Point Programme and UNESCO providing additional funding. (41) A playing field was paid 
for by the Tripoli Administration and the Development Agency provided for the Zawia School 
a lecture and cinema room and a theatre.(42)
V Organisation of the Schools
"....both schools give the impression of abounding with life and activity. There seems 
every reason to believe that they will continue to develop successfully "
As secondary education had never existed for Arabs in Tripolitania before the advent of the 
B.M.A., special pains were taken after 1945, as it became increasingly urgent to commence 
secondary education for Arabs in the territory, to ensure their organisation was placed on the 
proper footing. The delicate task of securing the services of the right teachers was placed in the 
hands of G.H.Q. Cairo by Brigadier Travers Blackley. In this respect he relied upon the 
suppon of his long-time chum colleague, Brigadier Cumming, who held the Cairo command. 
Blackley's wish was not to recruit Egyptians but reliable Sudanese, especially for the 
appointment of Headmaster to the Tripoli school who could also be relied upon to act as 
superintendent to all secondary schools in the territory. There was much talk and propaganda 
at this time in favour of the Sudan amongst the British who viewed the development of the 
territory as a British success story. The British were particularly confidant of their educational 
achievements in developing a largely backward indigenous population, providing sophisticated 
establishments like Gordon College.
Strangely enough Egyptians had never been popular with the ordinary people of 
Tripoiltania for reasons that go back into history before even Italian times. Hence the 
employment of Sudanese was a tempting alternative to the politically risky and unpopular 
Egyptians. In attempting to get not only this one Sudanese for the Secondary School but, if he 
was a success, others of similar calibre to work in Tripolitanian schools, Blackley over­
committed himself in a way typical of the man. While Steele-Greig stood on the sidelines and 
gleefully watched the initiative fail. He was personally annoyed that he had never been 
consulted in the operation, confident the initiative would be a failure in which he was right, 
and probably correct in believing that a Palestinian would have been a better choice in the 
circumstances. (43)
40 B. Higgins, The Economic and Social Development of Libya, United Nations Report, 12 Oct., 1953, New York,
p. 122
41 Ibid
42 Ibid
43 Steele-Greig to Appleton. Also Sanderson, Italian Rule in Tripolitania, ChpL IV pp.56-65
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Blackley was worried that the trouble which had been building up in the schools amongst 
both pupils and teachers would lead to a confrontation with the Administration which he was 
anxious to avoid. The existing superintendent, an Arab of long-standing in the area and a 
nominee of Steele-Greig was not sufficiently in control of the situation and should be replaced 
as soon as a suitable successor could be found^44) The new man had now been located by 
(Humming in the form of a Sudanese by the name of Abdul Hakim El-Gamil and was 
accordingly appointed to the vacant post at the Tripoli Secondary School. As planned the 
following year, he replaced the existing superintendent who had fallen from favour with the 
Authorities, being dismissed from his post, and was made superintendent of all Arab schools. 
(45) It was clearly a case of out with the old and in with the new, as the disgraced supervisor 
had been an inspector under the Italian regime and had been especially appointed to the post by 
Steele-Greig on Contini’s recommendation as early as 1943. He was now, however, regarded 
as having "old-fashioned ideas liable to be influenced too much by the politically-minded 
notables". As a final damming indictment, he was also regarded as acting as a "deterrent to 
educational progress" which says something for the mind of the B.M.A. at this turning point 
in Tripolitania's history.
Abdel Hakim, on the other hand, was Blackley's man of the moment, being billed by the 
Annual Report as "fresh from the Sudan Education Department" and accordingly given every 
accolade, at least during his first six months in the territory. C*6 ) Even Steele-Greig rose to the 
occasion, writing in 1947, "His go-ahead enthusiasm, resulting in a really harmonious 
atmosphere and a general improvement in the work of the staff." (47) "He is besides," wrote 
Steele-Greig, anxious at this time to make conciliatory and reassuring noises in the direction of 
Blackley, "popular in and out of the school, and it is a pity the government cannot release three 
more such men to assist in the building of the Arab schools." (48 )
Unfortunately, it was perhaps because the government couldn't release any more Abdul 
Hakim's that the much trumpeted Sudanese initiative ground to a halt, since the Sudan, unlike 
the ever educationally-fecund Egypt, lacked enough surplus manpower to resolve the 
educational problems of Tripolitania on sufficient scale to the size of the problem. Also Abdul 
Hakim was seen by the Libyans as too much a B.M.A. man, at a time when the popularity of 
the B.M.A. was fast on the wane, if it hadn’t by this time almost waned entirely in their eyes. 
Trouble therefore was sooner or later bound to blow up between Abdul Hakim and the Libyan 
teachers at his secondary school and this led to strikes during the politically sensitive visit of 
the Four-Power Commission who in 1948 were in Libya on a fact finding expedition.
44 Steele-Greig, Op.cit., p.38
45 Ibid
46 Ibid
47 Ibid, p.41
48 Ibid. Also, see, B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1948, p.47
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Steele-Greig from his Olympian height as D. of E. blamed the strike upon "petty 
professional jealousy among the staff, a lack of experience and above all outside political 
influences both on the boys and the masters". (50) It was however, the end of the Sudanese 
initiative in Tripolitania, as a scape goat had to be found for the public humiliation the 
Administration had suffered in the presence of the Four-Power Commission and inevitably 
Abdul Hakim was asked to resign, though the ring leaders were subsequently punished too. 
Steele-Greig secretly rejoiced in what he saw as the humiliation of Blackley since to him, 
whatever his public pronouncements on the controversial Abdul-Hakim, privately he viewed 
him as a "disaster" a view later confirmed by the Official Report of 1948 which now accused 
the unfortunate man of not possessing the "required personality" as a result of which he was 
"unable to maintain discipline with both masters an pupils". (50/b)
Now at last the penny had dropped and it was realised that whatever the attendant political 
risks, the only hope lay in the recruitment of sufficient Egyptian teachers to staff the secondary 
schools. This had been realised as early as July 1947 when the Administration had accepted 
the inevitable and sent Abdul Hakim to Cairo to recruit at least 10 Egyptians to work in the 
secondary schools. This mission was likewise a failure as for a variety of reasons, none would 
come. In all probability, 1947 was not viewed as a good time to start a career on the Tripoli 
secondary schools, on account of events in Tripoli, which were front page news in Cairo. 
Abdul Hakim, meanwhile, having survived the threat of resignation in Tripoli in view of the 
general difficulty of finding for him a replacement at this time, took his vacation during August 
in his native Sudan. Unfortunately, he was prevented from returning to Tripolitania by the 
refusal of the Egyptian Authorities to grant him a visa in his passport. (52)
At this point, in a desperate stop-gap operation, the future of the secondary schools in 
Tripolitania was placed in the hands of an experienced Palestinian. His reign, however, was 
brief since the importance of healing the breach with Cairo could brook no odds, and the 
Palestinian was replaced at the end of 1948 by an Egyptian who was appointed to spearhead 
the adoption of the Egyptian system in the territory. This measure finally bore fruit and the 
school year 1948-9 finally witnessed Libyan students attending secondary schools in 
Tripolitania offering a recognised curriculum on a similar par to their equals in Cyrenaica. If 
successful at their studies they could now go on to study at Al-Azhar University in Cairo (54). 
This change was accomplished by the end of 1948 before the establishment of a United 
Nations Mandate in the territory.
The adoption of the Egyptian System for the schools of Tripolitania was therefore a British 
move completed when the B.M.A. had only two more years still to run. If there was any fear
50 Steele Greig, Op.cit., p.41: and B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1948, p.47
50 b^ B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1948, p.47
52 B.M.A., Tripolitania, 1947, p.44: and Steele-Greig, Op.cit, p.48
54 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1948, p.48 and 1949, p.31
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of Egyptian influence surfacing at this point, it was not acknowledged at least officially, 
though the rapid Libyanisation which now took place at every level could be seen as an attempt 
to ensure that the future of the country would be firmly in Libyan hands. The senior 
appointments, including headmasterships at the new secondary schools, were entrusted to 
Libyans holding University degrees from Cairo. ( 55 ) They were to preside over a mixed staff 
of Libyan and foreign Arabs in an arrangement familiar to all who have experience of these 
schools down to the present day. (56)
A) Teachers
The real start of secondary education in Tripolitania was determined towards the end of 1948 
therefore by the B.M.A.'s decision to adopt as Cyrenaica had the Egyptian curriculum. This 
began the long process whereby the schools were orientated towards Egypt and eventually 
virtually controlled by teachers with Egyptian nationality. This step had many implications for 
Libya and in particular Tripolitania which it is beyond the terms of this thesis to examine. 
However, at a time of rapid political, economic and social change it exposed Libya in a way 
that had never occurred in the past to a whole range of new influences amongst which the 
dominant position of Egypt in the affairs of the area cannot be ignored.
Such a situation had undoubtedly been foreseen before 1948; but in the end it had been 
brought about by the very Administration that had done so much to limit and delay the 
acceptance of Egyptian influence in the territory. It was the fear of Egyptian influence on the 
highly volatile environment of the territory before 1948 that had made it so difficult for the 
Administration to develop secondary education there. Secondary education on any scale does 
not appear to have been feasible in the area without Egyptian teaching-manpower. Within this 
context the employment of Abdul Hakim and the adoption of the Sudanese strategy can be seen 
as temporary stop-gap measures. Other than Egypt, Palestine and Syria there were no other 
countries in North Africa and the Middle East, other than the Franco-phone colonies from 
where it would have been impossible to recruit teachers suitable for Libya. Yet all of these 
countries were at the time either undergoing political turmoil themselves or about to do so; a 
factor which the B.M.A. was anxious not to import into the already uncertain and disturbed 
territory of Tripolitania on the eve of independence.
The recruitment of secondary school teachers was not helped by the low educational and 
cultural terms even in Arab and Muslim terms of the country at this time in its development, 
largely because of previous colonial policies, there were few Tripolitanian Arabs, other than 
the Karamanli and Muntazars who received any form of respectable secondary education, and 
that had been in Italy itself. Even secondary-school teaching would not have offered sufficient
^  Op.cit., 1949, p.31
56 Le Toumeau, Op.cit., p.23. Also see Educational Planning Mission to Libya, UNESCO, Paris, June 1964, p.27
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status and renumeration for the sons of notables or generally those of middle class background 
to find it possible as a career. At a time when even primary education was at a premium 
secondary school graduates could find far more promising and rewarding careers to follow 
than school teaching. This was the problem for Steele-Greig and would be for his successors 
down to the present day. In therefore examining the staffing problems of the new secondary 
schools one is observing the run-in to a new era in connection with which the dominant 
element was and would continue to be that of the foreign and mainly Arab teachers who were 
being recruited to run the schools. The top man, however, would be a Libyan even if he or she 
was the only adult in the institution of Libyan nationality.
As already pointed out, the new secondary school was destined for 1947 but opened its 
doors in 1946 on a purely makeshift basis to meet the needs of the time, which included 
enabling the B.M.A. to save face with the Arab population. The teachers employed had not 
been specially recruited for the job outside the country and were largely untrained for their new 
role, though the best available in the territory at the time. "A better type of schoolmaster" 
Steele-Greig lamented was "clearly required" but how and from where was such an individual 
to be obtained. (57) Despite this, the initial year of the school was described as "very 
successful under the able direction of the new superintendent" (58) His failure, however, to 
handle the striking pupils and teachers at the time of Four Power Commission's visit got him 
marked down as not possessing the "required personality". ( 59 ) Only following his failure to 
return in the summer of 1948 did the school lose its turbulence and settle down to "serious 
work" again. Yet Abdul Hakim was regarded by the Administration as having been the 
"founder" of secondary education in the territory, C60)
In the final analysis, however, even Steel-Greig conceded that the real cause of unrest in 
the school had been the absence of a suitably educated and trained staff of teachers there. The 
impression is somehow gained that the pupils felt their time was being wasted at the school. 
This was not remedied until 1949 with the appointment of an Egyptian headmaster. He was 
however only at the school for a few months before a Libyan was appointed in his place along 
with 4 qualified teachers.
Despite the problems experienced by the school in 1948 it was still the best school of its 
type in Tripolitania and pupils were arriving at it from all parts of the territory in the hope of 
receiving a "better education" (61) The Administration recognised by this time that "the 
employment of unqualified teachers is both a waste of time and money, as the teachers being 
untrained are unable to impart sufficient knowledge to the pupils with the result that
57 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1946, p.33
58 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1947, p.44. Also see supra note 48
59 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1948, p.48
60 Steele-Greig, Op.cit., p.38
61 B.M.A., 1949, p.31
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examination failures are numerous". (62) One consequence of this was the attempt at cutting 
down on the annual intake "until such a time as more accommodation and staff are available" 
(63) The Authorities were however sufficiendy satisfied with the progress made so far as to be 
able to conclude that the school had had "a successful year although difficulty has been 
experienced in obtaining enough suitably qualified imported masters". C64) By 1951 the 
Tripoli Secondary School had moved a long way from the early hesitant beginnings. In that 
year it had on its role 33 teachers, part Libyan and part foreign of whom 9 were Palestinian 
and 2 Egyptian, 2 British and 1 Maltese. There were also 14 teachers at Zawia of whom 6  
were Libyan and 8  foreign (Egyptian and Palestinian). (65) Despite these good results, a 
serious shortage of teachers nonetheless continued to plague all branches of the service after 
independence in consequence of which it continued to be necessary to employ many more 
expatriate teachers, especially at secondary level. (66)
Pupils
As the first secondary school was set up in the capital, Tripoli itself, it may at this point be 
pertinent to ask, whether the school had the aim of providing an education for the emerging 
Arab middle-class? As social statistics and sociological information is generally lacking, it is 
not possible to make definitive statements about the condition of the Libyan middle-class at this 
time, though it would be surprising if groups generally falling under the heading "middle- 
class" did not exist, at least to some extent. In the parlance of the B.M.A. the sociological 
groupings most often referred to in this connection were the sons of notables, shopkeepers and 
minor officials.
Such groupings were not really eligible to use the excellent Italian Secondary Schools in 
Tripoli despite Italian propagandist claims to the contrary. It was contrary to Italian policy even 
in Italian times to allow Libyans into their Secondary Schools and even after 1943 the exacting 
entrance requirements, combined with the general distrust of even rich Libyans from attending 
these schools, would have mitigated against the idea. (67) We can therefore only hazard a 
guess as to the origins and social class of the 60 or so initial entrants as coming from the better 
off sections of Libyan society in the metropolis itself, and not at first from the surrounding 
countryside.
As places were strictly rationed admittance was by special examination of which only 8  
failed and this followed attendance at the primary schools. ( 69 ) By October 1947, the numbers
62 B.M.A. 1948, p.48
63 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1949, p.30
64 Ibid
65 Ibid, p.31
66 Le Toumeau, Op.cit., p.23
67 Appleton, Op.cit.
69 Ibid
125
attending the school had risen to 170. (70) During its second year of existence, the number of 
promotions from the 1st to the 2 nd year courses was declared to be "satisfactory" and entries 
continued to increase from the primary schools.
The adoption of the Egyptian System in 1948 was a severe challenge to the secondary 
schools with the effect that standards had to be seen to rise in accordance with its 
requirements. This is perhaps apparent in the results for 1948 being declared "not up to 
expectations". This appears to have had a knock-on effect reducing demand for places. The 
reduction in demand meant the Administration only had to open "a single secondary class" in 
Nalut, Zuara and Zavia for a total of 55 boys who were to follow a programme in English and 
Italian if requested. (71) In fact the demands and pressures caused by the initial adoption of 
the Egyptian System had the effect of forcing the abandonment by the Administration of all 
provincial classes in that year except at Zawia and Nalut. (72)
The closure of classes created an unfavourable impression of the Administration's efforts 
in the minds of rural populations who felt they were being neglected. Yet to open secondary 
schools in rural areas was unrealistic in terms of the circumstances of he times. ( 73 ) Le 
Toumeau gives a clear picture of the condition of the surviving secondary schools at Tripoli 
and Zawia in the final year of the B.M.A.: "In all there were 539 pupils, 170 of whom are 
boarders. They must all hold the primary school leaving certificate and from this year onwards 
must pass a qualifying examination before entering the secondary school. They are grouped in 
the following way:
Year 
1 st 
2 nd 
3rd 
4th 
5th 
Total
* Divided into 3 Sections: Arts;
** 70 of them boarders 
*** 1 0 0  of them boarders
(74)
Schools
70 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1947, p.44, p.168
71 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1948, p.52
72 Ibid, p. 170
73 Ibid
74 Op.cit., Le Toumeau, p.23
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Tripoli
154 (4 Sections) 
97 (3 Sections) 
50 (2 Sections) 
42 (1 Section) 
45 (*)
388 (**)
Zawia
100 (3 Sections) 
43 (2 Sections)
8
150 (***)
11 Mathematics; 14 Experimantal Sciences, 20.
The virtual non-existence of secondary education for Arabs in Italian times, apart from the 
imposing Scuola di Cultura Islamica or Scola Superiore Islamica, situated in the centre of 
Tripoli, and only brought into existence towards the end of the Fascist era, (75 ); and virtual 
non-existence of special funds under the B.M.A. for the construction of new secondary 
schools, meant that maximum use had to be made of existing buildings. These were 
requisitioned and brought up to scratch for use as schools. Tripoli was lucky in the respect, 
and unlike Cyrenaica where war damage had been severe, it had escaped bomb-damage more 
or less completely. This left a good legacy of excellent buildings from the Italian era that could 
and often were transformed into schools.
Initially also the new secondary schools were to be set up in Tripoli city and other centres of 
Italian colonisation like Zawia, Nalut and Zuara, those at Nalut and Zuara, however, were little 
more than sections, consisting of one or more rooms each, whereas those in Tripoli or Zawia 
were much larger and intended for the region as a whole. To facilitate the development of the 
latter, special boarding accommodation was provided, so that boys from the provinces could 
attend on a more-or-less equal basis with those from Tripoli in Nalut and Zuara, so as to 
concentrate manpower and resources in Tripoli and Zawia, where there were "excellent 
buildings, until recently occupied by the army". These were then converted by the 
Administration into greatly enlarged schools. (76)
In both these schools a combined total of 7 new classes was accepted for the 1950 -51 
school-year, as against 3 new classes in 1949-50. Moreover, free tuition was arranged for 
poor but deserving pupils and free boarding "for those whose homes were not near by". 
Boarding accommodation was not provided in Tripoli until a year later - January, 1951. Yet 
not surprisingly, given the shortage of qualified and experienced teachers, the standard of 
teaching was viewed by the Department of Education as only "moderately efficient". The 
"absence of laboratories proved a serious handicap in teaching on the scientific side" - 
something which had still not altered in the 1950-51 academic year. Monies for the new 
laboratories and other much needed accessories for the school would be provided shortly by 
the Point-Four Aid Programme as organised by the United States of America. (77)
By 1952-53 the donations of international and foreign bodies was beginning to have some 
effect in the bringing about of developments and improvements in the schools. Hence we see 
the "installation of laboratories at the two schools, a library for the Zawia school along with the 
purchase of additional books". ( 78 ) The organisations providing finance for the Libyan 
secondary schools at this stage in their history were the Development Agency itself (United 
Nations), the Point Four Programme and UNESCO, and as such have already been referred
7  ^ Contini, O p .c i tp.97
76 Le Toumeau, Op.cit., p.22
77 United Nations Technical Assistance Programme, p. 122
78 Ibid
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to. ( 79 ) Also, as already mentioned, at Zawia a lecture and cinema room, along with a theatre 
were planned for the following school year. (80) Le Toumeau also confirms that by 1952, 
these schools were developing satisfactorily, with all the facilities including sports fields then 
in full operation.
Moreover, at Tripoli the pupils produced a weekly paper with an "admirable layout" which 
was posted up at the school entrance, electing committees for their club, newspaper and 
dramatic activities. (81) At this stage planners of secondary education, while recognising the 
existence of considerable local demand for secondary schools in places such as Jefffen, 
Misurata and Horns, believed there was not the need as yet for a third school in the immediate 
future or at least until primary education had become "firmly established in the Eastern 
province". (82) Supplementary agricultural colleges were another question and as such are delt 
with in Chapter Seven. ( 83 )
VI Conclusion: Comparison of Developments in the two Territories.
As secondary education had not yet been established in either Tripolitania or Cyrenaica by the 
Italians, apart from the brief attempt to implement the Fundamental Laws at Bengasi and 
Dema; the B.M.A. was at least in theory absolved from the obligation to set up secondary 
schools in terms of International Law. Unfortunately neither International Law, the British 
Government, the individual B.M.A.'s themselves or the indigenous populations of both 
territories had imagined a situation would result from the Italian defeat, in which the fate of the 
territories would for so long be held in the balance. Arab discontent must and did of moral and 
political necessity arise from such a situation and could only be mollified if a development 
policy was put into operation and seen to work. Secondary education must inevitably be part 
of any such package and the bona fides of either regime depended upon providing it at some 
point. In this respect, as far as the B.M.A. was concerned in either territory, the dilemma was 
the same, though it was not clear initially, that it would require a joint solution, as occurred 
when independence was finally declared in 1949 - an outcome not envisaged in 1943
The initial response to the advent of British Military Occupation appears to have depended 
upon the same factors, though having adopted the Egyptian Curriculum in the first place, 
meant that Cyrenaica would at all relevant stages of the development process, be better placed 
to seize opportunities than Tripolitania. One should not be misled into thinking the opposite, 
simply because secondary schools were set up first at Tripoli, Zawia and Zuara, since the 
acceptance of the idea of secondary education did not necessarily mean it would be
79 See Appleton, Op.cit., ChpL Nine pp.268-308
80 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1944, p.8
81 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1945, p.5
82 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1946, p.6
83 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1947, p.10
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successfully implemented. The acceptance in Cyrenaica of the Egyptian Curriculum in 1943 
implied that a proper system of secondary education would be brought about there at the 
appropriate time. Merely to take the primary certificate meant that a boy in Cyrenaica was 
eligible to attend secondary school in Egypt - an option not open to his colleague in 
Tripolitania. This is apparent as early as 1945, when plans were drawn up to send "some 
thirty boys from Cyrenaica to Egypt for technical training.
Moreover details abound of a similar nature to illustrate as they do that advances were 
being made in Cyrenaica of a real and tangible nature, especially with regard to secondary 
education, when in Tripolitania they did not exist in sufficient substance to be termed "real". 
This is apparent in 1946 when as Steele-Greig was opening his first secondary school in 
Tripoli, 15 Cyrenaican boys were already in attendance at the Helouen Secondary School in 
Cairo, with another 5 at the celebrated Victoria College, Alexandria and still more in other 
secondary schools in Egypt. Plans had of course been laid at this stage for the opening of 
secondary schools in Cyrenaica itself.
Thus initially at least, although Tripolitania had opened a secondary school of kinds in 
1946, where 60 boys were enrolled for the school year 1946-1947, Cyrenaica, while having 
as yet no secondary school of its own in operation, had at least 20 boys enrolled at Egyptian 
secondary schools. Officially, there was as yet no need to open secondary schools in 
Cyrenaica, as the Egyptian Curriculum did not require the provision of such places until the 
1949-50 school year. By this time children in the Cyrenaican elementary schools would have 
completed the requisite six years of schooling and in accordance with the Egyptian curriculum 
be ready to start their secondary courses in a state of complete readiness. For those who had 
completed their elementary education before the average, the Department of Education in 
Bengasi made arrangements to have them educated in appropriate secondary schools in Egypt, 
a facility not open to Steele-Greig in Tripolitania. Thus in the school year 1947-48, despite the 
failure to open the projected secondary school at Bengasi, due largely to the failure of the 
Egyptian Government to authorise export permits for school supply to Cyrenaica, there were 
21 students in Egyptian secondary schools and another 13 in various Egyptian "higher 
educational institutions".
In November 1948, at the same time as Tripoli was converting to the Egyptian Curriculum, 
Cyrenaica was opening its first Secondary School in Benghasi. Sixty four boys were enrolled 
for that year with another 14 under instruction at the Helwan school in Egypt, 18 others 
elsewhere in higher educational institutes, with 3 on courses in the United Kingdom and 1 in 
France. C84) Compared with this 100 students then receiving secondary education in the less 
numerically populated Cyrenaica, 226 were receiving secondary education in the numerically 
superior Tripolitania's 4 secondary schools (soon to be reduced to 2). ( 85 ) No evidence exists
84 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1945, p.5
85 See, Appendix, H.: Education, B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1948
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to show that Tripolitanians were being educated outside the territory although a few from 
wealthy families may have been undergoing education privately. By December 1949,141 boys 
attended the Bengasi Secondary School with 52 receiving education abroad. ( 86 )
The B.M.A.'s final year, 1950, produced for both Tripolitania and Cyrenaica an additional 
70 entrants for the Bengasi Secondary School, where the "foundation class" had by this time 
reached their fourth year. The result was a total of 211 pupils at this school, the only institution 
of its kind, which boasted a further 57 alumni studying abroad. (87) Tripolitania, on the other 
hand, had 4 so-called secondary schools containing 482 pupils, but no additional pupils 
studying abroad. (88)
Although the figures for the two provinces appear to break-down fairly evenly it should be 
remembered that the population of Tripolitania was twice the size of the neighbouring coastal 
province. Also statistics take no account of the difference in quality and quantity between the 
two territories and this was considerable. For example, Cyrenaica on the eve of independence 
was better placed to benefit from this event than Tripolitania at least educationally, and 
possibly in other respects as well. Not only did it possess more and better qualified and 
educated secondary school graduates - and even some university graduates too - but also a 
school system that was effective and as up to date as any in the Middle East at this time.
Such a juxtaposition must seem confusing in retrospect, but it was not part of any 
deliberate design by the occupying power which had virtually granted self-determination to 
Cyrenaica from 1943 onwards and this almost certainly have been confirmed by the United 
Nations in the resultant settlement On the contrary the result was one of chance since the final 
unification of the country could not have been envisaged in 1943.
Le Toumeau merely notes this difference without remarking on its general significance 
during first year of the new dispensation following the granting of independence by the United 
Nations when both territories had a fifth secondary course in operation. (89) By this time, 
1951-52, Cyrenaica already had 7 secondary school graduates attending courses at the King 
Fuad University in Cairo and another 9 at the Islamic University of Al-Azhar. C90) During this 
year, however, 78 students from Tripolitania were finally sent overseas to study with a few 
more taking courses overseas at their own expense.^1) By this time the government was 
already making a "considerable effort" to advance the education of the country, and indeed 
without it independence would have little reality in the economic, social or political sense. The
86 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1949, Educational Statistics, p.52
87 Annual Report Cyrenaica, 1950, p.7
88 See, Education: Appendix C, Annual report Tripolitania 1949, p.87; and Annual Report Cyrenaica, 1949, p.52
89 This had only recently been accepted by the Egyptian Government as a leading qualification, designed for entry into 
the Universities.
90 Ibid, p.28
91 United Nations Technical Assistance Programme, Op.cit., p.122
130
question for posterity is - could not more have been done earlier? And what price would Libya 
have to pay for the failure to determine the future of the country before 1949?
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C hapter Seven Female Education
"The girls' Italo-Arab School had a vocational direction and is continuously increasing. It 
has a great future ahead of it and fully accords with the desires of that section of the native 
population which wishes to be associated with us."*
Apart from in certain important centres, such as Tripoli and Bengasi, where female 
education had been started by either Italians or Turks, female education outside the home 
hardly existed in Libya before the Italian Occupation of 1911X1) The Italians, however, 
regarded the education of girls as an appropriate and efficacious means of exercising what they 
termed their "civilising mission" - sometimes referred to by the somewhat "infelicitous phrase" 
of "pacifico penetrazione". The objective of "pacifico penetrazione" was to secure the 
collaboration of the Muslim population through education and good works, such as schools 
and hospitals.
Basically, the plan aimed to provide Muslim girls with an education similar in most 
respects to that provided for boys in the Italo-Arab schools of the territory. In terms of 
curriculum, this would include the teaching of "our language, history and geography", along 
with the usual subjects associated with an elementary school curriculum. These included 
arithmetic, with suitable emphasis upon the "rule and duties of proper hygiene." (2 ) As the 
Italo-Arab Schools became gradually established in Libya, the syllabus was more or less 
evenly divided between the Italian language and subjects taught in Arabic such as the Koran.
This pattern was extended with little alteration to the girls schools set up in Libya after 
1911. Yet the colonial authorities were fully aware throughout the whole period under their 
control that female education was a most delicate matter in a Muslim country such as Libya, 
where traditional values could easily backfire unless handled with great discretion. The 
peculiarity of the situation was well summed up by Contini who had a continuous working 
association with educational developments in Libya of more than forty years.
Writing in 1953 of the situation obtaining in Libya, he says "the situation of women in 
Muslim countries proceeds against difficulties that have deep roots in the customs and 
traditions of the local population. Except in the larger centres, where there is a local element 
that is less misogenisitic, due to long contact with Europeans, the establishment of a girls' 
school raises opposition, especially from true upholders of tradition for whom the education of 
women strikes a note completely contrary to Islamic traditions. Only a form of education that is 
vocational and practical, and of direct benefit to the family can be imparted without raising
* Miccachi, Op.cit., 1919, p.75
1 " Exact estimates of the numbers of girls receiving a formal education before 1911 are impossible to deduce in respect 
of girls, due to the absence of separate statistics, the tendency being to compound the Arab with the Turkish 
statistics." Op.cit., footnote 39, p.342
2 Abstracted from Caruso Ingilleri, Report of April 1912, p.4, See Appleton, Op.cit., p.35
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difficulties. For these reasons, it was necessary, especially at the beginning to ensure female 
education was of a primarily practical nature, which meant being concerned with domestic 
economy and hygiene. Hence the schools in Tripoli and Bengasi taught the weaving of 
baracanes and traditional carpets." (3 )
Writing in 1948 Steele-Greig echoes the same sentiments, "The education of girls" he 
says, "is still only possible on a limited phase." He agrees with Contini that the aims of the 
girls' schools should be of a "practical nature" and designed to "stimulate powers of self- 
expression and self-reliance." By 1948 the climate of opinion in Libya, or at least in Tripoli 
itself, was favourable to the notion of female education, so much so that "the difficulties and 
prejudices of the earlier phases of girls' education are slowly disappearing" wrote Steele- 
Greig. (4 )
The problem after 1945 was how to develop the wave of positive sentiment for female 
education so as to bring the girls' schools into alignment with the standard pattern of education 
in the territory. Steele-Greig at this point was fully aware that this should be his goal, writing 
"it is far from easy to graft the modem system of education onto the social structures of 
Tripolitania." Unfortunately, like so many exclusively western orientated administrators when 
coming face to face with the cultural and religious differences of the Muslim and Arab World, 
he at this point retreated into viewpoints which were far from helpful if he was to make 
progress with the tasks facing him. "Modem education", he writes, "is based upon modem 
psychology, and this is not acceptable to, or even understood by a people who regard the other 
'sex; as something improper. Within limitations, however, what can be done is being done"
(5)
Unfortunately, the apologies of Italian times re-echoed under a British Administration were 
insufficient to meet the demands of the times. In Italian times, female education like the 
education for boys provided in the Italo Arab schools was too associated in the Arab mind with 
"colaborazione”, “penetrazione pacifico", civilising missions and all the other slogans with 
which the Italians adorned their social policies towards the Arab population. It would have 
been better if Steele-Greig had separated British policy in Tripolitania at this point from ideas 
which still had too many unpleasant associations for many Libyans.
Fortunately, the drive towards education and development, following the arrival of the 
British Army in Tripolitania, when the feeling that a new era for the territory was about to 
dawn had become such a universal sentiment, that even Steele-Greig couldn’t completely 
drown it with cold water. Female education therefore continued to spread and by the end of the 
British Administration had become as established in the territory as boys education, though 
girls were still not as numerous.
3 F.Contini, O p .c i tp.41
4 Steele-Greig, O p .c i tp.37
5 Stele-Greig, Op.cit, p.37
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II British Policy towards Female Education
"Education is the care of both economic and social development in Libya. The 
Libyan Constitution makes elementary education compulsory for all children of 
both sexes. This obligation will be the objective of all educational development 
in Libya." (*)
In the circumstances facing the B.M.A. at its inception in 1943, the setting up of schools for 
the female section of the population was less of a priority than that of developing male 
education. Italians had only opened girls' schools, as a part of "pacifico penetrazione" 
whereby they hoped their regime would be provided with a means of entering into the 
domestic and social ambit of the indigenous population. This had adversely affected the 
development of education for girls in the territory, especially outside the main towns, as 
needed it had for boys too. The chief problem affecting the B.M. A. was to separate 
educational policy generally from the political attitudes associated with the former colonial 
regime, but at his point it must be remembered that the B.M.A. was only a temporary regime, 
and apart from the grosser aspects of Fascism it was quite happy to co-exist ideologically with 
some form of Italian colonisation which it believed would take over again at a later date in any 
case.
At a more practical level, although the attitudes of Islamic scholars upon the subject of 
female education have varied down the ages; but more important than the consensus of 
educated opinion among Muslims at the time was the effect of prevalent social attitudes. Here 
we are dealing with the popular mind as such, in the Libya of 1942, where the sending of 
women out of the household was still regarded as generally undesirable, unless for the 
purpose of visiting of relatives. As far as the planners were concerned, the yardstick of past 
attitudes was more important in determining future trends than hypothetical changes to those 
attitudes in the sentiment of the public. Moreover, priority had to be given to the education of 
boys because the economic and social development of the country would as far as the 
immediate future was concerned would be largely dependent upon them.
To plan for the education of girls and women required looking ahead, beyond the 
unemployment and stagnation that characterised the Libyan economy, following the ending of 
Italian subsidies, which had been largely responsible for the general prosperity which had 
attended the years of Fascism (6 ). For the moment at least, whatever the manifold usefulness 
of women in the home, there was no place for them in the marketplace, where men were in a 
traditional society still the bread winners.
* United Nations Technical Assistance Program, Op.cit., p. 114
6 United Nations Technical Assistance Program, Op.cit., p. 114
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The message was however being imparted under the B.M.A. that methods of production 
and general living standards could only be improved through education. "Pacifico 
Penetrazione” had also sought to get a similar message home but it was unfortunately 
inseparable from political messages imparted by the colonial system as such which the Arab 
population rejected. Women as much as men accepted the need for change and development 
and wanted increasingly to be part of this experiment. For both men and women, future 
economic prosperity would increasingly be seen to depend upon being able "to make use of 
these opportunities" and for this " a good elementary education is necessary , to serve as a firm 
basis for learning these new skills." ( 7 )
Unfortunately, under the uncertain years of the B.M.A., when stagnation became general 
and investment virtually non-existent, the economic role of women remained what it had been 
before, and was still largely outside the home. Only as prosperity started to return in the late 
fifties did opportunities for the employment of women begin to appear in the market place. 
Before these developments, educational changes had to be in keeping with the basic mood of 
the country, which as Steele-Greig remarked, might change but only "slowly" given that Libya 
was still by all the available indices regarded as being one of the most backward societies in the 
Middle East, lacking as it did, following 30 years of Italian colonial rule, the educational 
facilities developed in Egypt and North Africa.
This, unfortunately, was one of the dilemmas of the B.M.A. that whereas its existence 
raised expectations amongst the Arab population, the capacity of the regime to satisfy these 
expectations was extremely limited Female education was a case in point that while being far 
from intrinsically opposed to the idea, the B.M.A. lacked the means to carry it very far. Even 
when the B.M.A. was almost over, further expansion of female education, as of boys, would 
have to await more prosperous times. It was important at this point not to burden the country 
with an educational system it could not afford to run in the future. What facilities had been 
developed in addition to the basics of elementary and some secondary education depended 
upon foreign aid - support without which they would not have been possible.
If the economic argument for any expansion of female education was unpromising under 
B.M.A., other grounds for action were considered relevant, "civilising mission" divested of its 
political associations, might come into its own in this sphere, though on a limited scale.
Always happy to be following Italian precedents, it was a such embraced Steele-Greig who 
saw his role in this respect, less as a means of securing Arab approval for the B.M.A., but 
more in the guise dispensing "sweetness and light." (8 )
The B.M.A.'s policy therefore regarding female education was primarily to pursue low- 
keyed altruism and in this respect bears some affinity with the Italian notion of "civilising 
mission". As such therefore it was utilitarian rather than economic or political, falling into the
7 Ibid
8 Steele-Greig, History of Education in Tripolitania, Tripoli, 1948 p.37
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C hapter Eight: Educational Training and development (Part One)
“Vocational schools are just as indispensable in the colony as private and secondary schools, 
whether for metropolitans or for natives.” (*)
Italian Policies
Given that the B.M.A. entered less into an inheritance and more into a political and 
administrative vacuum when it undertook the burden of managing the affairs of the former 
Italian colony of Libya in 1942, until the major powers could find a way of disposing of the 
Italian colonies, it is necessary to look at events before this date if light is to be cast upon 
subsequent developments under the B.M.A. Firstly, it is necessary to recognise that little 
remained from the previous regime apart from buildings, all personnel having left and 
documents on the administration of the colony having been removed to Italy or destroyed. The 
return of Italian teachers to run the Italian schools was the only exception to a situation in 
which everything was otherwise run by British personnel. This was a confusing situation for 
the administration to be in, especially with regard to matters connected with education. With 
the help of Fulvio Contini, the former Italian Director of Education for Cyrenaica, Steele-Geig 
was enabled to reopen not only the schools for the children of Italian residents but also most 
importantly for Libyans too. When it came, however, to vocational education and eventual 
development in the form of Libyanisation neither Fulvio Contini or Steele-Greig had anything 
to offer and matters fell into the hands of the Chief Administrator, Brigadier Blackley himself. 
In his handling of these matters, Blackley, however, found himself dealing with problems in 
terms of a bureaucratic system that had been largely set up by the former Italian colonial 
regime, even if controlled if not exclusively staffed by British personnel, though there were 
still many Italians still working in the Administration, especially as medical personnel. Also 
despite Steele-Grreig’s reservations on the subject, the Department of Education became 
involved, at least indirectly, in a range of activities, such as Libyanisation, which technically at 
least were beyond its immediate area of concern, namely the running of the school system. 
Furthermore, although many B.M.A. personnel would have preferred to see a clear cut 
between the former Italian colonial regime and themselves, they became increasingly 
preoccupied with the affairs of the former colony upon a range of related issues.
* Angelo Picciolli /' instruzione publica in Libia, Parte Prima : La Libia Venti Anni Di Occupazione Italiana, Tomaso 
Silleni, Seconda Edizione, Roma, MCMXXXIII, p,l 19
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Italian policy upon subjects like vocational education and various aspects of Libyan 
development in the economic sphere after 1922 did exist at least on paper, but was heavily 
clothed in the political and cultural mentality of colonialism. This in Libya was summed up by 
the term “pacific penetration” by which was meant the attempt by the colonial authorities to 
influence the lives and behaviour of the indigenous population with a view to bringing them 
into a relationship of collaboration with the regime. )
This policy was formulated by the first Minister of Colonies, Pietro Bertolini and applied 
to Libya as early as 1913 in his initial educational ordinance. In this document, it was accepted 
that the curriculum of the Muslim schools in Libya be directed towards vocational and 
agricultural education, expressed as “spoken Italian, hygiene, morality and love of the soil”.
(2) Vocational education was accordingly viewed as the teaching of particular skills to an “elite 
workforce”. A more general type of vocational education was also to be provided in the 
elementary schools which in rural areas were to give practical guidance on agricultural matters. 
(3 ) It is therefore all the more curious that the Bertolini ordinance of 15 January, 1915 omitted 
all reference to the provision of vocational education, as part of the elementary system of 
education for Arabs. Vocational education was instead confined to special institutions, such as 
the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli and a specially projected School of Agriculture. (4 ) 
The problem was the Italian Government was always looking for the convenient cost-effective 
way of introducing a system of education in the colonies so overlooked the fact that the 
existing School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli, originally set up by the Turks in 1896, was an 
eleemosynary or Islamic institution. As such it was technically beyond the control of the Italian 
Government being controlled by the statutes of Auqaf-El-Sur (5 ). Again nothing could be 
done immediately to implement the Bertolini Ordinance at the existing school of Agriculture, as 
the Italians had initially hoped. This had also been set up by the Turks prior to their departure 
from Tripoli, following the Treaty of Ouchy which had concluded the Italo-Turirish War, but 
had never been opened for teaching purposes. (6 )
Neither the Colosimo proposals of 1918 (7 ) or the educational provisions of the 
Fundamental Law of June 1919 ( 8 ), produced any new Italian initiatives regarding 
professional education. Whatever was available in Libya, continued as before the Italian 
occupation, to be taught in either the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli; or at the Girls’ Italo- 
Arab School in the Shara Misran. Meanwhile, attempts to implement the educational
1 Ibid, p. 111
2 Mamias Report of July, 1913, p.7
3 Ibid
4 See, Arii 1,2,18, R.Decreto, 1946, n.56, Gazzetta Ufficiale del 13 Febrio, 1914, no. 36
5 See MAI-AS, Assctto Dei Servizi Civili 1911-1919, p.113, Fasc, 1-2, Systemazione dei beni auqaf 1911-1916, C.A. 
Nallino, 27 Luglio, 1916,
6 See Caruso Ingillieri, Op.cit.,p.2
7 See,Colosimo report, Op.cit., Professional Education, p.373
8 See, Fundamental Laws of Tripolitania, Arts. 10, 11 & 12, B.U.C., 289
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provisions of the Statutes of Cyrenaica had produced, albeit temporarily, the Bengasi School 
of Arts and Crafts which unlike its namesake in Tripoli was to be both set up and controlled 
exclusively by the colonial authorities as an Italian government institution. (9 ) Attempts after 
1922 in Tripoli to develop some form of vocational education for Libyans would largely as 
before depend upon what use the Italian authorities could make of the School of Arts and 
Crafts for this purpose. Also, in the case of agricultural education, the School of Agriculture 
set up by the Turks in Sidi Mesri, but not yet used for educational purposes.
Unfortunately for Italian plans, the educational and disciplinary situation at the School of 
Arts and Crafts in Tripoli between 1911 and 1922 had fallen into a condition of more or less 
complete stagnation and decay. Upon the reform of this institution, however, seemed to 
depend the future of vocational education for Arabs in Libya at this time. The Ministry of 
Colonies therefore in 1926 ordered a special report to be drawn up on the school by the then 
Superintendent of Education, Dr. Angelo Piccioli, a official of high critical acumen. (10) 
Piccioli’s extensive report, which was never fully implemented, was intended to provide a 
plan, whereby the school could be regenerated and made to serve a wider purpose than had 
been intended by its original founders. Intended to serve as an orphanage and institution 
whereby orphans could receive some form of training in a craft or skill that would enable them 
to survive upon leaving the shelter of its walls for the wider world. The general plan for 
vocational education in Libya of which the School of Arts and Crafts was to be so central a 
feature had been laid down by Piccioli’s superior Rome, the celebrated Dr. Rodolfo Micacchi. 
This plan for Arab vocational education was not intended by Micacci to be particularly 
extensive, the level of economic activity in Libya to which any scheme of educational training 
should be related, not being considered sufficiently substantial to justify an elaborate 
programme of training for Libyan tradesmen and artisans. (n )
Micacchi’s approach was in line with the government’s extreme frugality whenever it came 
to any question of providing actual educational facilities for the indigenous population. Almost 
Malthusian in his approach to vocational education for Arabs, Micacchi derived his more direct 
inspiration from the ideas and work of the American, Senator Combes in Algeria. This view, 
whereby supply was always seen to follow demand served post-liberal and Fascist Italy until 
the era of demographic colonisation. Then the almost opposite notion of syndicalism, an 
inverted form of state socialism, came into fashionability with the creators and propagandists 
of imperialism. (12)
Educationally, the Combes’ view as transcribed by Michacchi implied that it was both 
useless and educationally dangerous to provide the native population with knowledge and
9 See Appleton, Op.cit., re Chpt. Nine: Professional Education, p.287
I® Angellio Piccioli, Op.cit.
11 See, Micacchi Report, Op.cit., Insegnamento Agrario e Professional, p.166-173
12 Ibid
138
skills for which there was not a commercial market There had to be first a need for carpenters 
and builders before money and expertise were lavished by the state upon creating a supply of 
them. ( 13 ) Almost designed to give capitalism a bad name, these distortions of laissez faire 
economic principles were used by Micacchi to try and justify the Italian approach to vocational 
education for Libyans even before Mussolini sought to impose such a system after 1922. In 
practical terms Micacchi had concluded, and Piccioli after him, that in the circumstances of 
post-war Libya, there was hardly enough work in the principal towns and urban centres to 
occupy Italian operatives. Would Libyans therefore who had received an expensive vocational 
education be able to use the skills they had acquired not in towns but in their own villages or 
tribal locations? But here too there was neither need nor demand for such operatives, so why 
waste government money in developing such an additional workforce in the first place? (14)
Yet sooner or later, even the most hard-headed and bigoted of colonial officials, would 
have to recognise that “civilising mission” and “pacific penetration” implied schemes of 
vocational and agricultural education for Libyans that would compliment in some degree, the 
advanced plans for the mass settlement in Libya of Italian peasant farmers, the thinking on 
these subjects had been provided by Micacchi before the era of mass colonisation but was still 
considered relevant by his successors. Professional education, Micacchi argued, should be of 
two kinds: the first of a purely preparatory nature, to be conducted in all the rural schools, 
where it should consist of manual work with a practical aim. Love of the soil and manual 
dexterity, such as would be required for the repair and manufacture of domestic appliances, 
should also be encouraged at this stage. If these aims, Micacchi believed, became the basis of 
government policy in the field of professional and vocational education towards Libyans, Italy 
could avoid creating a class of discontented operatives unable to put to profitable use the skills 
they had so arduously acquired. This had been the fate of other colonial powers such as France 
in North Africa where enlightened educational policies had created not only discontented 
intellectuals - products of the Franco-Arab secondary schools; but also a new proletariat of 
skilled and semi-skilled workmen who unable to find productive employment turned to 
political agitation against the colonial authorities.
Italy, Micacchi argued, could avoid this fate by adopting in Libya a via media between the 
two extremes by producing mainly the manually dextrous who in normal circumstances would 
have no difficulty in finding suitable employment in the familiar environment of village or 
tribe, where traditional ways of work were both understood and applied by the population ( 15 ) 
The danger of this approach was of creating a semi-skilled underclass of Libyan operatives 
who would be at the mercy of economic and political forces in the colony. Such ideas were not 
acceptable in the era of weak liberal governments but must have done much to prepare the way
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid
15 Ibid
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for the cultural separatism referred t oin fascist propaganda as the new "Islamic Policy" and
culminating in the mid-thirties in the College of Higher Islamic Studies along with for artisans
a form of craft-education, based upon the School of Arts and Crafts and the souk, whereby
selected Libyan apprentices would be attached to a master craftsman and thereby acquire a
traditional craft. These it was predicted would begin a renaissance of traditional crafts in Libya
carrying on to future generations the glories of the Arab and Islamic heritage.
In the straightened circumstances of 1919, Miacacchi thought in more prosaic terms and
was sufficiently old-fashioned to still recognise that a more rigorous form of professional and
vocational education would have to be provided for Arabs at the secondary level, even if this
involved setting up additional schools of arts and crafts for the purpose. Yet for the moment,
he concluded, this training should be limited to those pupils for whom work opportunities
existed in the current economic environment of the colony. Only by looking further ahead did
he foresee the need to develop a class of master craftsmen and technicians to supervise the
technical and artistic requirements of native industries. (16)
Piccioli's transference in December 1924 to Tripoli as Italian Superintendent of Education
brought about a period during which the ideas and plans of Rudolfo Micacchi, now in charge
of the foreign and colonial schools, in the Ministry of Colonies were put into effect Starting
with a reorganisation and extension of the Italo-Arabs schools, he almost immediately
commenced an in-depth enquiry into the history, organisation and management of the School
of Arts and Crafts itself in Tripoli. ( 17 ) This at least had the effect of bringing about a reform
of the school in 1925 on the lines of Micacchi's analysis in his report of 1919 upon the
possible development of the colony. It also commenced a new period in the history of the
school during which it was to undergo a series of reforms, designed to ensure not only its
greater efficiency but also a more extensive use of facilities by both Arabs and Italians. (18)
Still continuing its traditional function as orphanage, day boys were now admitted from
Tripoli, and the syllabus was redesigned to provide both an elementary and craft education. 
(19)
More controversial was Piccioli's plan to make a more intensive use of the school's craft 
workshops and machinery even to the extent of making them available at a price to local 
industry - a practice that had been going on illegally for some time already. (20) This certainly 
helped with the financing of the School of Arts and Crafts but it is doubtful if all the money so 
acquired was used for the purpose of Muslim education as the Statutes of the school would 
have required. More likely it helped also to finance the new Italian Complimentary and 
Technical School, to which Arabs were not allowed to enrol, at the rear of the School of Arts
16 Ibid
17 See, Piccioli Report, Op.cit.
18 Contini, Op.cit., p.42: Piccioi, Op.cit., p. 119
19 Ibid
20 Contini, Op.cit., p.43
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and Crafts and which also made extensive use of the former' workshops. (21) This phased 
reorganisation of the school of Arts and Crafts was undoubtedly a gross extension of the 
authority of the Department of Education into the affairs of what was essentially an Islamic 
institution with its own statutes. Designed to make use of the institution in the Italian interest, it 
did virtually nothing to extend and improve the facilities on offer to Libyans.
By a similar measure, Royal Decree, January 1926, the fascist authorities, established 
almost exclusively in the Italian interest the former School of Agriculture set up for the Libyans 
by the Turks. Q2 ) The new school was modelled upon the Italian schools of agriculture (with 
necessary modifications to fit in with the climatic and soil requirements of Libya) and provided 
both theoretical and practical instruction on a four year basis. Like, however, the School of 
Arts and Crafts in Tripoli, the education and training of Libyans rapidly became a secondary 
issue. As with the School of Arts and Crafts the School of Agriculture was fully exploited by 
Fascist propaganda to show that Libyans were getting a good deal when in fact the object of 
both institutions was to train Italians on the one hand to be intelligent efficient artisans and on 
the other to be intelligent and good farmers. Libyan education was to be confined to the 
practical side of the curriculum "as political circumstances were judged to be right." (23)
Gradually, however, Micacchi's original idea of providing agricultural training for Libyans 
in rural schools replaced any notion of sending some of them at least to the newly established 
School of Agriculture. Certain Italo-Arab Schools therefore came to have attached to them 
agricultural sections in rural areas. (24)
The final phase of Italy's development policy for Libyans was introduced in the thirties by 
Italo Balbo, Governor of Tripolitania from 1.1.1934 until 28.6.1940, when he was 
accidentally shot down in his plane by Italian gunners while surveying the Italo-Libyan 
frontier. By this time, with war on the horizon, Mussolini decided upon introducing the new 
Islamic Policy in what was basically designed as a propaganda move to counteract Western 
attempts to influence Muslim opinion against Rome within Libya itself. The possibility of 
introducing radical new measures to raise the educational level of Libyans to that of Italian 
settlers and residents had by now receded beyond recall. In such circumstances, the fascist 
authorities decided upon the best political solution they could devise in the form of 
"syndicalism" C25 ) Intended to counteract the effects of the political fallout upon the Arab 
population of the massive new waves of "demographic colonisation", whereby the best land in 
the colony was handed over on a plate to the landless of Southern Italy, Arabs were offered in
21 Ibid., pp.41-44. Angelo Piccioli, Op.cit, L' istruzione publica in Libia p. 120. Appleton, Op.cit., p.315
22 See, D.G. 16 Gennsio 1926, No. 41 che istituisce presso L’ istituto sperimentale agrario di Sidi Mesri, una scuola 
practica d’ agricoltura, B.U.T., 5,135
23 Appleton, Op.cit., p.316
24 Ibid
25 See, Gulielmo Quadrotta, Syilluppo e Realizzazioni Dell Artigianato in Libia, Roma, 1938 - Anno XVI, p. 2-3 
This official pamphlet offers a unique breakdown of "syndicalism" as it was practised in Libya by the Fascist 
authorities, immediatley prior to the out break of hostilities with the Western Allies in 1939.
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place of their lost land "equal and parallel development" with their Italian neighbours (26) Few 
Libyans seriously believed by this time that Italian rule was designed to "benefit both Italians 
and Libyans" as some apologists of Italian colonisation there still like to affirm, f27 ) "Equal 
and parallel development" nonetheless continued and the "Associazione Fascista degli Artigiani 
della Libya" was specially created to regulate and control the professional and social 
development of the Libyan artisan. (28) It is impossible to gauge now what effects if any this 
measure is likely to have had upon the actual development of the Libyan artisan. Certainly, a 
centre was established in Tripoli for the cultivation of traditional arts and crafts and various 
workshops were set up around a central courtyard for such a purpose. (29) However, it could 
hardly be regarded as a new policy in any definable sense of the word as it merely drew upon 
existing levels of expertise, such as could be already found in the School of Arts and Crafts or 
indeed the souk itself where many alumni of this institution made a living. It is even so, a 
fitting comment on what was for Libyans a very barren era educationally, as in so many other 
ways, and as such had no historical follow on to the succeeding dispensation.
Initial Policies Under the B.M.A. (1943-1946)
The British recognised from the start of their administration that despite Arab yearning for an 
end to the war, a return of the P.O.W.’s and an awareness of some of the material benefits of 
Italian rule (roads, hospitals, electricity and abundant fresh water supplies), the Italians had 
never been very popular with the inhabitants of Tripolitania. To the Arab population, the so- 
called benefits of Italian rule had been "more than counter-balanced by its evils - expropriation 
of land for demographic colonisation, a horde of corrupt and inefficient officials, and perhaps 
most important of all, the lack of any advancement in the professions in business, in 
administration if their courts or of learning." (30)
As the British were quick to note in the early days of 1943, "At the time of our occupation, 
there were in Tripolitania, no Arab doctors, lawyers or engineers or magistrates, in trade the 
Italian and Jew predominated and in the administration the Arabs held only minor posts. Arab 
children would leave school with neither a good education in their own language or in Italian. 
The Italians intended that the Arabs in Libya should be hewers of wood and drawers of water 
and provide a market for the output of Italian industry. The Arabs knew this and knew that the 
Italians were achieving their intention. They realised that they were one of the most backward
26 Claudio Segre, Op.cit, pp. 87-8
27 Ibid
28 Guglielmo Quadrotti, Op.cii., p.6
29 Ibid see, plates i-x
30 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1943, p. 16
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Arab communities in the Middle East” 31 This then was the true measure of Italy’s “civilising 
mission” and a policy of “pacific penetration” over a period of virtually 32 years of 
uninterrupted Italian rule at the beginning of the British Administration. For this reason the 
B.M.A. was welcomed “for the hope of things to come” since even to a superficial observer,
“the material prosperity of Egypt and the independence of Iraq were credits which Great 
Britain could claim. Britain stood for democracy with a capital D, and at a later stage perhaps 
for independence”. (32)
Unfortunately, while all this was true and much more besides, Britain could not even 
pretend, like the Italian colonists in Libya before them, to have even the most superficial of 
“civilising” missions, only a policy of “care and maintenance” and a dry, if not at times cynical 
espousal of International Law as determined by the Hague Convention. Barely a month 
following the start of the British occupation, the Arab population quickly recognised that for 
whatever reasons, their new conquerors were certainly not bearing gifts. At least under a third 
rate power like Italy, there had been some material benefits, but under British rule there were 
few if any. Thus in the summer of 1943, a reaction had set in amongst the Arab population as 
the cost of living increased, the price of goods on the black market soared, the currency had 
become devalued, taxation had increased, wages increased, trade remained at a standstill, 
shops empty and lands still expropriated by the Italians not returned to their previous owners. 
(33>
In such circumstances, any hope of development at the level of vocational education 
seemed slight if not ridiculous. Whatever efforts the Italians had made in this area, such as the 
much trumpeted policy of “equal and parallel development” with its accompanying program of 
so-called technical, artistic and commercial assistance to Libyan craftsmen and artisans had 
disappeared for ever into the dustbin of history. All that was left for the British to get to work 
upon was the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli, in which vocational education had at least in 
pan survived the Italian regime. Later, as new political initiatives gradually manifested 
themselves, more ambitious programmes, such as those associated with Libyanisation might 
be attempted; but unlike Cyreanica, where a future government of the Territory was already in 
virtual formation under the Emir Idris El-Senusi, Tripolitania was leaderless and powerless to 
take steps at this early stage that might have filled the vacuum left by the departed Italian 
regime.
31 Ibid
32 Ibid
33 Ibid
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m  The School of Arts and Crafts
“The Arab Trade School - Madressa Fanun Ua Sanaa - is a noteworthy institution.” (*)
The School of Arts and Crafts had remained open, along with the Bishop of Tripoli’s school, 
throughout the emergency caused by the war, even following the advance of the 8 th Army 
after the Battle of Alamein. C34) This was extremely fortunate for the school and probably did 
more than anything else to save it from the bouts of looting that occurred in the early months of 
1943, following the Italian and German military evacuation, when many schools were literally 
stripped of everything moveable and immovable, leaving them often no more than “empty 
shells”. C35)
As Steele-Greig commented, “whether this action was done purely for gain or spite will 
never be known”. (36 ) More looting and damage occurred when many schools including this 
time the School of Arts and Crafts, were occupied by the Army, since, “ not all soldiers 
appreciated the value and future use of the school and its equipment”. (37 ) This, however, 
was no new experience for the School of Arts and Crafts, then occupied by a Royal Airforce 
Barrage Balloon Unit, with the orphan boys still continuing to reside there as indeed, had their 
somewhat distant predecessors, when the school had also been used as a barracks at the start 
of the Italian occupation itself in 1911. (38)
A) Administration
Under the B.M.A., and the evidence is far from substantial, it would appear that the School of 
Arts and Crafts in the main reverted to the way its affairs had been managed in Turkish times, 
even if parts of the building were used in ways not envisaged by its original founders, as for 
example when use was made of the premises as a Girls' Teacher Training College. In other 
words its unbroken tradition as a place of refuge for orphan boys, who were trained on its 
premises in arts and crafts or some other profession, from which they would be able to make a 
living on leaving the shelter of its walls.
During this phase of its history, the connection with the existing Italian Technical school 
appears not to have continued, though of course the Italian schools as such continued to cater 
for the needs of the still considerable Italian community. The use of the school workshops by
* B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1944, p.35
34 Steele-Greig, Op.cit., p.28
35 Ibid, p.31
36 Ibid
37 Ibid
38 Ibid, Official sources indicate that there were 77 orphan boys in the school at this time
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local business interests also appears to have fallen into abeyance, and for the first time ever, a 
Libyan rather than a Turk or Italian became its "able Arab director". (39) As in Italian times, 
the overriding control of the school rested with the Director of Education, now Major A.J. 
Steele-Greig and a committee of Arab notables who were in effect the trustees. (40). With the 
exception of the appointment of an Arab director, this had been the administrative system in 
Italian times, during which the school had undergone some quite radical changes. The original 
Auqaf, whereby the institution had been funded, was sequestrated by the Colonial regime, 
funding instead coming directly from the colonial budget. The collapse of the colonial regime, 
also meant that the school at the start of the British Occupation was without any official 
funding, as the original funding from Auqaf-El-Sur could not be restored. (45)
In these circumstances, the B.M.A. was obliged to step in and provide the school with 
sufficient funding to keep it going, but little more, and certainly nothing in the way of 
financing that would be required to turn the institution into a centre for vocational training in 
the territory, as Ralph Micacchi had initially dreamed of doing. (46) Instead the subsidy 
consisted for the most part of wages for the staff (47). Because of the crisis in funding and the 
financial limitations affecting the Administration's begetting arrangements, the old-time method 
of maintaining the school was reverted to and, as in Italian times additional income was again 
derived from the production and sale of touristic items, in this case to the British troops.
The ability of the school to fund itself had been tested in the first year of the B.M.A,. even 
before the Administration agreed to subsidize the payment of teaching staff, and output from 
sales, "particularly of pottery" to the British troops had put the finances of the institution well 
into the black. Unfortunately, a shortage of basic raw materials threatened the future of this 
entrepreneurial exchange, and notes the Annual Report, "the lack of glazing powder has now 
caused output to virtually cease".
Fortunately, the financial well-being for the school was not entirely dependent upon its 
output of pottery, and the report again notes that a "master cobbler had been engaged and the 
boys are learning bootmaking and repairing". Whatever the educational merits of 
"bootmaking", and it should not be forgotten that the school exists to train boys in a skill or 
craft, the activity proved "very profitable to the school" at this difficult stage in its existence. 
(48).
The continuance of such methods of financial survival, also enabled the School of Arts and 
Crafts to be "financially successful" during 1945, but concern that the school was again 
becoming a souvenir factory, which it had been its fate under Balbo's regime were now being
39 B.M.A.., Tripolitania, 1944,p. 35
40 Ibid
45 Annual Report Tripolitania, 1945, p. 35.
46 R. Micacchi, op. cit., pp.166-173
47 Annual Report Tripolitainia, 1945, p. 35
48 Ibid
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voiced. As a result of such criticism, the orientation of the school towards the commercial 
exploitation of its products, however lucrative, was brought to a definite halt, and all income 
from such sources of commercial activity was accordingly terminated. (49)
The decision of the Administration in Tripoli to re-establish the School of Arts and Crafts 
upon its original footing, in accordance with the intentions for its Ottoman foundees was not 
an unpopular move in Tripoli, as at least it meant that the institution would finally come under 
Arab control, with its own administrative body chosen exclusively from local personages and 
without any strings attached. This in effect meant that the school became an orphanage 
continuing its original function of training the alumni in an art or craft Unfortunately, the 
demise of the Aqaf-El-Sur meant that funds for the running of the orphanage and school would 
have to come from the B.M.A., which was an important precedent for the future since it meant 
that all funding would now come from the government, whatever that government might be, 
and the return of the Italian authorities was still very much a likelihood at this time.
On the other hand, the institution was again a purely religious and educational institution 
and apart from periodic inspection by the Department of Education was free to run its own 
affairs under its Arab Committee of Libyan Notables. Also for the B.M.A., this meant that it 
was carrying out limited responsibilities towards the institution as determined by international 
law. According to this definition of its role, no mandate existed to transform the School for 
Arts and Crafts into any thing other than what it had been in the past, namely an orphanage and 
vocational training centre for the exclusive benefit of its alumni.
B) Curriculum
The B.M.A.'s decision not to attempt any transformation of the School of Arts and Craft, as 
would later be recommended in 1951 by the UNESCO Committee of visiting experts, into 
vocational centre for Tripoli, and even the territory as a whole, meant that curriculum at this 
point would revert to what it had been under the Turks. This of course now meant that the 
curriculum would express the previous social, religious and economic goals of the institution 
but little more. (50)
It does appear, however, that the possibility of engineering changes in the nature and goals 
of the institution to make it reflect contemporary realities and permit future evolution upon lines 
of a vocational centre for general use was mooted at this time. Such ideas, however, did not 
find acceptance amongst the Committee of Libyan Notables running the School. Instead, 
fearing perhaps a recurrence of the troubles which had in the past sadly affected the running of 
the School they favoured a more conservative regimen, in line with the original dispensation
49 Ibid
50 R. Micacchi, L'Enseignment Aux Indigenes Dans Les Colonies Italiennes Dependent Directement de la Couronne, 
Institut Colonial International, Session de la Haye de 1927, Rapport Preliminaire Bruxeles, 1926, p.545
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originally safeguarded before its abolition (51) by the Auqaf-El-Sur. This was designed to 
ensure the maintenance of a purely eleemosynary institution run on Islamic Lines, all other 
ideas being rejected by the Committee of Notables, (52)
The clearest expression of the nature of this curriculum in print is provided by Piccioli in 
the course of his report of 1926 on the history, organisation and administration of the School 
of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli. ( 53 ) "In Ottoman times", wrote Piccioli, "the School had offered 
a six-year course consisting of six classes, five of which were preparatory (elementary 
geography, history, arithmetic, geometry, reading and writing in Arabic and Turkish, the 
Koran and religious doctrine) with the remaining classes being professional. In the 
professional course, Piccioli added "following the daily two hours of general education - and 
lasting until one hour before sunset, the following skills were taught: shoemaking, carpentry, 
fitting and mechanics, tailoring, brass and copper work, saddling, building, typography, gold 
and silver work, along with special crafts reserved for girls (weaving, carpet-making and 
seamstressry) which were conducted in a special girls' section of the school." (54)
Following the revival of the school after a long period of decay and neglect, in the late 
twenties by the Italian governor De Bono, the original pattern of the curriculum, with the 
exception of the teaching of Turkish, was re-continued. This is confirmed by Contini, who 
while adding that the school was substantially reformed in 1925, following the proposals put 
forward by Piccioli in his report of that year (though for some strange reason dated as 1926), 
( 55 ) Despite the changes which overcame the functioning of the School, as it was opened up 
to the Italian interest, especially under Governor Italo Balbo, the curriculum would have 
continued to be followed in the remaining years of the Italian Administration and on under the 
B.M.A. for the Moslem pupils.
As no vocational schools as such were to be set up, though vocational training would be an 
integral part of preparation for independence in the late forties, it is important to recognise the 
nature of what was essentially a standard curriculum for the School of Arts and Crafts, 
especially as this institution was the only serious vocational training establishment in the whole 
of the territory. In this respect Fulvio Contini provides us with the following outline of 
options:
a) an embroidery section
b) a weaving section
c) a carpentry section
51 Appleton, Op.cit. chpt, three, Direct Rule and the Libyan Schools 1911-1919, IV Policy Towards Professional 
Education, p.85
52 Annual Report Tripolitania, 1945, p.35
Angelo Piccioli, Op.cit, p. 16
54 Ibid
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d) a bookbinding section
e) a silversmiths section
f) a painters section
g)a bricklayers section
Contini informs us, as is clear from any study of the internal running of the school during the 
later Italian period, that there was an enormous machine-workshop in the school, with 
specialised sections equipped and operating as forges, lathe-shops, welding and soldering 
shops, foundries, automobile repair shops and finally an enormous workshop for the 
manufacture of wooden objects. In addition there had been established a section for the 
production of ceramics and another for the hotel industry. (56) What Contini neglects to add to 
his lengthy description of the workshops was the additional information that under the 
preceding Fascist Administration those facilities had been the virtual exclusive preserve of 
pupils from the nearby Italian Secondary Schools and such businessmen as had obtained from 
the colonial authorities direct access and use of them. This was something Italians under the 
B.M.A., especially in the early phase when it was hoped that Tripolitania would revert to the 
Italian flag, were anxious to play down of forget entirely: but to claim that Libyans had equal 
access to them or that they were there for the exclusive use of orphan pupils at the School of 
Arts and Crafts itself was just propaganda repeating itself ad nauseam.
Balbo had recognised the need to compensate for depriving the native population of any 
form of modem education and training s workmen and artisans, such as was being provided 
for Italian subjects in the excellent Italian secondary schools in Tripoli and the workshops of 
the School of Arts and Crafts, by developing the traditional arts and crafts option for Libyans. 
This of course was the function of the Fascist syndicate for Libyan artisans intended on paper 
at least to offer the same equity as was being offered by the state in the "Fascist Syndicate for 
Italian Artisans". (57).
IV Attempts to Develop the School of Arts and Crafts Beyond its Traditional Role.
Not surprisingly under a Libyan Administration, reaction to a curriculum dominated by arts 
and crafts and the virtual transformation of the school into a "commercial concern, catering for 
a souvenir hunting public, rather than an educational institution meant for the training of young 
artisans" was not slow to surface. A scheme was accordingly submitted to the Administration, 
whereby the school was accordingly submitted to the orphanage and training institution, still in 
the field of arts and crafts but within terms of the accepted educational conventions, This was
56 See, Contini, Op.cit., p.42
57 Ibid
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accepted by the B.M.A. which appears to have had no alternative ideas to offer on the subject 
and the school was allowed to revert to what it had been in Turkish times. (58)
Yet it could be argued that in returning to the status quo ante bellum a valuable opportunity 
had been lost in developing the school in the interests of the territory as a centre for vocational 
education. Such a reform would only have been inconsistent with the B.M.A's role if it had 
acted against the interests of the Moslem community or without its consent. The problem with 
so-called reforms under the Italians was that they had been neither in the interests or with the 
consent of the Moslem community. The result, however, of these reforms was to develop the 
School of Arts and Crafts and its surrounding institutions, such as the Italian Secondary 
Schools, the Complimentary School and most importantly the Scuola D'Aviamento y 
Professionale into a centre of unrivalled technical an educational expertise. True the 
workshops may have been plundered by the invading soldiery, but they were British soldiers 
not Italian of German soldiers, as has been noted on page 187. Also, the Italian secondary 
schools in the immediate vicinity of the School of Arts and Crafts were falling into disuse due 
to the poverty affecting the Italian community following the collapse of the former colonial 
regime. In the circumstances International Law might well be seen as requiring the B.M.A. to 
do something about this situation if only to ensure that the status quo anti bellum was 
maintained.
As has, however, frequently been stated, the B.M.A.'s position was one of extreme 
ambivalence in a highly charged volatile situation in which Arabs, Jews and Italians were 
ready to blame the Administration for any infringement of their interests. Permission to 
sequestrate the Italian schools in the interests of the Moslem majority would never have been 
obtained from London; and it is most unlikely it would ever have been sought. At this point, 
any comparison with the conduct of affairs in Cyrenaica is irrelevant and erroneous as 
political, social and cultural conditions in the two territories were entirely different, however 
similar on other respects. Furthermore, any attempt to confiscate Italian property or interfere 
with the educational rights of Italians, however high-minded and well-intentioned, would have 
infuriated the new democratic government of Italy and outraged the Italian community in 
Tripoli.
When it came, however, to the management of the affairs of the School of Arts and Crafts, 
the B.M.A. was on firmer ground and a case for developing the school as a vocational centre 
for Libyan artisans would certainly have gained support of the Muslim majority for the 
B.M.A. International Law nonetheless did not require the B.M.A. to do more with the 
institution than it had to and this depended upon what type of institution it was seen to be. It 
would be helpful therefor to see whether the B.M.A. should have reformed the institution by
58 Ibid
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looking more carefully at it in Turkish and Italian times and particularly at how the non- 
boarding element had been viewed then.
Pupils and Teachers
Any perusal of the documentation relating to the history of the School of Arts and Crafts in 
Tripoli quickly conveys the idea that this was a religious foundation set up for the maintenance 
and training of either orphans or the children of very poor families.(59) If therefore the legacy 
of Italian times, in the shape of up-to-date workshops, machines and tools was to be made use 
of them, it was clear that it must be in terms of the constitution of the school. Whether the 
B.M.A. had any obligation in terms of the International Law to proceed with such a reform is 
another matter, though by no means irrelevant to the B.M.A's position in Libya at this time. 
Certainly, even if the B.M.A did not attempt to improve vocational education in Tripoli by 
means of the School of Arts and crafts, the same dilemma could beset its successors, whether 
Italian or Libyan and this was still far from clear in the circumstances of 1945. The immediate 
practicality of a reform of the school by the B.M.A. is also largely irrelevant given that the 
question appertained to the development of the workforce of the territory in the near and if not 
immediate future. Steele-Greig's attitude to this issue was to view it as unnecessary in the 
immediate future. He believed that any attempt for vocational education would not meet with 
any favourable responses from the Arab population who were not interested in being trained 
for manual work only for work with a future managerial connotation. He had accordingly 
advised Blackley that any scheme of vocational training was "a waste of time with the 
Libyans" who did not want to become artisans. The brigadier ignored his advice on one 
occasion when he sent a group of young Libyans for training to the former Agricultural 
institute. On this occasion, Steele-Grieg's advice was correct, and on being taken out to start 
work on plantations surrounding the college, the students were shocked and dismayed to find 
they were expected to roll up their sleeves and start digging the soil. As a result, the project 
collapsed and the brigadier ended up with egg on his face. C60)
Yet in the long run such attitudes had to be overcome in the interests for the country, 
though it is arguable whether the B.M.A was the best Administration to attempt this, rather 
than a national government of the future. Nonetheless, an attempt could and should at this 
time have been made by the B.M.A to at least improve vocational education in the schools. If 
not the School of Arts and Crafts should have been a candidate for reform. There the number 
of boys in the capital, Tripoli, could satisfy category number one, of being either "orphans" or 
"utterly destitute" was perhaps numerically insufficient. There were, however, very many 
more, on the other hand, definable as "being of very poor family" or at least of "poor" family
59 Ibid
60 G.Quadroua, "L'Ordinamento Auiorizzato Per Nazionali" Op.cit p.6
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must have included virtually the whole Arab population of the city if not the territory as a 
whole.
Indeed, it could be argued, that with the latter factor in mind, the Turks had originally in 
part at least, set about founding such institutions as the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli 
throughout their extensive domains in the previous century. (61) Moreover, not all these 
schools were orphanages, many being set up for the training of apprentices most of whom 
would have been boys from poor families. The Tripoli School of Arts and Crafts, however, 
seems to have begun its existence as an orphanage, which perhaps explains why it was set up, 
though later moved to its present location, at a distance of five kilometres beyond the city 
walls. Also, the Tripoli institution was not a government institution, rather being organised as 
an autonomous institution, with its own statutes and financing, though this was not always 
sufficient for its needs. (62) Once the era of colonisation began, the city of Tripoli rapidly 
began to spread beyond its walls eastward and with this increase in the commerce and activity 
of the city started the pressure, from a variety of different sources for changes to the nature and 
running of the School of Arts and Crafts, so that it could be used for wider purposes than 
those intended by its founders, the Wakf. ( 63 )
In the tumult and uncertainty, however, surrounding the start of the Italian era in 1911, it 
was the school's facility as an orphanage that was most in demand, due to the increase in 
homelessness an destitution amongst the Arab population that created many homeless and 
often parentless children. Two years following the start of the colonial era, 1913 saw the 
school with a population of 120 orphans of both sexes, under the age for seven. A time of 
crisis that particularly affected the running of the school causing it to suspend all educational 
functions sue to the increase in the numbers of destitutes to which it had to attend. C64)
By this time it became clear to the Italian authorities in Tripoli that the school was barely 
able to support from it own patrimony of 1 0 0  orphans, whereas in fact the numbers in need of 
care and attention far exceeded this figure, so requiring additional provision from the colonial 
authorities, if they were to be maintained there. ( 65 ) After 1913, the arrival of more settled 
social, economic and political conditions, at least along the coastal areas of Tripolitania, as a 
result of the Italians consolidating their control of the region, had the effect of reducing the 
refugee problem considerably.
Plans were therefore revived for an increase in the educational activity of the school and in 
particular for its opening up to Moslem children other than orphans. This development had 
undoubtedly established itself as a trend immediately prior to the Italian Occupation, as is 
apparent from the statistical evidence available form this period. By then, there were 120 Arab
61 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1945, p.35
62 Piccioli Report, Op.cit.
63 Stcele-Geig to Apleton, Barbados, 1981
64 A.J. Cachia, Op.cit., p.48
65 Appleton, Op.cit., Note 4
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boys at the school of whom about 90 were orphans in receipt of general education and another 
thirty artisans. ( 66 ) Between 1918-1919 during which the training functions of the school 
virtually ceased, the number of enrolments increased to 175. (67 ) This rise was due entirely to 
the establishment at the school in 1913 of an Italo-Arab annexe. ( 6 8 ) By 1922, the School of 
Arts and Crafts had also become the principal Italo-Arab centre in Tripoli, with a total on the 
site of 243 pupils. ( 69 )
The removal in 1913 of the Italo-Arab school from the old city, where since 1911 it had 
functioned somewhat unsatisfactorily as an annex to the original Italian elementary school, 
lasted until 1925. As such it functioned in tandem with the School of Arts and Crafts which 
continued as an orphanage. Unfortunately, due to a succession of ineffective and corrupt 
directors, it virtually ceased to operate during this period as a training centre for either arts and 
crafts or artisans. (70) The gradual establishment of the colonial regime in the region began 
after 1922 to have an impact upon the organisation and running of the school which from 1925 
onwards changed considerably both as an orphanage and training centre, the Italo-Arab School 
being moved to another site. It was during these final 17 years of the Italian regime that it 
became a skill centre for the near-by Italian Complimentary School and Scuola D'Aviamento e 
Professionale, as well as being a factory for producing printed items and commercial 
wares.(7l)
At the advent of the British period, therefore, the school had served a wide variety of 
purposes, not all of which had been educational, to a wide range of puiposes and commercial 
interests. The pupils had been orphans and non-orphans from poor families, ordinary scholars 
from Tripoli, though the Italo-Arab Annex had been technically separate from the functioning 
of the School of Arts and Crafts as such, while using the same premises, and finally Italian 
pupils and trainee artisans from the Italian Secondary Schools.
As there are no separate sets of statistics, covering the running of the school and 
admissions to it over the years, one can only surmise that the figure of 182 boys provided by 
Contini for the year 1939-40 is correct. ( 7 2 ) for some reason, Steele-Greig also neglects to 
mention of it in his two short historical accounts of education in Tripolitania. (72) One is 
therefore left to conjecture that under the B.M.A., the school remained an orphanage with 
possibly 1 0 0  residents which available evidence suggests was the maximum it could 
accommodate. Certainly Steele-Greig himself affirms in 1948, by which time it had reverted to 
its original function as an orphanage that "the average number of boys being educated there
66 Ibid, p.92
67 Ibid, p.87
68 Ibid, p.88
69 See Piccioli Report, Op.cit., p.68
70 Ibid
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was 90". ( 73 ) There is no doubt that the situation would have remained the same when 
independence was declared though changes could have occurred subsequently. The dream of 
Rodolfo Micacchi, the former director of the Italian colonial schools, that the School of Arts 
and Crafts in Tripoli should become a vocational centre for the region, while being realised 
under the Fascist regime for the Italians, was never realised for the Arabs. It is perhaps one of 
the ironies of history that when the opportunity finally seemed to appear for the School of Arts 
and Crafts to become a vocational centre for the whole region, under a regime controlled by a 
nation that had liberated the country from the Italian oppressors, it merely reverted to the type 
of institution it had originally been under the defunct Ottomans.
No doubt had the political position in Tripolitania in 1942, when the B.M.A. commenced, 
been the same as it was in Cyrenaica, the School of Arts and Crafts would have had a different 
fate. Unfortunately, the political vacuum in Tripolitania under the B.M.A. and the general 
shortage of personnel and resources, combined with the fact that the B.M.A. was not intended 
by the Hague Convention to do anything more than preserve the situation in all its aspects as it 
had been when the Italian colonial government was in control, ensured that the institution 
merely reverted to the original pattern.
At least, however, the School of Arts and Crafts under the B.M.A. was not subject to the 
exploitation and neglect that had marred most of its existence until this time. By becoming 
again an orphanage and training school in traditional arts and crafts, the position was clear for 
the new independent government of Libya to determine what its future would be. By this time, 
the development situation in the country had considerably widened so ensuring that the School 
of Arts and Crafts need not be subject to further changes, as new schools and training centres 
began to emerge.
73 Contini, Op.cit., p.42 and 68
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C hapter Nine Educational T raining and Development (Part Two)
"Few countries in the world are less advanced economically, have a higher proportion of 
illiteracy, or have been longer under foreign domination than Libya." (* )
As will have been observed so far, while the B.M.A. had a firm commitment to restore the 
educational system in Tripolitania as it had been in Italian times, this commitment did not 
necessarily extend to any further form of provision. Unfortunately the B.M. A.'s mandate was 
to continue long after the period originally envisaged for it, due to the difficulties experienced 
by the powers in determining the future of the Italian colonies.
The B.M.A. therefore was obliged increasingly after 1945 to rethink its position with 
regard to vocational education in general though this did not have any immediate effect upon 
the educational situation in the territory. In the latter respect the financial limitations imposed 
by Care and Maintenance ensured that only very limited measures were taken in this field at 
least as far as the educational system itself was concerned.
No firm policy was therefore originated with the result that in the case of one avenue where 
something positive might have been achieved, a reform of the School of Arts and Crafts in 
Tripoli, opportunities that might otherwise have been seized upon were allowed to pass by.
This refusal to become involved in vocational education by means of an existing institution 
which was crying out for reform was unfortunately typical of the B.M.A. which often seemed 
to see itself in the role of a caretaker administration in the territory. Such a policy was in 
marked contrast to Cyrenaica, where the political environment was so different from 
Tripolitania, enabling vocational education to move ahead rapidly.
If the B.M.A. did not then consider the development of vocational education in the territory 
as an integral part of its mandate under International Law, it would have to consider other 
ways of training Libyan personnel to fill vacancies created by natural wastage in the system of 
administration itself. Priority was therefore increasingly given after 1945 to education and 
training of personnel for the future manning of the infrastructure required for running the 
country. This was necessary both while the B.M. A. had itself finally passed away.
Before 1946 such training programmes were given less emphasis as it was still far from 
clear whether independence as such would ever take place. Until the Administration knew for 
certain that the Emir would be eventually installed as head of the government of united Libya 
its position with regard to the training of personnel was extremely ambivalent. Indeed in terms 
of International Law it had no mandate to commence what amounted to the devolution of 
authority in the territory. Until the legal position was crystal clear any major job-training 
scheme leading to a Libyanised work force in the administration itself was in many respects
* B. Higgins, Op.cit., p.7
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contrary to both the spirit and the letter of International Law. Therefore, until the issue of 
Italian sovereignty in the territory was finally settled by the United Nations, Libyanisation 
would have to be a low-key issue involving the training of only essential personnel who could 
not be obtained from any other source.
Fear of contravening International Law was undoubtedly a factor in the delay of major 
Libyanisation programmes until they were too late have the effect intended. Had Libyanisation 
been introduced five years before it was a more effective administration would have resulted in 
1951.
Libyanisation: Phase One
" The administration began to aim not only at removing the Fascist work but at laying sound 
foundations upon which any successor government might build in the future." (* )
Sanderson's observations refer to moves towards some form of Libyanisation by the B.M.A. 
following the failure of the Bevin-Sforza initiative in the year 1948. This ended all speculation 
that Tripolitania might return to Italian jurisdiction and was met with great rejoicing throughout 
Libya. As such it marks the end of the marking-time era of British Military Rule and the start 
of a more dynamic period leading directly to independence. It must however, be noted that 
even at this phase it was still not finally clear that Libya would become an independent 
sovereign state or what form the final settlement might take. In fact both external and internal 
observers were far from united as to whether Tripolitania was in fact ready for independence 
yet and pointed to the weakness of the country in economic and educational terms.
"Care and Maintenance" was nonetheless over as such, since although Britain would have 
only limited funds to spend upon Libya, in the restricted post-war climate of rigid austerity 
measures and rationing, planning for the future of the country could now be clearer and more 
positive. Tentative moves away from a strictly applied "Care and Maintenance" policy had in 
fact been underway since the conclusion of the Peace Treaty with Italy. This, although due to 
be approved by the peace conference on 25 September, 1946 was not in fact finally ratified by 
Italy Russia and France until 15 September, 1949 but had a more or less immediate effect upon 
relations between the B.M.A. and the Libyans themselves. (*) In this sense, the final outcome 
had been recognised by the concerned parties, though it was not until the ratification of the 
Italian Peace Treaty in September, 1947 that the B.M.A. officially received the green light to 
proceed with internal reforms. By the Treaty, "greater power" was given to the B.M. A.,
* Sandison, Op.cit, p.92
1 Ibid., p9
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"since Italy renounced her right and title over all her former colonies". Hence, political changes 
with a view to "training the country for self-government" were not undertaken. (2 )
These political preparations included, the setting up of Libyan People's Courts, in all 
districts, with local provincial headquarters, along with further measures, marking "real 
progress towards democratic government". These included the adoption of plans to "establish 
elected local government councils", f3) It should be added that the B.M.A. had in fact already 
begun a measure of Libyanisation, before these momentous changes had been announced 
which "was at first restricted to lower grade employees". (4 ) This could be called the first 
phase of Libyanisation.
The first so-called phase of Libyanisation was less a response to any legal ideological 
mandate than a pragmatic answer to the demands of the times. It contained three discernible 
areas: to provide employment and practical training to Libyans who might not have received 
elementary education, as in the case of the early police recruits; and to fill with Libyan 
personnel, vacancies created by the demobilisation of British servicemen. This process was at 
first "restricted to lower grade employees - clerks, police constables and customs guards". (5 ) 
Gradually, these initial categories of personnel were extended with the same aims in view 
to cover almost all the areas included in the existing administration, other than that is the 
political, military and diplomatic. These included the departments of Education, Legal Affairs, 
Finance, Customs and Excise, Custodianship of Enemy Property, Labour, Postal Services, 
Press and Propaganda, Police, Medical and Veterinary, Antiquities and Agriculture. It is safe 
to say that in almost all these Departments, Libyans were from the very commencement of the 
B.M.A., both employed and depending upon the skills required - provided with on the job 
training which in some cases, such as police, could be described, quite accurately, as 
"vocational training" or education. Steele-Greig, for example, asserts that in the case of the 
Transport Department, the "Road Transport Officer was able to train a number of boys in 
motor-mechanics which proved a huge success".(6 ) Educationally, several of these areas 
would require both a level of educational attainment and vocational training, though the Annual 
Report only refers to Police and Medical services in this respect. Obviously, at this stage 
insufficient analysis had taken place as far as the determination of present and future education 
and training requirements were concerned, though this would have to change later as standards 
of admission were raised.
After more than thirty years of Italian rule, including 22 of the Fascist regime itself, the 
removal of which had required a World War of unprecedented ferocity, the re-establishment of 
the Tripolitanian Police was undoubtedly a priority. Not surprisingly, the very first plans for
, 2 Ibid
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156
the occupation of Tripolitania, included "the provision of classes of instruction in police duties 
for the newly joined officers". This was soon followed in March by the setting up of a training 
school in the ex-Italian barracks at Tarhuna with a composite staff of British and Libyan 
personnel. Initial courses of instruction were scheduled to last two months; but subsequently 
increased to three months. ( 7 )
Later additional courses for mounted personnel, inspectors, and those requiring refresher 
| courses, were added to the school's curriculum. Of the 2295 recruits who passed out of the 
school at the end of 1943 598 had failed to graduate "for a variety of reasons". (8 ) Pay and 
conditions, along with other factor made for a high wastage rate of trained officers, and the
i
| force had become so depleted by December, 1944 when the actual strength was only 1328,
| whereas the "war establishment" required 1816. (9) further extensive training programmes
| were therefore constantly required under the B.M.A. to maintain the Tripolitanian Police on the 
; required footing.
t
| Extensive recruitment of Libyans into the police service had many educational implications 
| since "literacy" was a sine qua non of entry into the police, except where an applicant had
| special qualifications, such as a knowledge of animal management, mechanical transport, etc.,
| etc." (10) Despite such entrance requirements, by 1947 the force still contained "illiterates", 
j  though these had greatly diminished, which was perhaps a reflection of the increased
educational standards in the territory. (10) Thus of the 794 applicants, 425 were accepted in
i
accordance with the new educational standards. (n  ) This was reckoned, a "100% in excess of 
| those for 1946". ( 12 )
1 The standard of intelligence was also improving slowly though the illiterate policeman was
j  still an indispensable element in the force and often highly esteemed by his superiors. (13)
f
| many of these policemen, it was estimated, possessed great "powers of memory" and were the 
| force's "most valuable policemen. “It is not clear whether the police Training School held
I
| classes for illiterates though it would be surprising if it hadn't. This is more or less confirmed 
■ from reports that in 1948 those recruits whose literacy was "not of high standard received
i
I tuition in the Arabic Language at the Police Training School, and for this purpose, Arab
| teachers have been specially engaged." (l4 )
| By 1948, however, literacy was being "insisted upon", as a condition of enlistment, and
I the percentage of literate members of the force was "higher than at any stage since the
7 Annual Report to Tripolitania, 1943, p.33
! 8 Ibid
| 9 Annual report to Tripolitania, 1944, p.26
| 10 Annual Report to Tripolitania, 1947, p.31
! n  Ibid
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occupation". ( 15 ) By 1949, the inspectorate was opened to Libyan applicants, and two 
English speaking Libyan inspectors were sent to England on a special training course. (16) 
The Police Training School continued to provide "a good basic training for recruits, together 
with promotion courses for those selected as possible for N.C.O. rank and the Libyan 
Inspectorate". (17)
The final year of the B.M.A. and the imminence of independence "attracted recruits of a 
better type" into the force and led to the imposition by it of ever higher standards of education 
and discipline. ( 18 ) The pressure for even higher standards culminated in 1950 in the 
establishment of a Cadet Officer's Training Centre, which was placed in the charge of a Grade 
II British Officer, following retirement, earlier in the year, as Commander of Metropolitan 
Training School at Hendon. (19).
Arab instructors were obtained from the former Palestine Police Force and the first course 
of 36 weeks was started immediately with 24 cadet officers drawn from the Libyan 
Inspectorate, (20) As no preparations had been made under the B.M.A. for the setting up of 
the Libyan Armed Forces, it is only with reference to the Police Force, that it is possible to get 
some idea of the educational requirements of the Libyan Armed Forces, when they were 
eventually set up, which was following Independence itself.
The Libyanisation of the Tripolitanian police Force was obviously a case of political reality 
assuming an absolute role over the political and diplomatic niceties of the moment. Clearly, the 
absence of the former Italian Police, and the Fascist antecedents of that force, required the 
creation of a viable alternative, as quickly as possible, if control over the territory was to be 
maintained by a so-called "military administration" in mufti. Yet the creation, organisation and 
training of the Tripolitanian Police Force was Libyanisation at its most important level, not 
only springing out of the needs of the moment, but without any international sanction or 
approval whatsoever. The same pattern was also to occur with another very important area 
upon which the Italians had prided themselves, especially in the quality and extent of the 
medical service which they had provided for the Moslem population, This had been regarded 
as almost as if not more important than education, since it was integral to "pacific penetration",
15 Ibid
16 Anual Report to Tripolitania, 1949, p.48
17 Ibid
18 annual Report to Triplotania, 1950, p.54
19 Ibid
20 Ibid
158
and like education enabled the government to obtain the sympathy and goodwill of the native 
population, especially women and children.
It seems to have been important for the Italian propaganda machine to be able to show 
Italians actually attending to Arabs in a medical role, and there does not appear to have been 
any shortage of Italian medical operatives at this time. Therefore, apart from last minute 
provisions at the School of Higher Islamic Studies (21), virtually no effort was made to 
prepare Libyans for the future as a people, training them as nurses and doctors. Instead, as 
with everything else, they were to be kept in subservience to Italian personnel whether trained 
or untrained.
The numerous clinics, hospitals and medical annexes, established throughout the country 
by the Italian regime were therefore at the start of the B.M.A. staffed exclusively by Italian 
nurses and doctors without a Libyan in sight, except perhaps as a patient. (22) Unfortunately, 
the acute shortage of the former, who had mostly fled to Italy before the arrival of the 
B.M.A., produced a virtual complete breakdown of the Italian Medical Service, causing in 
1943 a severe threat to the health of the territory and the army in particular. C23 )
Once this crisis had been dealt with by the then Director of Medical Services, Lt. Colonel 
Beamish, R.A.M.C., it might have been expected that the B.M.A. would begin training 
Libyans for the Medical services. This would have to have been purely at the level of nurses, 
as it had not the facilities or opportunity to educate and train doctors, which would in normal 
circumstances take many years to achieve for a country like Libya.
Initially, however, the burdens and challenges were too many for the B.M.A.'s hard- 
pressed medical teams to be able to devise programmes for the education and training of 
Libyans as nurses and medical assistants.
The steam, however was taken out of this issue by the return to the territory of many 
Italians who had worked in the hospitals before the arrival of the 8 th Army in Tripoli. 
Nonetheless, the Medical Services were under considerable pressure which was aggravated in 
this first year by the reopening of the schools. This required that the B.M.A. provide on the 
spot medical service to meet the requirements of moment. Italy had ensured that Libya had one 
of the best medical services in the Middle East and the B.M.A., had to work hard to ensure the 
same standards were maintained after 1942. This included dental treatment. C24)
Within a few weeks of the schools having been opened, all the children had been 
examined, and cases of trachoma isolated and the sufferers put into separate classes. Medical 
standards had been one of the achievements of the Italian colonial regime, and the 
establishment of peaceful and secure conditions ensured the maintenance of such standards
21 See Appleton, Op.cit., M.Phil, p.34
22 Annual Report to Tripolitania, 1943, p.42
23 Ibid, p.42
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under the Occupation. This was particularly the case in the schools, where inspections of all 
educational institutions became routine, and a close check was kept upon the general health of 
the school population upon a regular basis by qualified medical personnel. C25) Yet still no 
Libyans worked in the Medical Services. The first sign of Libyans at work in the Medical 
Service, was the placing in charge of many small medical dispensaries, of Arab medical 
orderlies in provincial locations. Also short courses, of two months duration were provided to 
train veterinary assistants, who following an examination, were offered employment in their 
departments. (26)
By 1945 it was clear that the B.M.A. would have to remain in charge of the country for 
longer than was originally anticipated, and attempts began to train Arab nursing personnel. (27) 
initially, however, shortage of staff rather than the needs of the future or policy, was the 
motivating factor in this particular development. C28 ) Nonetheless, Arabisation now became 
the key word and by December, 1946 outlying dispensary, such as those at Nalut, Ulid and 
Jeffen were staffed exclusively by Arabs. ( 29 )
In those circumstances, however, it was impossible to Libyanise higher grade positions 
following the increasing demobilisation of British personnel after 1945, and it therefore 
became increasingly necessary to rely upon Italian doctor, nurses and even religious to keep 
the hospitals running effectively. Even so, the shortage of personnel became acute, despite the 
arrangement of crash courses for the training of male and female nurses, from which the 
results were not reckoned good enough to maintain the quality of the service. (30) This 
included the training of additional medical personnel, such as local sanitary inspectors, when 
basic educational standards permitted.
The shortage of higher grade staff, however, persisted with the result that in 1947 the 
possibility of enlisting Arab doctors was reviewed without much progress. The problem was 
one of insufficiently high salaries, lack of job security and difficulty in securing suitable 
accommodation. Moreover, until the future of the country had been determined, new entrants 
to the service, especially foreign doctors, could not be sure that they were really welcome in a 
service primarily staffed by Italians. (31)
The training of lower grade staff, however, proceeded apace, with the organising of more 
courses for Libyan nursing staff at the Tripoli and Misurata hospitals followed by the issuing 
of 8  diplomas. At this point the Department of Education was brought into the picture and 8  
Arab boys commenced a higher standard than of nurse, so that they would be able to
23 Ibid., p.64
26 Annual Report to Tripolitania, 1944, p.30
27 Annual Report to Tripolitnia, 1945 , p.29
28 Annual Report to Tripolitania, 1946, p.29
29 Ibid
30 Ibid, pp.29-30
31 Ibid
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commence work in the provinces, where non-Libyans often refused to go, but where there 
was a desperate need for qualified medical personnel, (32)
The need, obviously at this stage was to create more diversity in the service, by selecting 
from graduates of the basic nursing courses, those who could should go on to more 
specialised training. Hence in 1948, whereas 31 new staff qualified as nurses "4 of the best 
trainees from the previous year commenced their second year of training" specialising in 
hygiene. Moreover, if candidates showed themselves to be suitable for such courses, a similar 
scheme would be organised for the next year. (33)
During 1949, training courses for nurses of "all nationalities" continued and in addition, 
the general medical courses for "selected students" proved satisfactory. Clearly by this time the 
long-term factor had entered into the calculations of the authorities, since 3 students completed 
their third year of training, and it was hoped to find students to commence first and second 
year courses. (34)
In its final year, the B.M.A., though some success had been obtained in the training of 
nurses, it was nowhere near adequate enough for the staffing of the hospitals with Libyan 
personnel, something which still has not been accomplished down to the present. The training 
of doctors had not yet been touched upon and could only come following a development of the 
educational service as a whole. Consequently, Italian and foreign personnel continued to 
dominated in the Medical Service. (35)
By 1950 it was necessary to recruit foreign Arab women to work in the hospitals, as most 
Jewish nurses had departed following the rapid disturbances of 1945. Also as Libyan 
independence became a political reality many Italian nurses decided not to stay on in the 
country. (36) Unfortunately, efforts to train Libyan replacements had largely failed. (37)
The same problems prevented the training of local girls as mid-wives. (38) Obviously, 
there were still some local difficulties to be circumvented before the medical services could be 
sufficiently evolved t meet the demands placed upon it. This would again depend upon 
improving the quality of basic education upon which everything else really depended. Only 
when the latter had been achieved would the problem of female illiteracy be sufficiently 
reduced to perhaps successfully persuade the families of Libyan girls to let their daughters seek 
careers and employment in the hospital of the metropolis and provinces.
II. Libyanisation: Phase Two
32 Ibid, p.37
33 Annual Report to Tripolitania, 1948, p.53
34 Annual Report to Tripolitania, 1949, p.23
35 Annual Report to Tripolitania, 1950, p.26
36 Ibid
37 Ibid See, B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1948, p.48
38 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1947, p. 10
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"The year 1947 will be remembered as a year of drought and hardship greater than any since 
the troubled times of twenties."(*)
Until 1947, the Libyanisation scheme had made steady if unspectacular progress, despite many 
difficulties and a number of setbacks, such as shortage of finance and time as well as the lack 
of adequate facilities in which to train the new Libyan personnel for the opportunities arising 
daily. The failure to develop the School of Arts and crafts into a true vocational centre, offering 
modem courses relevant to the needs of a post-colonial and developing society, along with the 
postponing of the opening of the new secondary school "with a strong agricultural bias" 
outside Tripoli were further factors in a difficult situation. (*9 ) Even legally, it is not clear 
what the situation of the B.M.A. really was regarding the Libyanisation project as far as 
International Law was concerned. Steele-Greig simply regarded it as technically at least outside 
the sphere of activities of the Department of Education, sanction for it having been obtained by 
Blackley from his superiors in Cairo.
Elsewhere, however, support for Libyanisation came from boys who had completed their 
primary course in Tripolitania of 4 years originally commenced in 1943. "Successful graduates 
of these schools were by 1947 ready to be admitted to secondary classes in the larger centres." 
(40) Meanwhile attendance at Koranic Schools had by then exceeded 16,000 and a qualified 
Libyan Inspector had been appointed to take charge of them. (41).
At the level of adult education, and so-called continuation classes for the "partially 
educated", attendance was 2,600 students. (42) Moreover, there were 100 boys receiving 
technical training "to fit them for employment in a government department". Also 30 teachers 
had enrolled in the newly opened” Teacher Training School", though in effect this more likely 
referred to the special course for training elementary school teachers, which Steele-Greig had 
devised than a fully organised Training School as such, which for teachers was not finally 
opened until 1950. This is confirmed for 1948, when only in November "was the first teachers 
class opened. This had been urgently needed since 1943, but lack of finance had impeded the 
advancement of this important side of education. The class consisted of 36 selected 
candidates". (43 ) The B.M.A., attested proudly that, in all, "some 31,000 Libyans" were 
receiving some form of education, as against the "highest total under the former Italian regime 
of 15,921". C44 ) These successes were the culmination of 4 years of B.M.A. existence in
* B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1947, p.9
39 Ibid
40 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1948, p.9
41 Ibid, p.45
42 Annual Report to Tripolitania, 1948, p.49
43 Ibid, p.49
44 Ibid
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Tripolitania, which according to the B.M.A.'s mandate, should at this point have seen the 
territory handed back to Italy, following the ratification of the peace treaty with Italy in 
September.
It was however difficult to terminate the B.M.A. at this point without formally issuing to it 
a new mandate, that required both the development and intensification of the Libyanisation 
programmes, even though it was still not finally clear whether Italy's last-ditch attempt to 
retain Tripolitania, through the Bevin-Sforza initiative would succeed or fail, until it was 
rejected by the United Nations a year later, in 1948. Such uncertainty, vacillation, and of clear 
directives which could only be issued to the B.M.A. by the cabinet office in London, via the 
central Bureau in Cairo, but never were, was part and integral to the whole precedent in which 
it was placed in trying to provide effective government to Tripolitania at this most uncertain 
and difficult time in its history. Had the position of Tripolitania been the same as its sister 
province, Cyrenaica, where the Emir was all but installed as a ruler so much more beneficial to 
the territory as a whole.
Unfortunately, nothing was ever clear-cut in the affairs of the troubled province, and even 
at this belated stage the position was only similar to gazing into a crystal ball though the 
contours of the situation were becoming clearer. It was, however, increasingly apparent to 
the Administration that it must at all costs retain overall control of the political affairs of the 
territory until the final decisions for the future were made and power was handed over to the 
new government. It was therefore essential to increase Libyanisation and Libyan participation 
in the e running of the province without sacrificing final control yet. This was most important 
with regard to education, where affairs were still largely under the direction of the somewhat 
autocratic Major A.J. Steele-Greig with whom relations were difficult.
An Arab advisory committee was therefore set up for education by Blackley to "assist the 
department in maturing its plans" but primarily with a view to as ostensibly as possible 
increasing the political participation of the Arabs in the running of the territory. Membership of 
the Committee was therefore restricted to "leading members of the main Arab political parties" 
whose role was to be purely advisory. (45 ) Executive power, as before, was to remain in the 
hands of Director of Education, a pattern that was repeated with all the participation and 
Arabisation schemes that were developed during the B.M.A.'s final years.
Another similar scheme embarked upon by the Administration in the same year was that of 
Ahilya or Peoples Courts, which while offering little in substance, were again designed by the 
Administration to win time and convince the Arab population that the tide was flowing in their 
direction, when in fact it could still have been turned back. After all, Italy had merely 
"renounced" her colonies, which did not amount to abandoning all hope of ever having them
45 Ibid
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returned. In fact, a "large majority" of Italians in Tripolitania and Italy itself, still favoured 
either the "outright return of Italian sovereignty" or "at last Italian trusteeship". (46)
Such measures were in fact also window dressing in anticipation later in the year of the 
War Office Working Party which was known to favour increased Libyanistion measures. The 
War Office Working Party was also seeking increasing signs of development, particularly at 
the educational level, which was essential if the case for the independence of the country 
favoured by Britain was to be successfully presented at the United Nations. In return, the 
B.M.A. wanted the support of the War Office Working Party for projects, such as the 
importing of secondary school teachers and the implementation of a scheme for training Libyan 
apprentices in the various sections of the Administration.
The latter, worked out and implemented, "in conjunction with the heads of departments" 
was also operated in conjunction with the new Arab Advisory Committee, which had selected 
the boys for training from the many applications. The heads of the various government 
departments then interviewed all the candidates forwarded to them by the Committee before 
the start of their training programmes. Steele-Greig observed that a number of trainees 
"resigned" from their course but were quickly replaced by other eager applicants. (47 )
The boys accepted as trainees were often from rural districts with ages ranging from 13- 
20, who "besides learning a trade", received lessons in English, Mathematics and Commercial 
Subjects," so as to fit them to fill vacancies, which might occur from time to time in the 
various departments of the Administration". The trainees were also assisted financially, being 
"in receipt of an honorarium of Lst. 3 a month". (48 )
By 1948, the number of trainees appears to have fallen to 52 and these completed their 
course in October. The programme of training as such fell "under the War office Working 
Party's scheme for the training of Libyans to fill posts in the various departments of the 
Administration now being filled by Europeans". (49) This policy did not contain anything 
new, as Libyans had been under training with such a purpose in mind since 1943. If there is 
any change in the nature of this training it lies in its political orientation or dimension, as the 
Libyans under training are now to replace "Europeans", albeit British or Italians, the former 
being demobilised, the latter having lost their empire. Moreover, not only will they replace 
Europeans, in the job-allocation sense, they will replace them in the executive sense for the 
most part too. This was already apparent by 1948, when some "thirty seven" Libyan trainees 
had already been absorbed into the various departments and sections of the Administration as 
"permanent employees". Of those remaining, fifteen were described as having "commenced a
46 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1948, p.49
47 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1949, p.32
48 Ibid
49 Ibid
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| second year of training in technical work"; for which one years training was not regarded as 
| sufficient preparation. (50)
i  The difference at this point between a normal course of technical or vocational education or 
training and the type of courses being offered by the B.M. A., lay on the one hand, in the job- 
related training factor, which was new, and had all kinds of other connotations, such as the 
political factors already referred to. These concerns are apparent in the preparations made for 
the second of such courses, whereby some fifty trainees (the number being limited by the jobs- 
| related principle" to the number of junior employees which can be absorbed into the various 
departments at the end of the course of training") had been drawn up for interview, 
presumably again following selection by the Arab Advisory Committee.
The various curricula or syllabuses followed by the trainees is unfortunately not available 
for comment, though presumably it was based upon the previous pattern. What is known is 
that technical training in the job skills required by the departments took place in the mornings, 
with general education following in the afternoon. Where the training and education took place 
is similarly not known in the absence of any training centre as such for this purpose. (51)
The schemes of training in operation had to be diversified to cater for the needs of the 
various departments, this meant not only training for apprentices, but also training for clerical 
and other administrative types of personnel as well. Here again, it should be recalled that the 
B.M.A. had involved Libyans in the various administrative and clerical tasks of administering 
the former Italian colony, though on an extremely low level from 1943. Then, and 
subsequently, most of these tasks had been in the hands of Italians, but in 1948, a "specialised 
Commercial Training Class" had been set up with the object of training selected Libyan 
applicants, "for training and other duties in the district administrative offices of the territory".
! (5 2 )
The class was composed of 18 trainees, the curriculum comprising "a thorough grounding 
in English, typing accountancy and general office routine". It was intended that these 
applicants should replace "expensive imported personnel". Plans were also laid for the training 
of a further 50 students for the next course, but as with much of the Libyanisation policy, the 
success of the plans was jeopardised by the "lack of general" education on the part of the 
entrants themselves. Obviously, "only when the Arab secondary schools have been working
for several years and turning out students who have completed their full secondary
education" would this problem be overcome. It would be "from these that future Commercial 
Training Classes would be formed". (53 )
50 Ibid
51 Annual Report to Tripolitania, 1950, pp.34-38
52 Ibid
53 Ibid, p.260
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In the meantime, the graduates of the new Libyanisation projects returned to their various 
district and provincial centres for on the job training. This included a "three month 
probationary period in practical office work", after the successful completion of which, "all the 
trainees became junior clerks". Even so, the number finally "passing out" was only fifteen, 
compared with the eighteen original entrants. The ones who succeeded in the course were 
declared to be "doing good work" and to have fully justified their training". (53 )
These trainee clerks had started the ball rolling towards the formation of a skilled cadre of 
Libyan administrative personnel who would be around in future to fill posts previously filled 
by Italians. In May of the same year, a further class was started in what was clearly designed 
to be an ongoing process, whereby a new Arab bureaucracy would be formed. Even so "the 
general standard of the candidates "was declared "to leave much to be desired". Hope, 
however, was expressed that "when a better educational standard has been reached by the 
aspirants for the trainee scheme that these difficulties of selection will be largely averted". The 
class was therefore deliberately kept small to ensure a higher standard with only 21 clerical 
entrants. (54)
On the technical side, a "further course was commenced in February for technical trainees 
who spent the mornings in the department to which they were attached and the afternoons at 
school". Again the emphasis was on quality rather than quantity, as from a large number of 
applicants, only s limited number were selected for interview, with only "62 being chosen for 
work in the various departments". This totalled 51 in training with a further nine being held 
back from the previous year for further training, all of which, by December 1949 had been 
taken as employees. (55 )
This phase of Libyanisation projects was brought to a conclusion in 1950 when the several 
trainee courses, which had been set up "with the object of fitting young Libyans for various 
manual trades and non technical posts, such as clerks and accountants", were completed.
These trainees were in February of the same year appointed to posts in the Administration, and 
a further 23 were appointed to different posts at various intervals throughout the year. Not all, 
however, completed their training satisfactorily, 5 not receiving any appointment at all. (56) 
The second clerical course finished in April, and "all its 21 students were appointed, after 
the usual probationary period, to posts in the Administration". (57) This system of educating 
and training applicants for posts in the Administration who had previously been selected by the 
Arab Advisory Committee followed by a further vetting by the various heads of department 
with the offer of a job in the Administration, following satisfactory completion of the course, 
now came to an end with the setting up in 1950 of the Tripoli Technical College.
53 Ibid
54 Ibid
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Greeted as a "major step forward" in the history of the territory, the initial organising and 
funding for the institution came from the B.M.A., with UNESCO agreeing to pay the salaries 
of the teachers. This was on the understanding that the Administration, and subsequently the 
Government itself, "defrayed all other costs and made its departmental workshops available for 
institutional purposes". (58 ) from this point forward it is clear that one era has been left and 
another dawned.
Before the end of the year, the Tripoli Technical Commercial School, as it was now 
known, had a "well qualified Egyptian Principal", along with "such staff as was available 
locally". Nonetheless it was not until January, 1951 that a start was made with the 
"preliminary general education of more than 200 students". (59) The problem, however, as 
always was who were the teachers going to be and from where would they be obtained. It was 
easy to acquire or even put up educational buildings but a much more difficult task to find the 
right pupils and students to fill them and qualified and experienced staff ready to work there.
The adoption of the Egyptian Curriculum, besides being a good logical choice, also meant 
that there would be less of a problem in obtaining the right teachers to work it. Therefore, 
negotiations were started with the Egyptian Ministry of Education to secure the secondment of 
a number of technical instructors, whose arrival was expected in February 1951. This was not 
the only problem in getting the school on a work-a-day footing because it did not as yet 
possess any workshops of laboratories of its own. Only by using the Administration's 
workshops could the school in fact be opened at all, and this dependence would have to 
continue until such a time as the college was equipped with its own plant and tools, either from 
U.N.E.S.C.O. or from the United States Government, under the Point Four Programme. (60)
Education although important, as independence approached, was not the most important 
activity of the Administration. Much Libyanisation up to this point, as has been shown, was 
really vocational education in another guise. It may therefore be irrelevant to suggest that if the 
B.M.A. had set up vocational schools along with ordinary schools, in 1943, a proper system 
of vocational education would have been in position by the time it came to handing over 
control to a Libyan Government, or at least by the time Phase Two of the Libyanisation 
Programme commenced. As it was the B.M.A. at least bequeathed to the new Libyan 
Government a corps of skilled manpower which had been specially trained to replace British 
and Italian personnel.
Ibid
59 Ibid
60 Ibid
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Chapter Ten: Educational Training and Development - Vocational and
Agricultural
"For some time (the School of arts and Crafts) had tended to become a commercial concern, 
catering for a souvenir hunting public, rather than an educational institution meant for training 
young artisans." (*)
Under the British Administration, the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli eventually reverted 
to its original status and function before the reforms of the colonial era, more or less as it had 
been under the Turks. No attempt was made to develop it on modem lines or to set up a 
vocational training centre elsewhere, as had been done by the British Administration in 
Bengasi, for the teaching of modem vocational skills. The Italians had at least promised to 
import trained teachers of professional skills for the School of Arts and Crafts, though had 
largely neglected to do so, but under the B.M.A. the institution was largely neglected. Even 
the debate over the future of vocational education for Arabs in the territory which had been 
conducted in official circles during the early years of Fascism subsided under the B.M.A. with 
hardly a mention of the institution appearing in the official reports of the Administration.
Instead the B.M.A. decided to let the school go its own way under its own Administrative 
body which was constituted on purely traditional lines with the Department of Education 
exercising only nominal control over its functioning. Indeed with Steele-Greig at the helm, the 
authorities were initially at least mainly content it could pay its own way, through the sale of 
souvenirs to Allied servicemen. What educational activity there was at the School both before 
its reversal to its traditional role was confined to the school itself, at which teaching would 
have been related to that of a normal general education, such as was already provided in the 
existing school of the B.M.A. in the territory. In addition, of course, skills had to be imparted 
and the teaching of craft, such as "pottery, leatherwork, carpentry, shoes and aluminium" (for 
the making of pots and pans) etc. etc. )
These skills would have to have been imparted by local craftsmen or by former boys, 
working at the school, rather than foreign teachers who would not have been employed for 
such low grade work. Any attempt to return the school to what it had been under the Italians, a 
Vocational Centre, but this time for Moslem Arabs, either did not occur to the B.M.A. or was 
rejected by Steele-Greig and Blackley. Nor is there any evidence that the school gave up its 
traditional role in favour of becoming a Vocational Training Centre for Libyan artisans during 
the immediate post-independence period. Vocational training, when it came to Tripolitania, 
would require the establishment of a different set of schools especially designed for such a
* B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1945, p.35
1 Steele-greig, Op. Cit, P.42
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purpose, and with a new body of teachers, who had been trained in the requirements of 
technical and vocational education.
The reason why the vocational training was never developed on any scale in Tripolitania 
under the B.M.A. was basically because it was not regarded as either compatible with the 
B.M.A.'s mandate, since it had never been offered to them by the Italians, and also because all 
such essential training was covered by the Libyanisation projects, already referred to. 
Vocational education for Libyans had not been regarded as essential for Libyans C2 ) under the 
defunct colonial regime, because the colonists argued it would only bring them into 
competition with "metropolitani"; but would also defeat one of the main objectives for building 
a colonial empire namely to provide lands, homes and employment for Italy's excess 
population on the "Fourth Shore". By training Libyans in arts and crafts associated with their 
history and culture, Italy was helping them benefit from the peace and prosperity provided by 
the colonial authorities in their own country. Propaganda apart however, considerable 
prosperity had been created in and around the environs of Tripoli and in the country generally 
by the "vast military expenditure" which characterised the years of Fascism and this enriched 
both Arab and Italian. (3 )
Under British Rule, such expenditure had come to an end and "Italian subsidies, building 
programmes and tourist traffic were all swept away leaving the country to exist on its own 
resources" with the result that unemployment increased and the territory became increasingly 
"poverty stricken". (4 ) Under such circumstances, and given that "80% of the Libyan 
population is engaged in agriculture and animal husbandry" (5 ), there seemed little justification 
for the B.M.A. to go about trying to set up vocational schools, even with adequate resources 
which it didn't possess. This, however, is not to deny that educational programmes were 
needed, including training in light industry, handicrafts and agriculture. (6 )
1 Vocational Education
Before the development of educational programmes, designed to benefit light industry, 
handicrafts and agriculture, there was the fundamental problem of illiteracy to deal with 
especially in the countryside and non-urban areas where educational facilities were either slight 
or non-existent. This had been unanimously agreed by a Commission of Experts who had 
visited the country in 1951 and had determined that "there must be a solid foundation of 
general education". New educational programmes were required to deal with endemic problem 
of "illiteracy" which the B.M.A. had already attempted to affect in the East and West of the
2 See, Supra, Italian Policies, pp. 206-217
3 Sandison, Op.Cit., p.94
4 Ibid
3 Higgins, O p.C it, p. 10
6 Ibid., p i3
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Country, including "improved facilities for elementary education and a general development of 
Libyan minds and bodies, must be among the top priority projects in any plan for the economic 
and social development of the country". (7 )
By the end of British Occupation in 1950, while still burdened with this tremendous 
illiteracy problem that would take decades to solve, if indeed it could or would be solved at all, 
since all prognostications depended upon the change of social and cultural attitudes, and the 
allocation of precious resources in money buildings and manpower which as always were 
required for other as pressing projects, Tripolitania was in certainly in a better educational 
condition than at the start of that occupation in 1943. It is also clear that for the country as a 
whole to benefit from more specialised education, such as vocational schools, these should be 
designed to initially fit in with more general patterns of education at the elementary level. By 
the end of the British Occupation more specialised vocational and technical education had 
already been established in Tripoli but this was at a more specialised level than was required in 
the country as a whole. (8 )
Unable to formulate a policy of vocational education for the country as a whole the B.M.A. 
had instead attempted to develop points of excellence to provide a few skilled artisans and 
technicians to deal with particular demands only. This was probably all the B.M. A. could hope 
to achieve in the circumstances of its mandate, and indeed the sorry state of the Libyan 
economy by the end of that mandate, required very few numbers of technical and skilled 
personnel to run it. These were primarily needed to replace the non-Libyan personnel, then in 
the "key posts" in order to achieve the "real economic independence" that the nationalists 
required. (9 )
For this purpose, the new Ministry of Education, in co-operation with UNESCO and with 
the assistance of the Ministry of Public Works Department, set up in Tripoli a centre for the 
administrative and technical training of future employees and workers in the government 
service. (10)
This organisation not only filled an empty space left by the B.M.A., which as has been 
noted had done little or nothing until the end of its administration to facilitate vocational 
education and technical training, but also emphasised the importance now being placed in post- 
B.M.A. Libya on this aspect of development. The B.M.A.'s contribution had been to set up 
the Technical Commercial School and also go ahead with its Libyanisation Programmes which 
had been a select form of vocational education. (n  )
The setting up of the Technical Commercial School was a must because without it 
"vocational training" could not have been effectively established, beyond the sphere of
1 Ibid., p. 13
8 Le Toumeau, p.60
9 Ibid, p.66 also, see supra, pp.253-266
See, supra, Libyanisation, pp.253-266
Le Toumeau, Op.cit., p.69
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agricultural activity. This was observed by Le Toumeau in 1951 since the former "to a very 
large extent” depends "on the link between primary education and technical training". (12) "So 
long", he adds "as the young people leaving the primary schools have not reached a sufficient 
level of general education, or been instructed in technical training" (13) The most the B.M. A. 
could do in these circumstances was to have adopted the temporary solution, known as 
Libyanisation, which as has been shown was fine, as far as the specific requirements of the 
Administration was concerned, in so far as it produced a body of trained native personnel to 
take over from the other employees; but did not solve the problem referred to by Le Toumeau, 
which rightly became a number one priority for the government in 1951.
II Agriculture
"Agricultural improvement in Libya is a long-term project, and its success requires new 
attitudes and skills among the future farmers of the nation." (*)
As Claudio Segre writes, "The Italian dream of creating a fourth shore in Libya reached its 
peak in 1940. The w ar," he adds, "prevented any further settlement and seriously disrupted 
the programme of agricultural development." (14) Even so, Tripolitania, "remained the home 
of an Italian community of nearly fifty thousand during the early post-war years." (15)
Not surprisingly, therefore, the Italian government was concerned to either re-establish it 
sovereignty over Tripolitania (Cyrenaica had been vacated entirely by Italian colonists); or at 
least maintain some form of indirect control. The failure of Italy to regain control over her 
former province of Tripolitania was largely due to the back-lash of Arab sentiment against a 
country that had ruled them for over thirty years. The situation is well summed up in Segre’s 
remarks that "For nearly thirty years the colonists had defended their creation as best they 
could. But were no longer masters of Libya, and without Italian political control, the 
colonisation rested on treacherous foundations." (16)
Yet despite this apparent fact, the Italian agricultural settlements, or at least the farms which 
they comprised had nearly another 30 years still to run before their Italian resident-owners 
were expropriated and expelled from Libya in summer of 1970. (17) By this time, however, 
the number of actual Italian tenants of farms in Tripolitania would have been greatly 
diminished as properties were one by one sold off or part exchanged to Libyan owners.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Le Toumeau, Op.cit., see III. Training in Agriculture, p.78
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid
17 Ibid
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In the early days of the B.M.A., however, while most of the country was farmed if not 
owned by Libyans, "The demographic villages and private concessions employed between a 
third and a quarter of Italians remaining in Libya" or around 16,000 farm workers, (18 ) It is 
clear therefore, that even at this stage the Libyans comprised by far the majority of those 
employed in agriculture in the territory which from the point of view of employment was 
indeed Libya's predominant industry. (19 )
As late as 1964, agriculture provided a livelihood for over 70% of the population, but at 
the time of the British Occupation, the figure was more than 80% and about a quarter of the 
gross national product. (20) These proportions therefore for the period under review (19442- 
1952) would have remained fairly constant after which they began to decline. Prom then on, in 
the middle sixties, the industry with the most rapid growth was petroleum. (21)
The importance therefore of following educational projects with an agricultural dimension 
as early as possible for Libyans should not have needed to be emphasised. It was nonetheless 
not until 1951 that the first social and economic development plans for Libya were drawn up. 
(22). It need not also be emphasised that the responsibility for such plans, while falling to 
government were not part of the B.M.A.'s mandate, which deriving from International Law 
had neither the authority, manpower or finance to institute new policies, however vital for the 
well being of the country, merely preserve things as they had been under the pervious regime, 
until a legitimately constituted government authority came along to replace it.
In fact this was part of the tragedy, given that the essential conditions of the territory had 
not developed between the start of the Occupation in 1942 and its phasing out, nearly a decade 
later. Unfortunately during this time the fabric of the country - building, roads, services, 
economy - had all deteriorated. This of course was not the fault of the Occupation which was 
neither intended or equipped to develop the territory or allow the territory to develop itself. As 
a caretaker administration it was obliged for the most part to stand aside until a legitimate 
solution for the future of the territory could be found; or indirectly implemented strategies 
determined by the government in London in line with British interests in the area.
The only people to really suffer from this situation were the people themselves who unlike 
their neighbours in Cyrenaica were unable to get on with the development of their country in 
accordance with their own intentions and desires. This stalemate is reflected in the failure 
under the B.M.A. to do more than marginally affected the following educational areas:
"a) the adoption of primary schools to include agricultural education:
l s Ibid
19 Educational Planning Mission to Libya, UNESCO, Paris, 1953, p. 10
20 Ibid
21 Ibid, pp. 10-11
22 Ibid
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b) the organisation of two agricultural training centres for training rural teachers and 
practical agriculturists;
c) the establishing of twenty-five scholarships for higher studies abroad which cannot be 
pursued in Libya." (23 )
Although all three of these points have absolute relevance as far as the development of the 
country is concerned in a most vital area, the "adoption of primary schools to include 
agricultural education" is perhaps the most important in order of priority, especially for a 
country like Libya, where agriculture is the dominant industry for most of population. This of 
course had been recognised by the Italians too, but as with many of their ideas, so good in 
theory, but never put into practice for the Arabs except perhaps in a very minimalist sense, if at 
all.
In 1953, however, it was a case of actions speaking louder than words as so much tie 
remained to be made up - and time was a shortage commodity for Libya. Experts in 
agricultural matters determined that special material would have to be devised for class-room 
and practical instruction (24), something which the B.M. A. had not possessed the expertise 
deal with, though it had successfully coped with a succession of the severest famines in the 
country's history between 1946 and 1948. Certainly Steele-Greig had not had at his disposal, 
the "four experts" required to draw up a relevant programme of agricultural education for the 
country in 1943, and nothing remained of relevance to schools in these areas from Italian 
times either.
Unfortunately, the refusal of the Administration to adopt the Egyptian curriculum in 1943 
or during the early years of the Occupation may at this point have compounded the B.M.A.'s 
worst error or omission with the failure to develop elementary schools in the countryside with 
an agricultural bias. The final adoption of the Egyptian Curriculum while rectifying errors of 
judgement and omissions from an earlier phase, also in 1948 enabled educational materials 
produced in Egypt to be used in schools in Libya. Now, however, it was a case of more hurry 
less speed as these materials, while dealing with agriculture of relevance to Egyptian 
conditions, did not contain material that suited agricultural conditions in Libya. C25 ) as has 
been noted the problem still hadn't been rectified when Tripolitania became independent with 
the result that even as late as the mid-fifties suitable agricultural material had not been devised 
for use in the primary schools.
It would be extraordinary, however, if in the long period of Italian rule and the intervening 
British interregnum some ideas had not been discussed and even put into practice to the benefit
23 United Nations Assistance Program, Op.cit., p. 130
24 Le Toumeau, Op.cit., p.79
25 Ibid p.78
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of the Libyan population in agriculture. At its simplest level, rural education as conceived in 
terms of placing at the disposal of students agricultural plots together with simple tools, such 
as hoes, spades, etc., etc. had several times been proposed. (26 ) Micacchi in 1919 in his 
Report to the Ministry of Colonies had proposed the idea, which at least had the merit of being 
cheap and easy to implement, along with many other much more expensive schemes, related to 
Arab education. In this case it was put into practice at the School of Arts and Crafts in 1932.
(27)
In 1932 the orphans from the School of Arts and Crafts, attended an agricultural course at 
the primary level in buildings and estates of the former for of Sidi-Bilal and later transferred to 
the Sidi-Mesri district, "where land and buildings were provided for 40 boarding students".
(28 ) This agricultural annex appears, almost miraculously, to have survived until 1943, when 
it was closed down - presumably by the British - under what circumstances is not known, 
except that it was not re-opened again.
Steele Greig did make an attempt, with Blackley's approval, towards the end of 1946 to 
provide agricultural training for about 20 young Libyans between the ages of 13 and 18. 
Unfortunately, the effort ended in fiasco when the previously enthusiastic trainees, on being 
given overalls and told to get ready for sowing suddenly became extremely reluctant, downing 
tools and saying that they were "students and not common workers". (29) This incident which 
perhaps well illustrates the assertive attitude of ordinary Libyans at the time, following 30 
years of economic, educational and political repression, is perhaps explained by their new 
attitude and expectationism in this era of transition, when those who took education seriously 
expected middle-class type occupations as a result of it. More, one might add, than similar 
students today might reasonably expect from completing their courses!
Light is shed on the closure of the School of Arts and Crafts Agricultural Annex in 1943, 
by the opening in the same year of the same premises at Sidi-Mesri to a number of psychiatric 
military patients, who were undergoing a course of rehabilitation involving the practice of 
simple animal husbandry, crop husbandry, poultry keeping, fruit and vegetable production 
under British N.C.O.'s and Educational Leaders. (30 )
Unfortunately, there is no detailed evidence of the rural schools, opened increasingly in 
country and agricultural areas after 1943 by the B.M.A., though it is clear that they were not 
part of a conceited attempt, such as occurred following the adoption of the Egyptian 
Curriculum in 1948 and would have therefore without any rigorous theoretical or practical 
elements as far as agriculture was concerned, though some might have plots set up at local 
instigation. The main aim at this level should have been the teaching of new skills and
26 Ibid
27 Ibid p.80
28 Ibid
29 Steele-Greig to Appleton, 1st May 1983
30 B.M.A. Tripolitania, 1943.
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awareness to pupils at the elementary stage, so that when they themselves became responsible 
for the management of their own farms, they might break free from the “archaic agricultural 
environment which has made their parents content with current methods of agriculture." (31) 
There is no evidence that these goals were set out or at any point achieved.
The second aim of the plan, the “organisation of two agricultural training centres for training 
rural teachers and practical agricuturalists”, along with “the establishing of twenty five 
scholarships for higher studies abroad, which cannot be pursued in Libya” could only come at 
the end of a period of development rather than at its commencement It was not possible to 
bring about either of these aims under the B.M.A. although some progress was made in this 
direction in Cyrenaica. (32)
Instead, the Agricultural Institute at Sidi-Mersri, originally established by the last Turkish 
Governor of Tripolitania, Ibrahim Pasha in 1910, and extended and developed by the Italians 
after 1922, remained an Agricultural Experimental Centre, organised and managed by British 
and Italian personnel, but without any form of teaching commitment. (33 )
By the end therefore of the B.M.A.’s decade in Tripolitania, agricultural education needed 
to be developed boys as an integral part of the primary system of schools and also along with 
technical and commercial education. A Training Centre, Le Toumeau advised in 1951, should 
be set up at the Experimental Centre of Sidi-Mesri, an idea which shortly materialised. The 
training however, of rural teachers, he regarded as a “long term” business, despite the urgent 
need for such teachers in the system. In the meantime “short term” measures should be 
adopted including the training of teachers on special courses at the Sidi-Mesri Institute, f34)
III Comparison with Cyrenaica
Despite possessing the historic School of Arts and Crafts with its legacy from Italian times of 
well equipped machine workshops, Tripolitania under the B.M.A. lacked any definite 
commitment - other than through “Libyanisation” - to vocational education as such. On the one 
hand, International Law did not require the B.M.A. to pursue policies, such vocational 
education which had not been adopted by the Italians; on the other hand, the eleemosynary 
character of the school, meant in practice that its facilities could only be used by accredited 
orphans or by children from “very poor families”. The latter presented a loop-hole which the 
B.M.A. could have exploited had it so wished in order to develop the school as a Vocational
31 Le Toumeau, Op.cit., p.78
32 See Le Toumeau, Op.cit.,
33 Le Toumeau, O p .c i tp.80
34 /bid p.8
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Training Centre, ostensibly for the poor of Tripoli and its environs, but as the Italians had not 
done so, the B.M.A. had no obligation in International Law to do so either.
Instead the B.M.A. quite correctly allowed the school, which had been placed under the 
control of its own director and governing board, to revert to the policies adopted in Italian and 
even Turkish times. The Italians had of course made extensive use of the workshops, which 
they refitted, for their own nationals. This had been stopped by the B.M.A. and the school 
continued as an orphanage also training boys as potters, carpet weavers, silversmiths or 
producers of items for the tourist industry until this was stopped. The curriculum, however, 
differed little from that followed in Turkish times and no up-dating of it occurred under the 
B.M.A.
The criticism against this reversion to past policies - however legitimate in terms of Islamic 
and International Law - took the view that at a time of transition and great uncertainty in the 
history of the territory, vital opportunities were being lost, as far as the education and training 
of the future workforce of the country was concerned. In the only place where this kind of 
training had and could be given, instead of producing local mechanics, bricklayers, carpenters, 
plumbers and automobile technicians, the school was producing specialists in traditional arts 
and craft but little more on a serious scale.
Cyrenaica, on the other hand, while lacking a School of Arts and Crafts on the model of 
Tripoli, had embraced vocational education and training programmes by adopting in 1943, the 
Egyptian Curriculum, as has been noted, this did not occur in Tripolitania until 1948 and even 
then the course books were unsuitable for the territory. Thus from 1943 onwards, the schools 
of Cyrenaica had a school system fully related to vocational education and training. One of the 
many advantages of this arrangement was that candidates from Bengazi, Dema, Barce, 
Agedabia and Apollonia, following the completion of a six-year elementary education, could 
then pass on to commence either study at the government secondary schools, schools of 
agriculture, arts and crafts or trade schools. Needless to say this range of choice was not 
available in Tripolitania until the mid-fifties, despite the Egyptian Curriculum having been 
endorsed in 1948. Even in Cyrenaica, the secondary tier was not fully established in 1946, but 
plans had been laid to send 30 boys to Egypt for technical training in that year. (35 )
The absence of trade schools in Cyrenaica does not appear to have unduly hampered the 
training of apprentices there, who if not sent on courses of technical education in Egypt, 
underwent training at the Public Works Department or Transport Department until such 
schools could be established in the territory. (36) This method for training apprentices, in the 
absence of trade schools, was never adopted in Tripolitania, apart from the Libyanisation 
Programme, which involved allocating selected candidates to the various departments of the 
Administration for subsequent education and training with future employment in mind. No
35 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1945, p.5
36 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1946, p.7
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doubt, the fact that elementary education, except in an extremely superficial sense, meant that 
there was no subsequent demand for such training, until 1952 when candidates would have 
been available for the new Technical Commercial School and Agricultural Centre, following 
the adoption of the Egyptian Curriculum in 1948.
The sending of trainees to Egypt was only intended in Bengasi as a temporary measure, as 
a Trade School was to have been opened at Bengasi in 1947, but was delayed until 2nd April 
1949 when it was finally opened with a staff of 1 headmaster from Palestine, 6 teachers and a 
role-call of 53 boys. (37) This school was the exact counterpart of its equivalent in Egypt; but 
would have no counterpart in Tripolitania until the mid-fifties. As such, it pursued the 
curriculum of primary education, which allowed sufficient time for additional studies, such as 
mechanics, carpentry, weaving or leather work, with the option of introducing the students to 
further trade skills at a later date, since the school was expected to be popular in the region due 
to the scarcity of tradesmen or similar training. (38 )
Known subsequently in Bengasi as the Technical School, it cost £3000 to fit out, and was 
situated at Sidi husein. As such, it was fairly well equipped with 12 fitted workbenches and 
various kinds of equipment^39). Obviously the chief problem with technical education was 
the cost of the equipment which in Tripoli had meant that the practical classes had to be carried 
out for some time still to come in the workshops of the Administration, i40)
Agricultural education and training should have been much less of a problem to introduce 
into the school system both in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania since it required a possibly lower 
level of expertise and little if any expensive equipment. This point was made in the latter part 
of 1951 by Professor Benjamin Higgins, who visited Libya at this time in company wit h i8 
other specialists. According to Higgins, “Agricultural training is partly a matter of including 
bias into regular instruction in primary schools, partly a matter of including a certain amount of 
practical instruction in agriculture by means of school gardens, and partly a matter of 
establishing agricultural training centres.” (41)
Coming at the end of the B.M.A.’s decade, Higgin’s policy statement upon agricultural 
education was clearly too late to be implemented; or have any effect upon the policy of the 
outgoing Administration; but not for the new government of Libya whose task it now was to 
implement the Egyptian Curriculum (now the “National Curriculum”). The B.M.A.’s policy in 
1943 was more influenced by what Italians had done than what they hadn’t done, but needed 
to have done, if Libya was to develop into a modem society. While not wishing to turn the 
clock back too much, the B.M.A. had also no deep seated desire to turn it too far forward
37 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1949, p. 16
38 Ibid
39 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1949, p.16
40 Le Toumeau, Op.cit., See II Technical Training for Industry, p.66
41 Professor B. Higgins, Education and the Economic and Social Development of Libya, Report of the Mission to 
Libya, Op.cit., p. 15
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either. To have done the latter would have required more money and manpower than was 
available for running Tripolitania on a budget of Care and Maintenance which was all 
International Law required of it. As has already been noted in the previous section on 
agriculture, the Italians opened an Annex at Sidi-Bilal in 1932, later transferred to Sidi-Mesri, 
where land and building was acquired for 40 students. Having discontinued this undertaking 
in 1943, maybe Blackley felt obliged under International Law to restart it, this time under the 
Chief Agricultural Officer of the Administration, with 20 students in 1944, and the help of a 
specialist from the Sudan. The failure of the operation, recounted elsewhere (42) need not 
referred to again, save to add it was not restarted, at least under the B.M.A. (43 )
In Cyrenaica, the “agricultural bias” referred to by Professor Higgins in his policy 
document of 1952, had already been appraised by the B.M.A. at the start of its Administration 
in 1943. Practical instruction by means of school gardens had already been implemented and 
eventually the establishment of a training centre was also achieved. At the elementary levels in 
village schools, a four-year course, designed to meet rural needs was the universal standard. 
Moreover, “where possible gardening is a school activity and at Gerdis, Gubba, Cyrene and 
Apollonia, large plots have been secured for the use of the boys. In March, a professional 
gardener was appointed as instructor, he travels about the territory spending about a month a 
time at each school he visits.” C*4 ) The importance of acquiring plots was emphasised by Le 
Toumeau - “ In order to carry out the practical side of school education, a garden plot at the 
disposal of the students must be provided together with simple agricultural tools such as hoes, 
spades, etc. Where programmes of this nature,” he added, “ have been introduced in other 
parts of the world, they have usually received the endorsement of the rural population.” (45) 
Regarding the third criteria, the establishing of an agricultural centre for the training of 
future farmers, this was promised by the Administration for early 1949. (46 ) It was not, 
however, until October 1950 that the Magdalen School of Agriculture was set up in Cyrenaica. 
The school planned to offer a three year course composed of theoretical and practical 
instruction in agricultural subjects for students who had completed primary education. (47) 
During 1951, its initial year, this school “provided first year courses consisting of two 
sections, one of 17 regular pupils and another of 19 government workers, for a special 
intensive course on agriculture. For 1952 a regular attendance of 15 pupils for second year 
courses and thirty recruits in the first year was expected.” (48)
42 See supra, p. 242
43 Steele-Greig to Appleton, Barbados, 1st May, 1983
44 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1945, p.5
45 Le Toumeau, Op.cit., p.79
46 B.M.A. Cyrenaica, 1948, p.8
47 Le Toumeau, Op.cit., Agricultural Education, p.80
48 Le Toumeau, Op.cit., p.80
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The “scarcity of people trained in agriculture”, concluded Le Toumeau, “is undoubtedly 
one of the most formidable obstacles confronting any effort aimed at the development of the 
country’s agricultural resources.” (49) As far as the future was concerned, with the opening of 
new Agricultural Training Centres at Sidi Mesri in Tripolitania and the Magdalen School in 
Cyrenaica, provided personnel were forthcoming, the prospect looked brighter for Libyan 
agriculture than at any point previously. (50)
49 Ibid., p.80
50 Ibid , p.82
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C hapter Eleven: Conclusion
“ the first step worthy of great care is to unify the curriculum of education in the United
Kingdom of Libya on the Basis of the Egyptian Programmes and make its purpose clear and 
definite, that purpose being to create a good, fruitful generation, straightforward in its 
morality, organised in its thinking, believing in God and loyal to the fatherland....” (* )
Major A.J. Steele-Greig in the circumstances of 1943, as far as education was concerned in 
Tripolitania, appears as either the man with all the options available to him; or instead the 
creature of circumstances and political forces with few real options at all. However, as has 
been repeatedly emphasised throughout, he in fact did have options available to him of a 
limited nature which had to be interpreted in terms of International Law and not exceed the 
Care and Maintenance budget allocated to education.
According to this brief, he was called upon to devise educational policies - or at least strategies 
- that made sense of and by and large maintained in being the legacy for Arabs, Italians and 
Jews of his colonial predecessors. To satisfy the changed circumstances emerging following 
the Axis defeat in Libya, the various accretions of Fascism were purged from the educational 
system, adding whatever else might be required to satisfy the requirements of the British 
mandate. Under no circumstances, was anything of a revolutionary or extreme reactionary 
nature to be allowed though there was pressure for both from both Arab and Italian sources. 
Therefore, within these limited constraints, sufficient scope existed for Steele-Greig to put his 
own stamp upon the development process in a way that would certainly affect the evolution of 
human resources long after the B.M.A. was over.
It has never been clear, whether Steele-Greig ever sat down and thought out the 
possibilities inherent in his situation on a systematic basis, or simply went ahead on a day-to- 
day basis, mustering whatever advice and support he could obtain, in the hope that it would all 
work out for the best in the end. Of course, it was far from clear what that end would be, 
especially in the circumstances of 1943 when he was first offered his position as Director of 
Education for Tripolitania by the then Chief Administrator, Brigadier Maurice Lush. Closely 
associated with these considerations is the question of whether he can in retrospect be seen as a 
reformer of education in Libya; or as the founder of post-colonial education for Arabs in the 
country?
As the latter question cannot be answered without a survey of Steele-Greig’s achievement 
in Libya, it is better to attempt to deal with the first question first - was he in any sense an
* Higgins, Op.ciL, "Speech from the Throne" report on Libya, p. 14
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educational reformer? To qualify for such status, Steele-Greig would have had to radically 
resolve the dilemma facing him in some way so as to utilise all the existing resources for the 
benefit of all the children of the territory whether Arab, Italian or Jew. As it was all the 
resources were in the hands of the Italian minority and had been for thirty years. If those 
resources were to be fully utilised, it would require that a new system of education was created 
for the territory in which all children were given an equal chance to succeed. This would 
indeed have been a radical step and if embarked upon with energy, enthusiasm and resources 
might well have created a new Libya.
Unfortunately, as has been repeatedly shown, the B.M.A. was not a reforming 
organisation as such, and even if it had possessed the necessary ideas and resources, the 
practical problems inherent in such a project would have been immense. Also, from what we 
know of Steele-Greig as a man such a course of action would have had no appeal to him, even 
while persisting that he had all the options open to him and could have decided in 1943 to go in 
whatever direction he chose. (1/a)
In fact when it came to the subject of choice he was like all other administrators belonging 
to the B.M.A. guided by International Law and Care and Maintenance for most of his time as 
Director of Education. This in practical terms meant working within terms of the existing 
educational settlement in Tripolitania. Arab, Italian and Jewish schools were to be maintained 
exactly as they could be handed over to whatever government or regime legally arrived in the 
territory following the termination of the British Administration. Whatever options Steele- 
Greig had to exercise would have had to have been within terms of this existing settlement.
Unfortunately, as has been shown throughout this thesis, whereas the Italian and Jewish 
educational settlements were static or declining, the educational situation for Arabs was in 
constant crisis and had been for the last thirty or more years extending not only throughout the 
Italian period but into Ottoman times as well, with the Ottomans doing as little to resolve it as 
their Italian successors. Neither International Law of Care and Maintenance were sufficiently 
elastic to contain effectively the cultural, religious and racial contours of the problem as both 
Steele-Greig and the B.M.A. were to experience during the whole of this interregnum. 
Therefore both Steele-Greig and his superiors had indeed no option but to devise new policies 
and solutions to a continuing or recurring crisis or problem, a situation not foreseen by the 
original devisors of Military Administrations following the end of the 1914-1918 World War 
upon which precedents the Military Administrations in ex-Italian Africa were based.
It is in reaction to this problem that both Steel-Greig and indeed the British Government of 
the day must be judged, as far as the setting up of adequate provision for Arabs in the territory 
was concerned, and given the adoption of the Egyptian Curriculum for Arabs in 1943 was not 
deemed admissible, whatever alternative produced by the Administration. In this respect it
ly,a Steele-Greig to Appleton, interview Barbados, West Indies, Dec/Jan 1981-1982. See infra, p.314
181
seems clear in retrospect that Steele-Greig was chosen for the job of Director of Education 
because an Italian-type solution to the problem was considered to be the most appropriate, as 
in all likelihood Tripolitania would at some future point be returned to the Italian flag.
In these circumstances Steele-Greig’s approach to the question of Arab Education does not 
seem as bizarre and irrational as might at first be concluded and he should not be blamed for 
policies resulting from political decisions beyond his control. Also, when pro-Italian policy 
changed after 1946, once it had become clear that Tripolitania was less likely to be returned to 
Italian sovereignty, the failure to replace Steele-Greig with a suitable substitute to carry out the 
pro-Senusi policies in Education only served to aggravate the already profound dilemma. Once 
this is clear it is easier to assess both Steele-Greig the administrator and the policies which 
were in effect put forward by the B.M.A. to resolve what was a very old problem in the 
territory, which in the change of regimes entered into its terminal phase.
In devising policies that would suit the Italian minority and a future democratic government 
in Italy Steele-Greig was obliged to become an expert in ideas, policies and methods already 
put forward by former colonial administrators in Libya. In understanding and interpreting his 
role in post-Fascist Libya he was advised and helped by the superintendent of Italian Schools 
Cav. Fulvio Contini, who was undoubtedly immensely knowledgeable and experienced in the 
management of education in the country. Unfortunately, the Italian experience in Libya with 
regard to Arabs had been a disaster and the Educational ideas and methods of the past offered 
little or no solution to the present and the future. It must have been a very difficult and 
confusing time for the new Director of Education and it is likely that he really only began to 
find his feet by 1945.
By this time Steele-Greig had come to realise that the old Italian ideas for Arabs would not 
work but he could not dispense with them entirely. Rational solutions, such as modelling the 
Tripolitanian schools upon those of the French colonies in North Africa had been deemed 
unworkable in Libya even before the Fascist era began. In the circumstances of the B.M.A. 
they were similarly unworkable, and Steele-Greig was largely left with the Italo-Arab school, 
which the Italians had devised as an alternative to the Franco-Arab schools of Morocco, 
Tunisia and Algeria. The object of these schools had been to secure the collaboration of the 
indigenous population for the colonial regime. Unable to draw upon resources of Arab 
teachers and school materials in Arabic, Steele-Geig was unable to really phase them out until 
after 1946. Instead, he made the claim that the “new Arab schools” had been put onto the 
“British Curriculum” which was a nonsense and only emphasises the impossibility of the 
situation into which the authorities had placed him.
Unable to adopt the Egyptian Curriculum, which would have solved the problem of school 
textbooks, examinations and teacher supply. Steele-Greig was similarly unable to adopt the 
British Curriculum except in name, though for reasons of propaganda, he claimed in both his 
Histories of Education in Tripolitania to have so done. For the latter claim to have made any
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sense would, however, have involved even more of an upheaval in the country than the idea of 
setting up a single system of education for all races, religions, languages and cultures.
Instead a “modus vivendi” was operated in practice as a way out of the impasse until the 
final adoption of the Egyptian Curriculum in 1948. Trial and error was presented as the way 
forward in the early days as the former Italo-Arab schools struggled to adapt to a post-colonial 
era. This involved, at least initially, having to make do with school materials and textbooks 
drawn up for the former colonial schools. Employment of teachers who were either untrained 
and poorly educated unless they had worked alongside Italian teachers in the former Italo-Arab 
schools. Use of syllabuses and examinations which bore no relation to those currendy in use 
elsewhere in the Arab world. It was no wonder that by 1948 administrators despaired of a 
situation in which most of the mistakes had been committed in an earlier period and the 
adoption of the Egyptian Curriculum was like starting afresh. Yet by this time there were more 
schools open for Arabs in the territory than ever before and in this sense the earlier years had at 
least established a base upon which future generations could build. It is unfortunate that 
political factors in the earlier phase prevented Tripolitania from receiving a similar deal to 
Cyrenaica. Also that reform when it came was too late to produce the improvements required 
in time for independence, the B.M.A. having by this time run out time and steam.
I. Elementary Education
“ the educational and cultural level of Libya is extremely low. It is out of the question,
therefore, to train up at the outset an elite able to cater for all the country’s needs. Provision 
will have to be made at several stages, before an educational system suited to the country’s 
needs and potentialities can come fully into operation.” (*)
Le Toumeau’s observations in 1951 were based upon what he could see of the educational 
system then in existence after nearly a decade of military rule. He therefore knew nothing of its 
emergence in 1942 or subsequent mutations, his approval of what he saw must be understood 
in this light and was summed up by him as follows: “it would appear unnecessary to make any 
radical changes in the basic structure of the educational system during the next few years; but 
its framework i.e. the teaching staff, should be strengthened and improved both in quality and 
quantity.” (! ) These remarks therefore referred directly to the reforms, which Steele-Greig had 
done his utmost to prevent and resulting in the final adopting of the Egyptian System, not to 
what had existed before this event of which he knew virtually nothing. (2 )
The B.M.A., however, had not neglected its responsibilities towards education, but merely 
pursued policies not intended to lead directly to national independence and here lies the
1 Ibid
2 Ibid, p. 19
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difference between developments in Cyrenaica and those in Tripolitania. Hence Le Toumeu’s 
observations that there are elementary and primary schools in three provinces, secondary and 
technical girls’ schools and teachers training centres underlies the former point. (3 ) Moreover, 
the Libyans while enthusiastic for official education under the B.M.A. had shunned such 
efforts under the Italians. This enthusiasm for schooling, notes Le Toumeau, affected both 
children and parents, some children walking 12 kilometres to school with several villages 
asking for additional schools and classes. In Cyrenaica, on the other hand, boarding schools 
were in great demand. (4 ) though as has been noted not all parents approved of such 
institutions for their daughters at least. Thus by 1951 there were 244 schools, providing 
modem education to 32,928 pupils, against 50 schools catering for 6,637 Arabs for 1939-40, 
the last scholastic year of Italian rule. (5 ) These statistics speak volumes for what was 
achieved in education under the B.M.A. in Tripolitania, despite criticism of the limitations 
imposed by the political status quo, reflected in the nature of the curriculum adopted before 
1948.
Traditional schools, such as Kuttabs, existed throughout Libya but were treated separately 
by the authorities from the government schools and therefore cannot be considered here due to 
the absence of official statistics. Yet it is known that the four higher Kuttabs or medressa were 
attended by up to 800 pupils. (6 ) Neither do the figures appear to exist for the number of 
teachers - Arab or Italian - employed in the Italo-Arab schools prior to the British Occupation. 
Hence reliable comparisons cannot be made with more than 1,192 Libyans in official teacher- 
employment in the elementary schools at the end of British Rule. (7 )
On a wider comparison with Italian times, however, it is apparent that under the B.M.A. 
there was a five-fold increase in the number of teachers employed in the Arab schools. This 
was as important as the similar increase in the number of pupils being educated at the schools. 
Yet by far the most dramatic step was of course the eventual adoption of the Egyptian 
Curriculum. It is however, unlikely if this measure produced any immediate impact upon either 
the quality or quantity of education in Tripolitania. It must nonetheless have greatly facilitated 
the planning of education in the territory since it was now clear not only what the aim of the 
curriculum and schools should be but also the materials and types of examination required to 
produce a national standard of education that bore some correlation with what took place 
elsewhere in the Arab World and especially in Libya’s powerful neighbour, Egypt Certainly 
for the immediate future, Tripolitania was bound to drag behind Cyrenaica, where education 
had undoubtedly come on in leaps and bounds since Italian times under the B.M.A., due no
3 Ibid, p.31
4 Ibid, p.27
3 Le Toumeau, Op.cit., p. 19 and Contini, Op.cit., p.96
6 The "four higher schools" were Ahmed Pashaan Mezran in Tripoli: Sidi-al-Glam at Ziltem and Sidi Zarrugh, nr 
Misurata. Le Toumeau, Op.cit, p. 19
1 Ibid, p. 19
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doubt in part to the adoption of the Egyptian Curriculum, but also to superior efficiency and 
different political climate in the territory since 1943.
During 1950-51, the final year of the the syllabus operating in the schools had
two stages: “the first four years of elementary education when children learn to read, write 
count and express themselves with increasing clarity; and then the next two years - the fifth 
and sixth years, when the educational field is expanded to include history, geography, science 
and even a foreign language.” (8) Education under the B.M.A. had never been compulsory 
but under the Libyan Constitution, the first four years became compulsory and given the 
continuing shortage of teachers, it is likely that for a considerable time into the future, the first 
four years would have to suffice for the majority of Libyan children.
One way of partly resolving the latter problem which was put forward in 1950 was to 
provide facilities whereby these four years might be supplemented by “adult courses where 
the children can keep their knowledge alive - and even add to it. “This partial solution, 
however, was not intended to be other than temporary, the additional fifth and sixth year of 
education being seen as the real alternative where possible. (9 )
This situation was also noted Le Toumeau who states that the two main types of primary 
education were provided; schools with six classes, “some of which can be divided into several 
sections if there is a sufficient number of pupils” and, “incomplete schools containing a 
maximum of five classes.” (10) Unlike the situation in Cyrenaica, this Egyptian Syllabus had 
only been in operation for two years in Tripolitania when independence was declared and still 
had a long way to go before it was effectively established in the territory.
At the time of Independence, not even the city of Tripoli possessed even a single 
elementary school with the full six classes required by the Egyptian Curriculum, with the result 
that all the sixth-year pupils of the town were “grouped together in order to make the best and 
most economical use of available teachers.” Furthermore, although the B.M.A. had greatly 
increased the number of schools in operation since Italian times, very few new schools had 
been built, most being perforce set up in former Italian buildings, most notably former 
barracks, which must have been very cold and draughty in winter. (n  )
Unlike Cyrenaica, the adoption of the Egyptian Syllabus, initially by the B.M.A. in 
October, 1948 and then by the government of Libya on the declaration of independence in 
1950, (12 ) meant by no means the adoption of the entire Curriculum, but only those sections 
of it appertaining to the operation of Primary Schools, and even the latter was severely 
restricted as far as Tripolitania was concerned. (13 )
8 Le Toumeau, Op.cit., p.47
9 Ibid
10 Ibid, p.20
Ibid
12 Le Toumeau, Op.cit., p.20
13 See Appendicies
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The reasons for the partial adoption of the Egyptian Syllabus is not far to seek, and relates 
closely to the anti-Egyptian policy pursued by the B.M.A. in Tripolitania before independence. 
Le Toumeau lists the following modifications to the Egyptian Primary Curriculum as it was 
applied in Tripolitania after independence:
“1) In order not to have to employ foreign teachers, no foreign language is taught in the 
primary schools.
2) History and Geography teaching is focused on Libya, not on Egypt.” (14)
The textbooks to be used for this very abridged form of the Egyptian Curriculum, now 
referred to only as the “Syllabus” were Egyptian in origin, the B.M.A. having failed to 
develop satisfactory course books, despite considerable efforts to do so before 1948.
However, given the anxiety of the authorities to prevent Libyans focusing their attentions 
upon Egypt, no textbooks in history and geography were acquired as these were all too 
impregnated with revolutionary nationalism to be acceptable. Instead, teachers were told what 
to teach until suitable textbooks could be produced in Libya. (15 ) Otherwise, the so called 
“syllabus” was developed on the lines of the Egyptian Curriculum as it was practised in Egypt 
itself. This was particularly valuable in Libya when it came to teaching practical concerns like 
gardening or handicrafts - “according to childrens ages and circumstances” (16) Infusions of 
Egyptian politics and culture therefore were closely controlled by the authorities after 
Independence as before.
Fear of Egypt in this way continued to beset the new government of Libya as it had its 
predecessors, a trend that again continued to have a deleterious effect upon the conduct of 
educational developments within the country as a whole, since because of it few if any 
Egyptian teachers could be employed in the schools. In this financial factors undoubtedly 
played a part as much as educational policy was still dictated in terms of financial stringency 
and there was little alternative but to recruit Egyptian teachers for Vocational and Secondary 
Education.
Moreover, it rapidly became clear that the development of a country like Libya was not 
possible without considerable dependence upon the Arab neighbour, Egypt regardless of 
political developments in that country. Hence by 1964 there were 825 Egyptian teachers in the 
schools and many young Libyans undergoing training in Egypt itself. The trend was foreseen 
with the signing of special educational concordat with Egypt 1954 “under which Egypt would
14 Le Toumeau, Op.cit., p.21
15 Ibid
16 Ibid
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co-operate in developing Libyan education by sending teachers and books” as well as 
supervising and correcting some high school examinations. (17 )
It is difficult to say what the political effects of this ever closer association with Egypt were 
to have upon the fledgling state at its most impressionable early phase but they must have been 
considerable. Thus at the same time that the new state was acquiring an “urban class of 
bureaucrats, civil servants and businessmen,” the education of such elites were almost 
exclusively in the hands of Egyptian teachers who dominated the new educational system 
especially at the secondary level. Thus young and impressionable Libyans were “going in 
increasing numbers to the new secondary schools and collages, where they under the Nasserite 
guidance of their many Egyptian teachers.” (18)
This was certainly a situation which both the Italian regime from its initial inception in 
1911 and the B.M.A. throughout its decade-long interregnum had foreseen occurring, though 
not perhaps in quite the same form as it was to transpire, and had done everything within their 
power to prevent ever materialising in the country but to no avail.
Such is the logic of history, unwittingly, if unavoidably sanctioned by the B.M.A. in 
1943, when it had sought to change the curriculum, however ineffectively from what it had 
been in Italian times, into an exclusively Arabic language syllabus, concocted by an 
inexperienced former prep-school master now Director of Education for Tripolitania. This 
change to a curriculum at a time when especially from 1946 onwards it had become 
increasingly clear, that the B.M.A. would have to “soldier on” for considerably longer than 
had been originally anticipated in 1942, exacerbated many problems with which the B.M.A. 
had not been designed to deal.
The supply of suitably qualified Arab teachers was hopelessly inadequate for the task of 
teaching the Egyptian Curriculum - another problem with deep historical roots in the territory 
and with which Steele-Greig had ineffectually wrestled before having to succumb to the 
inevitable. Thus despite organising a training section for teachers at the Libyan secondary 
school, which in October 1950 was transferred Sidi-Mesri (subsequently the original site of 
the Faculty of the University of Tripoli), the supply of teachers was completely inadequate for 
the needs of the country.
As a temporary solution to this problem, the new government had no alternative but to 
employ young Libyans, barely out of elementary school to work as teachers. This was the 
situation until 1958 when “black gold” was finally discovered in the country, the panacea that 
would change everything. (19 ) Ironically this only served to reduce the supply of native 
Libyan teachers still further as the new graduates of the elementary schools rushed to enter the
17 J. Wright, Libya, A Modern History, London, 1974, p.94
18 S.A. Hajjajy, The New Libya, Tripoli, 1967, p.84
19 Wright, Op.cit., p. 101
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nascent petroleum industry: and increase the educational dependence upon Egypt as more and 
more Egyptian teachers were needed to fill their places in the schools.
In the meantime, the international advisors and educational experts, offered solutions, 
which while apparently plausible on paper stood little chance of ever being implemented in 
practice, as teachers were in short supply and sufficient cash was still unavailable. Le 
Toumeau in 1951 paints a somewhat depressing picture of the state of teaching and the 
shortage of teachers in the schools, but is unable to offer any remedy other than advice for the 
“long-term”.
In the “short-term”, he advises “consolidation” and “better use” of existing resources.
“Any extravagance, anything unnecessary must be severely shunned,” he urges, “these must 
be the watchwords of those responsible for education.” The “goal”, he adds, in respect of 
teachers for the elementary schools is to “train on the spot” as well as possible, using for this 
purpose teachers “nearly all recruited from abroad and paid either by the government of 
Cyrenaica or the Federal Government.” C20)
II Secondary Education
“ There is considerable local demand for secondary schools in such places as Jefren and 
Horns. However, there is no need to establish a third secondary school in the immediate future 
- not until primary education has become more firmly established in the Eastern Province.” (*)
Having established two secondary schools in Tripolitania, one in Tripoli itself and the other at 
Zawia, which declared Higgins in 1951 were “flourishing”, both he and Professor Le 
Toumeau are able to agree on the urgent need in the immediate future to avoid further 
unnecessary expansion or expenditure in the secondary sphere, seeking rather to improve what 
already existed than adding more to the stock, f21)
Steele Greig would have taken some cheer perhaps from this advice without reflecting that 
it seemed more from retrenchment than reform as neither critics would have offered the olive 
branch of final approbation upon all the policies pursued to-date by the B.M.A. Even so 
whatever the circumstances and these were grim, the 1952-3 school budget permitted only 
very minor improvements in line with the advice so far rendered, and this included minor 
improvements to the two secondary schools in Tripoli and Zawia with no additions to the 
existing number of secondary schools. (22)
20 Ibid, p.222
* Le Toumeau, Op.cit.
21 Ibid, p.33
22 Ibid, pp.34-35
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As it was the existing two schools came under heavy criticism for being “too academic” for 
Libya’s needs, though they had been devised with the Egyptian Curriculum in mind since 
Tripolitania was still only at the level of the “Egyptian Syllabus”. C23) Confronted with the 
depressing reality of education as it really is in a developing country like Libya, where 
resources were virtually non-existent, and at a most critical juncture in its history, educational 
advisors seem to have no other option but to “think big”. Hence, while criticising the two new 
schools for being “too academic”, Higgins has no hesitation in going on to declare that “A vast
educational programme covering both age groups now active and, more particularly, the
rising generation” was now needed in the country. Not only that but given the federal structure 
of Libya, there will inevitably have to be three educational systems.” O24)
As it was, the new political system imposed upon the country was not only excessively 
expensive for a country living as close to the breadline as Libya, in the days before the 
discovery and commercial exploitation of oil on a sufficiently large enough scale to produce 
rising living standards in the country; but also a problem for development too, as the idea of 
federalism had of necessity to be incorporated into the educational system as well. Hence, if 
Triploitania, Cyrenaica and the Fezzan were to continue as before in the form of separate 
political entities, while part of the country proper, they would each need to have their own 
separate educational service.
Not only would this system be vastly expensive to maintain, especially in the educational 
sector, but it could easily perpetuate the situation bequeathed to the new state at independence, 
whereby Cyrenaica had all the cherries, Tripolitania the nuts but Fezzan only the straws. Thus 
Cyrenaica would have the full Egyptian Curriculum, Tripolitania only the “Egyptian Syllabus” 
and Fezzan possibly neither.
Le Toumeau, however, does not seem to have believed that the resulting imbalance in the 
development pattern of the country would necessarily be harmful, providing that “none of the
three discriminated against each other.” This could be avoided because “ each should be
able to train a proportion of the elite essential to the smooth functioning of each province and 
the state as a whole.” C25 ) This training of various elites would be via the new secondary 
schools, previously criticised as “too academic” for Libya’s needs for which three kinds were 
required. A) secondary schools proper, B) teachers’ training centres; C) Technical schools.
The development of the “secondary schools proper” were rightly envisaged as integral to the 
development of the country on the other. (26) This however, re-emphasised the essential 
philosophy, so to speak, of the advisors at this point in the development programme. This for 
the new government meant that there was no question of the over-multiplying of the new stock
23 Le Toumeau, Op.cit., p.28
24 Ibid
25 Le Toumeau, Op.cit., p. 114
26 Ib id , p.37
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of secondary schools”, because the yield from primary education was still only slight (as 
regards both quantity and quality) and the economic outlook for Libya still uncertain.” (P)
Due to Libya’s “uncertain” economic outlook and the limited financial resources for 
education, in common with many other developing countries on the African continent, limited 
access to secondary education was recommended. This was intended to ensure the “quality” 
aspect of secondary education. Only by adopting highly selective methods of entry would it be 
possible to produce the necessary elites for the proper running of the country. Otherwise, it 
would not be possible to maintain the “value of secondary studies.” The form of selection 
adopted, it was advised, would need to become increasingly “rigorous” as the number of 
candidates for secondary education increased. C28)
Thus the future pattern of educational progress in North Africa’s new federal monarchy 
was determined by a combination of financial stringency, due to the state’s inadequate 
resources; dependence upon Egyptian educational teachers and expertise, due to the failure in 
the past to produce an educated class with enough teachers to staff the schools; and a new 
version of Arab elitism with a view to maximising the potential of the existing limited quality 
resources at the secondary level, so as to produce a new governing class of Libyans for the 
future. In all these respects secondary education as advocated on the threshold of independence 
in Libya differed little in form or substance from that in operation in colonial dependencies 
elsewhere in Africa in a similar stage of transition to statehood. Libya, however, was very 
different as history would shortly reveal.
III. Vocational and Technical Education
“At present, technical training is limited by the general lack of education of the people. To 
make the training programmes effective, formal schooling must be extended and improved."
The opening of the new Technical Commercial School in Tripoli on 1 January 1951, although 
an important step for the future in the field of vocational education bears little in any 
relationship with what had or hadn't preceded it. Libya's adoption of the Egyptian Curriculum 
required such an institution, just as it required secondary schools, and eventually a university, 
but such developments were imposed by the independence settlement rather than being the fruit 
of a long and successful pattern of indigenous development. The latter had undoubtedly been 
the case in Cyrenaica following the demise of the Italian regime there but there had been no 
systematic parallel development in the sister province of Tripolitania under the B.M.A.
27 Ibid, p.33
28 Ibid, p.49
190
Instead under the B.M.A., Tripolitania possessed the School of Arts and Crafts set up by 
the Turks to teach a livelihood to orphans and the children of very poor families and restored to 
that function by the Department of Education in Tripoli under the aegis of A.J. Steele-Greig 
but virtually nothing else. To compensate for this the B.M.A had begun various training 
schemes for Libyans in the Departments and workshops of the Administration which were 
quite effective in training new personnel to replace departing British servicemen or Italians, 
increasingly leaving the territory during the middle and latter years of the Administration.
There were also various educational "nuclei" to facilitate the development of agricultural 
training and education in the schools in accordance with the requirements of the new 
curriculum. Otherwise, the B.M.A. for reasons already sufficiently explained like its Italian 
predecessor - if not because of its Italian predecessor - left no structural or institutional legacy 
in this area ( 29 ).
As independence approached and with it the demise of the B.M.A itself, the reason behind 
any attempt to develop vocational and technical training in the territory, apart form the 
requirements of the Egyptian Curriculum itself, lay in developing the future requirement in the 
form of skilled manpower. Yet in this respect, as it was then anticipated that "only a small 
number of technical and personal skilled personnel" would be required in the immediate 
future", there was no need, it appeared, to significantly develop this sector of education, 
especially when valuable resources were urgently needed elsewhere. (30). As far as the future 
running of the administration of the country was concerned, jobs were being created by the 
transfer of authority to the new Government of Libya and training schemes to facilitate this 
purpose had been in progress for some time already.
Instead of concentrating upon the training of personnel to replace the decaying B.M.A. or 
in the development of skilled manpower for an economy that had extremely limited 
requirements in this field, attention at the commencement of independence switched to 
agriculture. This was the main economy and agricultural production required a whole new 
approach to revitalise this most important sector. Educationally, recommendations were put to 
the government in 1951 that it was partly a matter of "introducing an agricultural bias into 
regular instruction in the primary schools, and partly a matter of establishing agricultural 
training centres, involving in Tripolitania, the improvement of facilities at Sidi-Mesri and in 
Cyrenaica at the Magdelena School near Bengasi." (31) The training of agricultural 
technicians at university level could only be achieved through "fellowships for study abroad" 
and 25 scholarships were suggested for this purpose. (32)
29 Ibid
20Ibid
31 Le Toumeau, p.84
32 Ibid
191
Recommendations for the future with regard to technical and vocational training were 
complex and extended, despite the belief that short-term needs should relate to continued 
Libyanisation measures. In these fields the concern was less with higher education and 
training, for which as with the agricultural technicians, the grant of fellowships to study 
abroad was the only course open, and more concerned with the training of artisans, for which 
the establishment of a network of workshop schools at the primary level was intended. Such 
programmes, however, would "require instructors, equipment for practical instruction, and 
building space. "(33)
These recommendations were summed up by Benjamin Higgins in his report for the 
Libyan Government for 1952 and as such compromise the agreed programme of such projects 
for the country, all aiming to provide the following "essentials of technical industrial training":
1) A network of school workshops within the framework of primary education will prepare 
students for further technical training;
2) Two technical industrial schools, one at Tripoli and one at Bengasi will train:
a) skilled workers for the basic trades;
b) junior technicians
3) The organisation of a Libyan technical instructors' training section attached to the industrial 
school at Tripoli;
4) The re-organisation of the Tripoli School of Arts and Crafts, if this school can be linked to 
the body responsible for defining and carrying out the handicrafts policy of the country."(34)
But at this point, with the mention of a further "reform" in connection with Tripoli's venerable 
School of Arts and Crafts, it is clear that a new and very different era has commenced. That 
associated with the former colonial regimes of Italy and the Military Administration of Britain 
is well and truly over.
33 Ibid, p.77
34 Ibid
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while latter was aWarden of Gordon Memorial College.
- R. A. Hodgkin to Appleton, Barreppa House, Falmouth, 13.8.1983
- a valuable letter about Cuthbert Scott, along with various enclosurers including a short poem- 8  
Stanzas by Scott, dated circa 1943 and an abstract of Hodgkin’s ideas on educational reform in the 
Sudan.
- Sir Maurice Lush, C.B.E., M.C., formerly Chief Civil Affairs Tripolitania, 1943 to Appleton, 
Carlton Mansions, London 10 June 1981- relates to writers query about Italian Archives in Libya at 
the start of the B.M.A. in 1943.
-Ibid. 22 April, 1983 - a somewhat enigmatic repost to the effect that Steele-Greig was the 
Brigadier’s own personal appointment as D. of E in 1943.
- Ibid., 6  Sept. 1985 - attempts to identify the various levels of educational responsibility in 
Tripolitania met with only a punctillious response from the Brigadier who clearly did not wish to 
co-operate with the project any further.
- C. Lea,alias “Sheilk Lea”, formerly Director of Education in Tripolitania (1951-52) to Appleton, 
Berwick Rd. Bournemouth, 31 July, 1982 - encloses an Obituary notice of Cuthbert Scott from the 
Times of 1978, along with the former’s c.v. giving details of educational posts.
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- Sheilk Lea to Appleton, Bournemouth, 17 August .1982
-Ibid, 19 July,1983
-Ibid, 26 July 1983
-Ibid, 3 August 1993
-Ibid 5 FEb. 1984 - relates to Christopher Tracey’s death and the cancellation of the interview
- Capt. N.F. Pengelly, formerly Grade III Assistant to Steele-Greig at the Department of Education to 
Appleton, Hartely Hill, Surrey, 2 August 1982. - A most uncooperative response after first 
agreeing to meet me. Penegelly who was operative between 1946-50 in a most sensitive post 
disclaimed any responsibility fot the running of the Department, being only “the Number Two”
- J.B. Segal (Prof), Edgeware Middx, 14 July 1980 to Appleton - nothing out of significance (as 
Captain Segal he was predecessor to Penegally at the Dept of Education in Tripoli for the year 
1945. Steele-Greig, however, was not impressed with his performance having, on one occasion to 
rescue him from getting linched from a mob in the city during the pogrom on 1945)
- A.J. Steele-Greig (major rtd) formerly Director of Education for Tripolitania (1943-51), El- 
Alamein, St. James, Barbados, 10 Jan 1882 - relates forthcomming visit to Barbados for purposes 
ofc conducting a wide-rangind interview based upon all aspects of Education in Tripolitania under 
the B.M.A. Steele -Greig warns that Barbados is “very expensive” in whivh was right.
-Ibid 1 1th Feb. 1982. (ditto)
-Ibid 9 June, 1982 (ditto)
-Ibid 6  Aug, 1982 (2 page typed letter containing A. J. Steele-Greig’s reactions to comments made by 
Travers Blackely during my recent visit to latter in Ireland, reveals that relations between them had 
been far from cordial, if not extremely bitter.)
-Ibid, 5 Sept, 1981 - relates to forthcomming visit to Barbados along with some comments in 
connection with relative merits of Penegelly and “Sheikh” Lea.
-Ibid, 10 Oct 1981 - Steele-Greig formerly offers his cooperation over the production of the Thesis.
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-Ibid, 5 Dec 1982 - final arrangements for the visit to Barbados scheduled for Christmas and New 
Year, 1982-3 while writer was working in Libya.
-Ibid, 8  March 1987 - a single-page typed sheet giving details of Steele-Greig’s participation in the 
School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli and his attitude towards the institution.
-Ibid, 1 May 1983 - Single-page typed letter, dealing with issues raised during the interwiew of Dec- 
JAn 1982-83 in Barbados with comments on Steele-Greig’s poor state of health at this time
-Ibid, 7 August, 1983 - contains Steele-Greigs c.v.
-Ibid, 12 Feb 1984
-Ibid, 22 July 1984 - pinpoints changes in policy during 1948-49 and details the role of the U.S. 
Point-Four Programme in providing funds for education in Libya.
-Ibid, 22 June 1984
-Ibid, 1 June 1985
-Ibid, 1 Jan 1987
-Ibid, 21 Jan, 1987 - Single page typed sheet, detailing policy objectives of the B.M.A. in 
Tripolitania, and policy regarding employment of teachers from Egypt.
Interviews with Former Official and Personnel of the B.M.A. in Libya
-Sir Duncan Cummings K.B.E., C.B. Jan 1980 at the Royal Geographical Society of which he had 
been president.- handwritten notes taken of the occasion which was not particularly fruitful as most 
of the topics had already been covered by our extensive correspondance to-date.(Sir Duncan made 
interesting remarks about J.B. Segals wartime role behind the German lines in Tripoli.)
-Sir Norman Anderson O.B.E., 23 oct at 3.30 pm in the Department of Advanced Legal Studies, 
London University, 17 Russell Square. Sir Norman Launched upon a 90 minute uninterrupted 
monologue of the B.M.A., from which 7 pages of handwritten notes were taken. This was an 
outstanding performance by a retired man with a heart condition.
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-Mr E.V. De Candole C.B.E., Shootwood, Bistem Hants, 18th Dec 1981. On this and subsequent 
occasions the writer was Mr De Cadole’s weekend guest and so able to avail himself of Mr De 
Candole’s unrivalled scholarship and expertese upon Libya and Cyrenaica especially. 5 pages of 
notes.
-Brigadier T.R. Blackley C.B.E., Gurrane Co. Cork, Ireland 4-5 April, 1982. A most fortunaye 
occasion when the writer was enabled to stay with the Blackney’s as their weekend guest which 
presented a one and only opportunity to gamer information upon a wide variety of topics connected 
with their stay in Tripoli. (7 pages of notes and References).
-Major AJ. Steele Greig, El Alemein, St. James’s, Barbados, West Indies, Dec-Jan 1981 - over a 
week due to Steele-Greig’s general indisposition, following his return from his annual visit to 
Caracas, where he owned a school. This resulted in Final secessions being conducted in his sick 
room. However, despite his fragile condition from which he later recovered Steele-Greig agreed to 
conduct our conversations in this way. This was regretably vital if the occasion was to be at all 
profitable as it turned out to be enabling us to covera wide range of tipics connected with his 
tenureship of the Directorship of Education in Tripoli between 1943-51.
-Mr C.A.E. Lea (‘Sheikh Lea”), July 1983, Talbot Woods, Bournemouth - a most pleasant Weekend 
spent with Mr and Mrs Lea at their home in Bournemouth. Unfortunately, as most of “Sheikh’s” 
experience has been in the Sudan, he had little to say of relevance to Libya. This visit was 
nonetheless important as “Sheikh” Lea was the last of “Blackley’s buddies” and a personal friend of 
Cuthbert Scott, besides being the last D. of E. appointed by Blackney. He was able to cast light 
upon his sudden dismissal by the Mufti of Tripoli, (no record taken except for photograph)
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Appendicies
Appendix A: Relating to the growth of the Muslim schools and teachers
under the B.M.A. (1943-1950)
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Appendix B: Comparison of Italian and British Periods
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Appendix C: Schools under the B.M.A. (1950)
APPENDIX C 
E D U C A T I O N
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Tripoli City + ..............................................
Western Province .
T o t a l
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Primary Education 
Tripoli City.
Tripoli Province .
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Eastern Province.
Western Province
T o t a l
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B. A. Italian Schools 
Secondary Education .
Tripoli C ity ........................................................
Eastern Province.....................................
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Primary Education
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Tripoli Province • 
Central Province* 
Eastern Province. 
Western Province
T o t a l
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British School . .
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Appendix D: Schools under the Ottoman Occupation
[CS:
Total
Pupils
60
90
16
551
545
146
254
152
648
577
607
625
880
532
860
979
868
995
1100
1091
1203
1118
1329
1469
Appendix 2
I’ALIAN SCHOOLS DURING  OTTOMAN OCCUPATION
Infant
Schools
126
124
228
117
121
165
181
177
207
207
208 
269 
208 
258 
235 
268 
258 
213 
239 
252 
275
1
BOYS PRIMARY GIRLS
PRIMARY
SECONDARY
TECHNICAL-COMMERCIAL
Day Evening Total Italian Others
60 
90 • ■■W
— — — —
— ■■i ■■ .i
t
— 16 10 6
162 180 | 162 17 8 9
284 . 1 1 3 7 20 12 8
7 7 22 12 10
? ? 7 26 14 12
? ? ?' 35 15 20
178 157 150 42 24 18
152 ? 210 50 25 25
152. 9 i 224 50 19 31
160 ? ! 236 52 23 29
154 185 284 50 19 31
? 7 I 287 38 16 22
160 139 322 41 16 25
198 166 302 44 17 27
247 57 310 46 14 32
326 88 280 43 16 27
364 148 301 52 20 32
338 148 289 48 14 34
394 198 306 47 15 32
385 125 340 55 19 36
453 241 340 56 23 32
463 335 348 71 25 46
433 208 348 63 23 40
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Appendix E: Schools under the Italian Occupation
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Appendix F: Schools under the Italian Occupation (1921-1939)
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Appendix G: Schools under the British Occupation (1943-1948)
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Appendix H: Administration of the Arab Schools under the B.M.A. in
Tripolitania
Appendix 7
ADMINISTRATION ARAB SCHOOLS — TRIPOLITANIA
S U P E R V I S O R
S E C O N D A R Y
S C H O O L S
Tripoli
Zavia
Zuara
Nalufc
I N S P E C T O R T E A C H E R S
KDRANIC ; — T R A I N I N G
SCHOOLS SCHOOL
I N S P E C T R E S S
GIRLS
SCHOOLS
INSPECTOR 
T R I P O L I  C I T Y  
and PROVINCE
H E A D - M A S T E R
Sc. Zavia 
Bab Akara
INSPECTOR 
W ESTERN PROVINCE
I N S P E C T O R  
C E N T R A L  P R O V I N C E
SUB-INSPECTOR
j
j SUB-INSPECTOR
GARIAN j JEFREN
Bughcilan ii Gagina
Bu Maad U1 El Gcrsan
Assaba Gadu
Kikla Rcbihat
Mizda Rogiban
Beni Califa Zintan
Iliaina
SUB-INSPECTOR
ZAVIA
Bir Tcrrina 
E l Hascian 
E l Maia 
Saycd 
Sorman 
Sirli Bu Isa 
Bu Rcisha 
Mamura
INSPECTOR 
E A S T E R N  P R O V I N C E
i SUB-INSPECTOR
SUB-INSPECTOIl MIS UR AT A
NALUT lion
Cabao Sirto
Birgliighila Tauorga
Uazin Zavict Mahg
Tamzin Misti rata Mar.
Ap p e n d ix  8
ADMINISTRATION ITALIAN (JEWISH) SCHOOLS — TRIPOLITANIA
S U P E R V I S O R
S E CONDARY
SCHOOLS
ASST. INSPECTOR 
TRIPOLI PROVINCE 
EAST
Aingila 
Bir Sbabil 
Cos tel Benito 
Castel Verdo 
Collina Verdo 
Mellaha 
Miani 
Sghedeida 
Sidi Hesri 
Suk El Giuma 
Tagiura
I N S P E C T O R
WE S T E R N P R O V I N C E
SUB-INSPECTOR
BIANCIII
Bianehi West
El Haseian
Bir Terrina
Giordani
Micca
SUB-INSPECTOR
TIGRINNA
Bu Maad
Garian
Sghaief
P R I M A R Y  S CHOOL S  
C H I E F  I N S P E C T O R
T R I P O L I  CI TY
ASST. INSPECTOR 
TRIPOLI PROVINCE 
WEST
Ala Zara 
Axizia
Fondok Togar
Gargarcsh
Gurgi
Pt. Azizia
Sabotinia
Suani ben Adem
Um El Adem
I N S P E C T O R
E A S T E R N  P R O V I N C E  
%
SUB-INSPECTOR
TARIIUNA
Abbiar Miggi 
Brerigiicri 
Casr Daum 
Marconi
SUB INSPECTOR 
IIOMS
Corradini 
Fonduk AUush 
Kusaabath 
Valdagnc 
Zliten
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Appendix J: Syllabus authorised in Arab Schools
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Appendix K: Syllabus authorised for Italian Primary Schools
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Appendix L: Syllabus authorised for Italian Secondary Schools
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Appendix M: Timetable for the School Year 1950
II. WEEKLY TIME-TABLE FO R  PRIMARY SCHOOLS 
IN  TRIPOLTTAN jCA
Subjects
Number o f lessons per week 
(each lesson lasts 4 5  minutes)
istyear 2ndytar 3 rdyear 4 thyear sthyear 6 thyear
Koran and religion 3 3 4 4 3 3
Arabic speech and writing . 12 . 12 10 9 9 9
Singing and music — — 1 1 1 1
Arithmetic . . . . 6 6 6 6 5 5
Practical geometry — — — — 1 1
History and civics — — 1 2 2 3
Geography . . . — — ■ 2 2 2 2
Elementary natural science. 3 3 2 2 2 2
Hygiene . . . . — — — - — — 1 1
Drawing . . . . 3 3 2 2 2 2
Practical work 3 3 2 2 2 1
Physical education and
games . . . 6 6 6 6 6 6
Total 36 36 36 36 36 36
H I. DAILY TIME-TABLE O F SCHOOLS IN  TRIPOLITANIA
Recreation
First
lesson
Second
lesson
Third
lesson
and
physical
education
Fourth
lesson
Fifth
lesson
Morning time-table 
3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th  year 
classes) . . . . 8.05 8.50
1
9.35 10.20 11.05 11.50
to to to to to to
8.50 9.35 10.20 11.05 11.50 1235
!fiemoon time-table (summer) 
1st and 2nd years) 1.00 1.45 230 3.15 4.00 4.45
to to to to to to
1.45 2.30 3.15 4.00 4.45 5.30
1ftemoon time-table (winter) 
from 15 November to end of 
February) 1.00 1.40 2.20 3.00 3.15 3.55
to to to to to to
1.40 2.20 3.00 3.15 3.55 4.35
57
c a t io n  c o u r s e  at b i t i i  IV icsi'i ^ L i o / a u  i J e v c t o c m c u L  i i g d i c y ; :  D o a r u c i s ,  o u m ,
lo be d e c i d e d  later.
kalian for Girls
juipmcnt of the Tripoli teachers’ training centre: Laboratories, sports equipment and 
library (at the expense of LATAS), £3,800.
rganizaiion of a summer course in the above centre (at the expense of the Libyan 
Development Agency or of LATAS): M aintenance of boarders, £ 110; Teachers’ 
salaries, not yet fixed.
nding, by Uncsco, of a woman expert on girh! education and kindergartens. 
mral Education
0
nding by Uncsco of an expert to study tin: problem of the education of nomadic 
peoples.
nding by Uncsco of an expert on agricultural training and manual work, 
nding by Uncsco of an expert to organize instruction in physical education, 
rganization of medical inspection in schools and of assistance to under-nourished 
children: arrangements to be decided by W HO.
rganization by Uncsco of the Tripoli production centre for textbooks and educational 
equipment.
id t Education
nding by Uncsco of an expert to study the problem and propose solutions, 
rganization, with Uncsco’s assistance, of schoo!. and popular libraries a t Suk cl-Gium, 
Garian, Zavia and M isurata.
'.ondary Education
Iditional equipment for the secondary schools in Zavia, Tripoli and Benghazi (cost 
lo be distributed between the Libyan Development Agency and LATAS), £9,200. 
irmation of new classes in these schools: Staff* (at the expense of the governments), 
£7,040.
crease in the number of boarders (at the expense of the governments), £ 1,850. 
tablishmcnt of a  secondary class a t Dcrna: Staff* (at the government’s expense), 
£1,944; Library (at the expense of LATAS), £500.
X I. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDED GOVERNM ENT 
AND EXPENDITURE ASSISTANCE REQUESTED FO R 1952-53
S U M M A R Y  O F  A S S IS T A N C E  R E Q U E S T E D  F R O M  U N E S C O
F O R  T H E  Y E A R  «9 5 2 " 5 3
tiding o f  Experts
1 order of priority: 1 expert for the establishment of the teachers’ training centre a t 
Benghazi; 1 woman expert for girls’ education and for kindergartens; 1 expert on 
adult education; 1 expert on physical education; 1 expert on agricultural training and 
manual work; 1 expert on the education of 1:0 riadtc peoples.
Appendix N: Timetable for Teachers’ Centre (1950)
IV. WEEKLY TIME-TABLE OF TH E TRIPO LI TEACHERS’
TRAINING CENTRE
Subject
Number o f lessons per week 
(each lesson lasting 4 5  minutes)
Firstyear Second year Thirdyear
Arabic ................................. 6 6 6
R e l i g i o n ................................ 2 2 2
E n g l i s h ................................ 5 5 5
Mathematics . 5 5 5
Physics and chemistry 
Practical work
2 2 2
(physics and chemistry) l 1 l 1
B i o l o g y ................................ 2 2 2
Practical work in biology . l l 1» l l
History . . . . . 3 3 3
G eo g rap h y ................................ 2 2 2
C iv ic s ......................................... 2 — —
A g ricu ltu re ................................ 2 1 1
Practical work in  agriculture 1* l 1 l l
Physical education 2 1 1
D r a w i n g ................................. 1 1 1
Educational theory 2* 6 6
Educational practice . — 41 41
T o t a l ................................
1 Afternoon.
* Child psychology.
* Three in afternoon.
4 Seven in afternoon.
39* 434 434
Appendix O: Timetable for Women’s Teachers’ Training Centre (1950)
V. WEEKLY TIME-TABLE OF THE YOUNG WOMEN’S TEACHERS’
TRAINING CENTRE
• Number o f lessons per week
Subject (each lesson lasting 4 5  minutes)
First year Second year
rab ic ................................................................ 8 8
a g l i s h ........................................................ 8 7
e l i g i o n ........................................................ 2 2
a th e x n a t ic s ................................................ 6 5
istory . ................................................ 2 2
eegraphy ........................................................ 2 1
ementary s c ie n c e s ........................................ 2 2
f g i c n e ........................................................ 1 1
fant w e l f a r e ................................................ — 1
jmestic s c i e n c e ........................................ • 4
sedlework........................................................ 2 —
t a w i n g ........................................................ 2 1
ychology........................................................ 1
lysical education and singing . . . . 1 1
T o t a l ........................................................ 36 36
• 
•a .... -  Budget for Tripolitanian Ministry of Education (1950)
VI. BUDGET OF TH E  TRIPOLITANIAN M INISTRY OF EDUCATION FOR
THE YEARS 1951-52 AND 1952-53 (English text supplied by the Director of Education)
Period
Items /  Apr. 1 9 5 1  to
3 t  Dec. 1 9 5  r
1 Jan.1 9 5 2  
to
3 1  Mar. 1 9 5 2
z Apr. 1 9 9 2  
to
3 1  Mar. 1 9 3 3
£ £ £
Personal Emoluments
Ministerial staff1 ................................ 1 ,2 0 0 400 1,600
U.K.-based s ta f f ................................. 3,910 1,500 6 ,0 0 0
Imported s t a f f ................................ 17,600 1 0 ,0 0 0 50,550
Locally engaged staff* . 171,8003 48,010 212,180
Total (Personal emoluments) . 194,510 59,910 270,330
Other Charges
G rant to religious (R.C.) schools3 2,250 750 3,000
Textbooks4 ......................................... 5,500 2 0 0 1 0 ,0 0 0
Purchase of school equipment4 . 9,500 400 12,600
G rant to K uttab schools1 750 250 1 ,0 0 0
Detention and travelling allowances4 230 1 0 0 400
English instruction classes7. 600 2 0 0 800
G rant to Jewish schools1 300 — —
Technical training college1. 7,500 3,375 12,125
Teacher training colleges10. 3,450 2,550 9,125
Adult illiterate classes11 2,720 900 3,60C
Library books1 1 ................................ 250 65 250
Repairs to school buildings13 700 250 1 ,0 0 0
Secondary schools boarding14 5,460 4,225 13,600
Grants and bursaries15 3,270 1 , 0 0 0 7,000
Educational magazine14 300 1 0 0 2 0 0
Sundries1 7 ......................................... 180 60 300
Hire of Transport1* . . . . — 1 0 0 400
Total (O ther charges) 42,960 14,525 75,400
Special Expenditure1* 
Miscellaneous equipment10 1 1 , 0 0 0 700
•
6,800
Arabic reading books31 3,000 ——• 4.000
2 . 0 0 0English school3 3 ................................ — 500
Total (Special expenditure) 14,000 1 ,2 0 0 12,800
Total (M inistry of Education). 251,470 75,635 358,530
1 Allows for imported U.K.-based teachers of 
English.
2 Includes the salaries of the teachers of Ital­
ian primary schools up to 30 Sept. 195X.
2 Schools, mostly kindergarten, run by nuns 
and attended by all nationals.
4 Text books, exercise books, and all expend­
able equipment, issued free to students. 
Enormous increase in cost of paper.
* Grant towards cost of running Moslem 
religious (Kbranic) schools.
8 Expenses incurred by inspectors, etc., on 
tour.
7 Salaries of teachers at English evening 
classes.
8 Similar to item 2 above, ceasing with 
Jewish exodus.
9 Allowances paid to each student in lieu of 
boarding.
10 Cost of boarding students at two teacher 
training colleges.
60
• 
•‘ ’* ~ Draft Budget for Cyrenaican Mininstry of Education (1952-
1953)
VII. DRAFT BUDGET OF TH E CYRENAICAN M INISTRY OF EDUCATION
FO R THE YEiAR 1952-53
Budget item Amount
£
Personal em olum ents.........................................................................................  152,157-
Detention a llo w an ce .........................................................................................  800
Boarding schools; food, laundry, cleaning, etc. . ................................  59,680
Books and m a te r ia ls ............................................................................................... 11,050
Technical education and courses a b ro a d ............................................................... 10,758
Grants: Zawias and Koranic schools.........................................................................7,865
Grants: community s c h o o l s .................................................................................3,075
Gleaning materials  .................................................................  550
S u n d r i e s .........................................................................................................  150
Furniture and e q u ip m e n t....................................................................................... 19,091
Agricultural school: stock and e q u i p m e n t ........................................   . 500
School gardening s c h e m e .................................................................................  —
Technical education, materials  ......................................................................... 1,300
Special courses, Cyrcnaican p e r s o n n e l ................................................................. 1,800
Refund Arabic tuidon fees.................................................................................  150
Courses for Cyrenaican t e a c h e r s ................................................   3,950
Examination f e e s ........................................................................................   300
Total (E d u c a tio n ).........................................................................................  273,176
VIII. LIST OF SCHOOLS IN THE FEZZAN ALREADY OPEN OR 
ABOUT TO OPEN IN THE SCHOOL YEAR 1951-52
The attendances in the following localities were: Brach, 63 (including 20 boarders); 
Murzuk, 39; Dar el-Bey, 90 (including 27 boarders); Ouenzerik, 45; Agar, 15; Bend 
Bcya, 13; Ghadames, 105; Deij, 35; Sinaouen, 39; Ghat, 83; ElBarkat, 20; a  total of 544. 
Schools to be opened: Edri, Berguen, Oum cl Araneb, Tamezaoua.
11 Originally teachers’ salaries. Now concen­
trating on production of books.
12 Central library and reference libraries in 
colleges.
13 Only minor and urgent repairs. Major 
works done by PWD.
14 Two resident secondary schools.
13 Expenses of students attending course 
abroad.
18 A local production.
17 Cleaning materials, etc.
13 Required when government resources are 
inadequate.
13 Capital outlay.
70 Includes school furniture and other non­
expendable equipment.
71 Provision of reading rooms in oudying 
areas.
iS Proposed fee-paying English-speaking 
school for all nationals.
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Appendix R: Fezzan’s Educational Budget (1952-3)
IX . TH E FEZZAN’S EDUCATIONAL BUDGET FO R THE YEAR 1952
(Draft submitted for approval)
Item French francs
Staff Salaries 
Item  I
1 director (65,000 x  1 2 ) .................................................................._ 780,0C0
1 secretary (13,000 X 1 2 ) .................................................................  156,0C0
Item  II
5 french teachers (35,000 X12 x  5 ) ................................................   2,100,000
6 native teachers (35,000  X 12 x  6) .................................................  2,520,000
10 monitors1 (7,000 x  12 X 1 0 ) .........................................................  840,000
6,396,000
Purchase and Maintenance o f E q u ip m e n t.................................................  50,000
School S u p p lie s ..........................................................................................  250,000
School Canteens  .........................................................  900,000
1,200,000
1 The exact salary of the future monitors training in Algiers has not yet been fixed, but it vnll 
certainly be more than 10,000 francs a month.
A sum of 20,000,000 francs has also been estimated for school buildings and cultural 
missions.
X. SUMMARY OF PROPOSED PRO JECTS FO R TH E SCHOOL YEAR 1952-53
Training o f Teachers
Establishment of a  centre in Benghazi widi school annex: Staff: 1 director (Uncsco ex­
pert); 5 teachers paid by the government, £4,000; 4 teachers in the school annex, 
paid by the government, £ 1,000; domestic staff paid by the government, amount net 
fixed. Buildings: construction or conversion of the buildings required (to be financed 
by the Libyan Development Agency), am ount not fixed. Equipment: Library (at 
Unesco’s expense), £500; Laboratories, sports equipment (at the expense of 
LATAS), £3,300; Maintenance of boarders (at the government’s expense), £ 1,460.
Supplementary equipment for the Sidi Mesri centre: Purchase of library books (at 
Unesco’s expense), £200; Laboratories, sports equipment (at the expense of LATAE't), 
£3,300.
Establishment of a school annex for the Sidi Mesri centre: Staff (at the expense of the 
government), £1,000; Buildings: construction and furnishing of 4 classrooms (at the 
expense of the Libyan Development Agency), amount not fixed.
Establishment of a senior section in the Sidi Mesri centre: Staff (at the government’s 
expense), £3,400; Maintenance of boarders (at the government’s expense), £i,too; 
Buildings: alterations to be decided later (at the expense of the Libyan Development 
Agency), amount not fixed; Equipment: addidons to equipment to be decided later 
(at the expense of LATAS).
